

Atlantic  
initiative

# THE NEW LURE OF THE SYRIAN WAR - THE FOREIGN FIGHTERS' BOSNIAN CONTINGENT

by Vlado Azinović and Muhamed Jusić  
Sarajevo, 2016.



**Dr. Vlado Azinović** is an associate professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo.

**Muhamed Jusić** is a theologian and columnist.



**NORWEGIAN EMBASSY**



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft  
Confédération suisse  
Confederazione Svizzera  
Confederaziun svizra

**Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA**

This project was supported by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed herein are those of the authors and the Atlantic Initiative and do not necessarily reflect those of any government.

Copyright © 2016 The Atlantic Initiative. All Rights Reserved.

by Vlado Azinović and Muhamed Jusić

---

# **THE NEW LURE OF THE SYRIAN WAR - THE FOREIGN FIGHTERS' BOSNIAN CONTINGENT**

---

Sarajevo, 2016.



---

# CONTENTS

---

Table of figures .....	7
Acknowledgment.....	9
Introduction .....	9
Methodology .....	10
Key findings and recommendations .....	11
Findings.....	11
Recommendations.....	14
The foreign fighter phenomenon .....	17
Foreign fighters from the Western Balkans.....	18
The foreign fighters' Bosnian contingent in Syria & Iraq .....	20
Official estimates .....	20
Unofficial estimate .....	22
Demography of the phenomenon: Key trends and patterns.....	26
Gender and age distribution.....	26
Bosnian Children in Syria and Iraq .....	29
Fatalities.....	31
Patterns of travel.....	31
Geography of the phenomenon .....	35
Ties to the diaspora .....	38
Pre-departure criminality .....	40
Socio-economic factors .....	44
The Bosnian community in Syria and Iraq.....	46
Motives for departure .....	50
Ideological preparation and recruitment for departures .....	52
General characteristics of the radicalization process.....	52
The family dynamics of radicalization.....	53
Factors of radicalization .....	56
The recruitment power of and radicalization among Bosnian diaspora .....	57
Mental health.....	61
Salafi settlements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	65
Para-jamaats.....	67
Developments in Syria and Iraq reflected in the Bosnian salafi community.....	69
The ISIL narrative .....	72
The internet and social media networks.....	74
Criminalization and prevention .....	78
Bosnian law enforcement agencies and the BiH prosecutor's office.....	78
Efforts across the Western Balkans.....	80
Prevention.....	81
Possible security threats to Bosnia and Herzegovina .....	83
Returnees .....	83
"Unaccomplished émigrés" .....	84
BiH in ISIL's plans .....	87
The final assessment .....	88
A closing thought.....	92
Annex 1. Albania.....	93
Annex 2. Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	106
Annex 3. Croatia.....	127
Annex 4. Kosovo .....	142
Annex 5. Montenegro.....	156
Selected bibliography .....	188



## TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Western Balkan foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq (December 2015).....	18
Figure 2. Western Balkan foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq (April 2016) .....	19
Figure 3. Bosnian contingent in Syria and Iraq (December 2012-December 2015).....	23
Figure 3a. Bosnian men in Syria and Iraq (December 2012-December 2015) .....	24
Figure 4. Bosnian contingent in Syria and Iraq in January 2016 .....	25
Figure 6. The average age of women from BiH in Syria and Iraq .....	27
Figure 7. Bosnian children in Syria and Iraq.....	30
Figure 8. Bosnian children in Syria and Iraq.....	30
Figure 9. Patterns of travel for men (2012-2015).....	32
Figure 10. Patterns of travel for women (2012-2015).....	32
Figure 11. Overall patterns of travel (2012-2015) .....	33
Figure 12. Overall patterns of travel for men (2012-2015) .....	33
Figure 13. Overall patterns of travel for women (2012-2015) .....	34
Figure 14. Vehicles used for road trips to Syria .....	34
Figure 15. BiH citizens in Syria and Iraq by registered residence .....	36
Figure 16. Breakdown by canton.....	37
Figure 17. Previous affiliation with known Salafi communities.....	37
Figure 18. Residential areas with the largest number of individual departures.....	38
Figure 19. Ties to the Bosnian Diaspora in the West.....	39
Figure 20. Links to Diaspora: Breakdown by country.....	39
Figure 22. Life in Syria.....	47
Figure 23. Life in Syria.....	47
Figure 24. "The Sand of Damascus".....	49
Figure 25 . Ines Midžić, aka Salahuddin al-Bosni.....	85





## Acknowledgment

This study would not be possible without the support of the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation. The authors feel a special need to thank the State Investigation and Protection Agency, the Intelligence and Security Agency, the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Police Administration, the Police of Republika Srpska, and the Brčko District Police for their understanding and support. We are also greatly indebted to our colleagues and friends in security agencies in Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.

The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed herein are those of the authors and the Atlantic Initiative and do not necessarily reflect those of any government.

Copyright © 2016 The Atlantic Initiative. All Rights Reserved.

## Introduction

The departure of citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to battlefields in Syria and Iraq, and the possibility of their return, is obviously worrying; but this is not the most immanent security threat facing BiH, which continues to be constrained by a peace agreement that embodied rather than resolved the fundamental dispute at the heart of the 1992-1995 war – whether the country should be united or divided – and resulted in a sort of socio-political purgatory. This extension of the war by peaceful means not only determines political, social, and economic dynamics in the country, but also limits its capacity to effectively respond to almost any challenge. In this way, the failure of the state in itself produces a number of security risks.

Still, individual and group departures to foreign battlefields are not a direct consequence of these dynamics. The foreign fighter phenomenon is instead the localization of a global trend that is thriving in certain contexts. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, this has meant that a country that was once a destination for foreign fighters in the 1990s has now become a country of their origin.

In mid-2015, the Atlantic Initiative published a study examining the foreign fighter phenomenon in BiH. A year later, we believe there are new developments that merit another look. For example, we have seen a shift in the motives driving people to depart for Syria and Iraq.

## Methodology

Research conducted from the middle of 2015 through the spring of 2016 was based on limited access to police and judicial files and open sources, as well as a series of research interviews with police officers, prosecutors, and diplomats. Due to the sensitive nature of our research and their professional responsibilities, almost all interviewees asked to speak on the condition of anonymity. As researchers, we strive to clearly identify sources; but, acknowledging the need for anonymity in this case, we chose to protect the identities of interviewees.

As for the individuals whose activities and personal backgrounds were the subject of this research, we identified them only in cases when, a) they revealed their identities themselves (during online activities on social networks, for instance), b) their identities were published in the media, or c) they were identified in public, after arrests in police raids or when they were prosecuted before the Court of BiH.

---

## KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

---

### Findings

- ▶ The departures of Bosnian citizens to Syria and Iraq continued throughout 2015 but at a slower pace. The trend almost completely stopped by early 2016.
- ▶ Except for a few cases of the extradition of Bosnian citizens from prisons in Turkey, returns from Syria and Iraq ceased completely in 2015. This could be attributed to a change in ISIL's rhetoric and a generally new understanding of the conflict – as not only *jihad* but also *hijra* (migration). In response to this call and based on their own understanding of developments in Syria and Iraq, entire Bosnian families are migrating there; and many have no intention of ever returning.
- ▶ Both departures and returns were probably reduced as a result of intensified efforts aimed at the criminal prosecution of aspiring fighters and returnees from Syria and Iraq. This reduction could also be attributed to developments in the territories under ISIL's control, which are now more difficult to enter and leave from.
- ▶ The numbers of Bosnians estimated to be in Syria and Iraq in this report may differ slightly from official estimates. This is because the Bosnian contingent in Syria and Iraq was analyzed in this research as a clan (or community of clans) that includes citizens of other countries (Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia) – typically spouses or people who originate from Bosnia and Herzegovina but for a variety of reasons do not have Bosnian citizenship or travel documents. BiH authorities, on the other hand, limit their assessments mostly just to individuals who hold Bosnian citizenship, for it is this status which provides these officials the legal grounds to criminally prosecute such individuals.
- ▶ A partial analysis of police databases and open sources has established the identities of 188 men, 61 women, and 81 children who are believed to have travelled to Syria and Iraq, from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from the Bosnian diaspora, between December 2012 and December 2015.
- ▶ By January 2016, 47 men had returned, 50 had been killed, and 91 were believed to remain in Syria and Iraq.
- ▶ A total of 8 women have thus far returned, one has been killed, and 52 remain.
- ▶ Since 2013, at least 80 children have either been taken from BiH to Syria and Iraq by their parents or have been born in these countries to parents from BiH.
- ▶ At least 39 married couples, as well as 12 widows with 24 children, are now believed to be in Syria and Iraq.

- ▶ By the end of 2015, some 91 men, 52 women, and 80 children were believed to comprise the Bosnian contingent in Syria and Iraq.
- ▶ Only 45% of the Bosnian contingent currently in Syria and Iraq (as of April 2016) are men of military age. The remaining 55% are non-combatants – women and children – although it is reported that some children as young as 14 have joined ISIL's combat units.
- ▶ The average age of men upon departure from BiH has been 31, but the most common age among those departing has been 22. Of those believed to be in Syria and Iraq now, roughly one half are thought to be married.
- ▶ On average, Bosnian women have been 31 years of age upon departure. Among women, the most common age of those departing has been 24. A vast majority of women have already been married upon arrival in Syria and Iraq, and of those now in these countries, some 94% percent are married.
- ▶ Compared to contingents from other countries, the Bosnian contingent in Syria and Iraq is older and includes far more women (36%, which is double the European average). This is due to the migration (*hijra*) of entire families – sometimes three generations.
- ▶ One in four Bosnians that has reached Syria and Iraq has been killed.
- ▶ The majority (94%) of people who have made this journey from BiH have come from the BiH Federation, mostly from Tuzla, Sarajevo, and the Zenica region. Just 4% have come from the Republika Srpska, and 1% from the Brčko District. One in five have come from the diaspora.
- ▶ More than one quarter (26%) of the Bosnian men who have departed for Syria and Iraq had been prosecuted or sentenced in BiH or abroad prior to their departures.
- ▶ While a unique profile of the typical Bosnian foreign fighter remains elusive, there are commonalities that can be understood as patterns, primarily: (1) links to Bosnian diaspora in the EU (particularly in Austria and Germany), and (2) pre-departure criminality. Other common features include poor education, unemployment, dysfunctional or broken families, and mental health issues.
- ▶ Motives for migration to Syria and Iraq include a mixture of personal drivers alongside overarching ideological incentives. Typically, people who have departed have escaped something – unhappy marriages, domestic violence, debt, criminal prosecution, alcohol and drug abuse – or have sought something, such as a spouse, an adventure, or belonging and purpose in life; and, at the same time, they have complied with what they see as a divine order.
- ▶ Radicalization and recruitment for departures to Syria and Iraq was once centered in traditional Salafi strongholds in remote areas of the country (Gornja Maoča, Dubnica, Ošve, Liješnica, etc.), but is now moving into new and less formal communities and congregations that have mushroomed over the last couple of years in and around major cities like Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla. A whole network of small businesses, community centers, and charities are facilitating

this effort from a financial standpoint, with a number of “pop-up” mosques providing spiritual guidance.

- ▶ The radicalization and recruitment process is occurring by and large within family and friend circles, during social gatherings that take place in the privacy of people’s homes. These gatherings amount to “illegal” or “parallel” mosques, or “para-jamaats,” as the official Islamic Community of BiH has labeled them, and are now considered by many as hotbeds of radicalization and recruitment in BiH, but also in Albania, Kosovo, and FYR Macedonia.
- ▶ In addition to the establishment of a parallel religious community, these groups are gradually setting up parallel structures in other vital areas, such as in education and healthcare, thus filling the gaps left by the failing BiH state and by public services plagued by incompetence, corruption, and nepotism.
- ▶ The radicalization process typically begins through an initiation with a “human touch,” meaning a personal interaction with a figure of authority. It is then followed by peer-to-peer interaction, often in congregation with like-minded individuals, where a very specific worldview is reinforced through group dynamics.
- ▶ The role of social media and the Internet in individual cases of radicalization appears to be only tertiary in importance, serving as a force multiplier.
- ▶ The most critical stage in the radicalization process – especially for the youngest recruits – is physical separation from their biological families and inclusion into a new ideological family that provides them respect, care, support, and often money; things they may previously have felt deprived of. Once this process of separation is complete, the biological family – the last and potentially most powerful force capable of countering or disrupting the radicalization cycle – is no longer an obstacle and the radicalization process can continue virtually unhindered.
- ▶ Even a cursory look into this process rather strongly suggests that vulnerable, traumatized individuals with a history of unaddressed mental health issues are likely to fall easy prey to radicalization efforts. Indeed, there are documented instances of such individuals seeking and receiving help for their mental health problems through “alternative treatments” (known as *ruqya* and reminiscent of exorcism) performed by uncertified imams. Many of these individuals have departed soon after to Syria and Iraq; and some have been killed.
- ▶ Efforts aimed at radicalization and recruitment are becoming more sophisticated, and thus more difficult to detect and prevent. Recent cases indicate the use of encrypted messaging applications as well as police evasion and detection tactics.
- ▶ The rhetoric of militant Salafism in BiH is focused on eradicating pre-existing belief systems and religious identities and, combined with the generally confrontational nature of adherents, is likely to remain a significant source of antagonism and conflict even after the foreign fighter

phenomenon subsides. Thus, radicalization into militant Salafism should be expected to produce new security threats in BiH and the Western Balkans.

- ▶ Possible threats to Bosnia and Herzegovina emanate from returned foreign fighters and from radicalized citizens who have tried and failed to travel to Syria and Iraq.
- ▶ BiH is most likely designated by ISIL as a “non-priority” state, viewed as suitable for the rest and recuperation or recruitment of new fighters and their transfer to or from Western Europe, as well as for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Therefore, ISIL (Central) does not seem to be encouraging Paris- or Brussels-style attacks in BiH, of an indiscriminate nature and directed against civilians, but rather limited strikes against selected targets (such as foreign embassies or diplomats, as suggested by ISIL’s magazine *Dabiq* in August 2015).
- ▶ Still, charges against 11 individuals arrested in late December 2015 for an alleged plan to hijack a police car, arm it with an improvised explosive device, and detonate it in downtown Sarajevo on New Year’s Eve, indicate that some citizens have had other ideas.
- ▶ The continued denial of war crimes against Bosnian Muslims and glorification of war criminals on the part of some citizens in the Republika Srpska, particularly political elites, may make an ISIL-inspired terrorist attack in this part of BiH more likely.
- ▶ Given the ongoing crackdown on *para-jamaats* by the state, instigated by the Islamic Community in BiH, a possible retaliatory attack against IC officials or property also cannot be excluded. In the words of a high-ranking Bosnian counter-terrorism official: “I am afraid that the next terrorist attack will occur in a mosque.”
- ▶ Moderation, or middle path Islam, has for centuries been the cornerstone of the belief system, identity, and way of life of Bosnian Muslims. This tradition and the state that enables and safeguards it could also be further undermined and targeted by ISIL.

## Recommendations

- ▶ With almost 65 foreign fighters per million inhabitants, BiH is among the European countries most affected by this phenomenon. Yet, public awareness of the problem is still rather limited, as is commitment at the society level to more actively prevent and counter radicalization. *Efforts to educate the public and engage citizens in recognizing and countering radicalization* must be undertaken.
- ▶ Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet developed standardized risk assessment tools to help differentiate between returning foreign fighters. Like other countries faced with the same problem, BiH is suffering from a knowledge gap and must carry out *more thorough diagnoses of returnees*.

- ▶ Law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, and the Prosecutor's Office must *develop a set of uniformed criteria on the basis of which a single, national database of Bosnian foreign fighters and their networks of support can be established*. This database could help with criminal prosecution in some cases, but also (and more importantly) in the development of rehabilitation and reintegration programs.
- ▶ The creation of a similar *regional database* of foreign fighters and their networks of support would be beneficial for counter-radicalization efforts across Western Balkan countries.
- ▶ There have been a number of recent indications that some Bosnian fighters in Syria and Iraq are contemplating a return home. These individuals are seeking to exchange their freedom for the safety of their families upon their return. BiH urgently needs *rehabilitation and reintegration programs for foreign fighters and their families*.
- ▶ A growing number of former and aspiring foreign fighters, as well as their handlers and facilitators, are being tried and sentenced to prison terms in BiH; yet, the country lacks experience and policy related to where and how to hold these convicts within the Bosnian prison system. *A clear set of guidelines standardizing the treatment of this special prison population must be developed with urgency and put into practice so that Bosnian prisons do not become another hotbed for jihadist radicalization*.
- ▶ The estimated number of Bosnian children in Syria and Iraq (more than 80) is one of the most alarming findings of this research. As a signatory to international conventions, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children (1996), Bosnia and Herzegovina has an international obligation to *enforce measures to protect/prevent children from being taken into conflict zones*. These obligations are also enshrined in national legislation.
- ▶ The potential for media to contribute to the prevention of ideological radicalization in BiH, and elsewhere, remains under-realized. *Additional and specialized training of editors and journalists, as well as the establishment of basic media standards or guidelines in reporting on terrorism and radicalization into violent extremism, could support this potential*.
- ▶ More research is needed into the complexities of radicalization and recruitment processes. Our understanding of the causes and drivers of radicalization is too often based on assumption rather than on researched-based knowledge. Some important international projects currently underway in BiH, aimed at preventing and countering radicalization into violent extremism (CVE), are based on just such dubious assumptions. While international assistance and available know-how in CVE are welcome and at times invaluable, *indigenous, locally-owned programs and policy development projects – involving experts with an authentic understanding of the Bosnian context, mentality, and tradition – stand a better chance of producing effective and lasting results*.

- ▶ Bosnia and Herzegovina's failing state is gradually producing an underachieving and failing society, polarized and unfit to protect and restore the eroding system of common-sense values and norms on which it was once based. To believe that such a society could alone produce an effective counter-narrative to extremist ideologies is as naïve as it is improbable. However, *a more steadfast dedication to accession to the European Union* could help BiH restore its traditional values by providing a unifying narrative that still resonates with the vast majority of Bosnians. An adjusted approach to BiH's EU integration process, which still relies on conditionality but also recognizes the need for preemptive action, could enable early negotiations on key EU Chapters 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (Justice, freedom and security), for instance. This could underpin the necessary and attainable goal of establishing a society based on political accountability, competence, and justice, which would serve efforts to prevent radicalization into violent extremism.

But for this to happen, the EU will need to reinvent its strategy for Bosnian accession and Bosnian political elites will need to evolve beyond hypocritical attitudes to instead work in the true best interests of their respective constituencies.



---

## THE FOREIGN FIGHTER PHENOMENON

---

From the start of the civil war in Syria, in March 2011, through the beginning of 2016, estimates are that more than 30,000 foreigner fighters have been on Syrian and Iraqi battlefields – some have fought and returned home (at least once), some remain there, and some have been killed. According to the United Nations, these foreign fighters have come from more than 100 UN member states. But American intelligence sources say these numbers are even higher, citing some 38,000 foreign fighters from 120 countries.<sup>1</sup> And research by the Soufan Group, published at the end of 2015, indicated that between 27,000 and 31,000 foreign fighters had been in Syria and Iraq from 2011 to 2015, hailing from 86 countries, mostly in the Middle East (8,240), the Maghreb (8,000), the European Union (more than 5,000), and the former Soviet Union (4,700).<sup>2</sup>

Turkey has added further insight on this issue by creating a database of official tracing requests filed with Turkey by 113 countries attempting to track their citizens. In the summer of 2015, Turkish authorities announced that this database included 22,635 names of potential foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.<sup>3</sup> The recently announced discovery of 22,000 personal questionnaires supposedly completed by future fighters upon joining ISIL seems to support this figure. According to various sources, these documents are from 2013 through mid-2014 and suggest that arriving fighters were from 51 countries.<sup>4</sup>

The highest number of foreign fighters have been from Tunisia (6,000), followed by Saudis (2,500), Russians (2,400), Jordanians (2,100), and Turks (2,000).<sup>5</sup> It is estimated that fighters from Arab or predominantly Muslim countries make up about 70% of the foreign fighter contingent in Syria and Iraq.<sup>6</sup> Still, slightly more than 5,000 of the foreign fighters counted through late fall of 2015

---

1 For more on this, see: UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat*, UN Security Council, February 9, 2016, <http://www.un.org/undpa/speeches-statements/09022016/terrorism> (accessed February 9, 2016). Also see: United Nations, *Analysis and Recommendations with Regard to the Global Threat from Foreign Terrorist Fighters* (Report prepared by the 1267 Committee), No. S/2015/358, May 19, 2015, 3, [www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/N1508457\\_EN.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/N1508457_EN.pdf) (accessed March 2, 2016); "Foreign Fighters and Those Who Return," *TSG IntelBrief*, March 9, 2016, <http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-foreign-fighters-and-those-who-return/> (accessed March 14, 2016); "IC's Worldwide Threat Assessment Opening Statement," remarks as delivered by The Honorable James R. Clapper Director of National Intelligence Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, February 9, 2016, [https://fas.org/irp/congress/2016\\_hr/020916-sasc-ad.pdf](https://fas.org/irp/congress/2016_hr/020916-sasc-ad.pdf) (accessed March 14, 2016).

2 The Soufan Group, *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*, December 2015, [http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG\\_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf](http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf) (accessed March 5, 2016).

3 "From Foreign Fighters to Migrants: Western Balkans and Unconventional Security Threats," conference proceedings, Sarajevo, August 15, 2015.

4 For more on this, see: "Germany says stolen Islamic State files 'probably genuine,'" *BBC News*, March 11, 2016; "The Islamic State's Foreign Fighters Exposed," *TSG IntelBrief*, March 11, 2016; "ISIS Data Breach Identifies 22,000 Members," *Hack Brief*, March 10, 2016; "Leaked ISIS documents reveal recruits' blood types, obedience levels," CNN, March 10, 2016.

5 "Terror Threat to Europe 'Highest for 10 Years,'" *Sky News*, March 9, 2016, <http://news.sky.com/story/1656134/terror-threat-to-europe-highest-for-10-years> (accessed February 9, 2016).

6 A.P. Schmid and J. Tinnes, "Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspective," *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 6, no. 8 (2015).

were from the European Union, and almost 3,700 came from just four countries – France (1,700), Great Britain (760), Germany (760), and Belgium (470).<sup>7</sup> These estimates are continuously updated; and by March 2016, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) put the number of European foreign fighters at a dramatically higher 9,000.<sup>8</sup>

Although foreign fighters tend to represent a minority in internal conflicts, the war in Syria is an exception. In fact, during certain phases of the conflict, it is estimated that foreign fighters have made up 40% of the total fighting population. Moreover, the participation of foreigners in command positions is believed to have reached up to 80%, mainly due to a significant contingent of former Iraqi Army officers in Syria.<sup>9</sup> Among opposition forces fighting the Assad regime (including ISIL and the Al-Nusra Front), some estimates are that up to 70% of fighters are foreigners; and in ISIL alone, foreigners are thought to make up between one-third and one-fifth of fighters.<sup>10</sup>

## Foreign Fighters from the Western Balkans

The Soufan Group found that approximately 875 fighters from Western Balkan countries were present in Syria and Iraq as of December 2015. Based on official and unofficial estimates, they estimated that 90 to 200 of these fighters came from Albania, 217 to 330 from BiH, 232 to 300 from Kosovo, 100 to 146 from Macedonia, up to 30 from Montenegro, and 50 to 70 from Serbia.

**Figure 1. Western Balkan Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq (December 2015)**

Country	Official estimate	Last update	Unofficial estimate
Albania	90	May 2015	200
BiH	217	October 2015	330
Montenegro	-	September 2014	30
Kosovo	232	October 2015	300
FYR Macedonia	146	August 2015	100
Serbia	50	July 2015	70

Source: *The Soufan Group, December 2015*

<sup>7</sup> For more on this, see: The Soufan Group, *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment*.

<sup>8</sup> FBI officials cited this estimate at the "Fight against Terrorism" workshop organized in Sarajevo by the US Department of Justice on April 12, 2016.

<sup>9</sup> J.E. Arasli, *Archipelago SYRAQ – Jihadist Foreign Fighters from A to Z: 200 Essential Facts You Need to Know about Jihadist Expeditionary Warfare in the Middle East* (Baku: Teknur, 2015), 118.

<sup>10</sup> Estimates of the number of foreign fighters in the war in Syria and Iraq are incomplete because they mainly only count the forces fighting against the regime, very rarely including members of Iranian and Iraqi paramilitary formations, Hezbollah, or members of some Christian militias.

Official European Union estimates are similar, indicating that between 900 and 1,000 fighters from the Western Balkans are in Syria and Iraq, including 350 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 150 each from Macedonia and Albania, over 250 from Kosovo, at least 50 from Serbia, and around 30 from Montenegro.<sup>11</sup>

In order to refresh these assessments, in April 2016 the authors surveyed law enforcement and intelligence sources in the Western Balkans, and arrived at more detailed and accurate findings, depicted below.

**Figure 2. Western Balkan Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq (April 2016)**

Country	Total 2012-2015	Returned	Killed	Women	Children	Still in Syraq
Albania	136	40 <sup>12</sup>	20	N/A	N/A	76 <sup>13</sup>
BiH	260	43 men 6 women	44 men 2 women	56	N/A	77 men 48 women 46 children
Croatia	1	-	-	1	N/A	1
FYR Macedonia	135 <sup>14</sup>	80	20 <sup>15</sup>	N/A	N/A	35
Kosovo	314	110 men 6 women 1 child	57	38	27	75 men 38 women 27 children
Montenegro	Up to 30		5			
Serbia	42	9 <sup>16</sup>	11	N/A	N/A	22
Slovenia	3+3 <sup>17</sup>	2	1 + 1 <sup>18</sup>	2	5	2 women 5 children <sup>19</sup>

Source: Atlantic Initiative, May 2016

11 From a February 2016 conversation with a high-ranking EU official who wished to remain anonymous.

12 Out of these, 33 are suspected of being engaged in fighting or military training.

13 Out of this number, 24 are considered as fighters. The rest are family members or supporters.

14 Macedonian security services estimate that share of women in this contingent is close to 10%.

15 The official figure is 17.

16 Three out of nine returnees are in custody, and are being tried before Serbian court. Another three FTF are being tried in absentia.

17 Three Slovenian citizens, and three men with either dual Slovenian/Bosnian citizenships or places of birth in Slovenia.

18 One Slovenian – Jure Korelec, and Denis Delanović, with dual Slovenian/Bosnian citizenship.

19 Two women married to Bosnian men, and thier five children.

# THE FOREIGN FIGHTERS' BOSNIAN CONTINGENT IN SYRIA & IRAQ

## Official Estimates

The size of the Bosnian contingent of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is most often cited as numbering 330, as the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) reported at the beginning of 2015.<sup>20</sup> Although it remains unclear what sources were used in that calculation, this estimate is still frequently the number of fighters said to originate from BiH, more than a year after being published.

At the end of 2015, an official United Nations document stated that 217 Bosnian citizens were in the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. That document also did not cite the source of this figure, but it appears that its authors may have relied on data from the 2015 Atlantic Initiative study that this research follows up on, titled *The Lure of the Syrian War: The Foreign Fighters' Bosnian Contingent*. In that research, we found that 156 men, 36 women, and 25 children from BiH – 217 people in total – departed for the battlefields of Syria and Iraq from the end of 2012 through the end of 2014. However, while the original report did not assert that every Bosnian woman and child who emigrated qualified as a fighter, the UN document inferred that all 217 Bosnians it referenced were foreign terrorist fighters.<sup>21</sup>

In early March 2016, the Bosnian Ministry of Security estimated that there were “around 130 citizens of BiH fighting on the side of the so-called ISIL army” in Syria and Iraq at that time. Some 45 Bosnian citizens were thought to have been killed fighting for ISIL, and around 50 were believed to have returned from the battlefields.<sup>22</sup> If these various counts are aggregated, from 2012 through the beginning of 2016, 225 Bosnian fighters have departed for the battlefields of Syria and Iraq.

Also in the spring of 2016, the Prosecutor's Office of BiH asserted that 260 Bosnian citizens had been or were in Syria and Iraq through the end of 2015. According to their estimate, 77 men

20 Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,” ICSR, January 26, 2015, <http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/> (accessed January 28, 2015).

21 UN Security Council, “Letter dated 15 December 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council, No. S/2015/975, December 29, 2015, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/975](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/975) (accessed March 11, 2016).

22 “Na strani ISIL-a ratuje oko 130 državljana BiH,” *Večernji list*, March 11, 2016; “Mektić: Na vanjskim ratištima trenutno oko 130 državljana BiH,” *Dnevni avaz*, August 27, 2015.

remain there as fighters, along with 48 women and 46 children, and some 43 individuals have returned while 46 have been killed.<sup>23</sup> As the variation in these official estimates reflects, the methods used by security services and judicial institutions in BiH to track these citizens – to which the authors of this study had limited access – do not accurately or precisely capture the number of Bosnians who have been or remain in Syria or Iraq.

Most police agencies in BiH are familiar with the names of individuals who are “believed to be linked to departures to Syria and Iraq.” Based on data collected on these people, every agency estimates within the context of its own competencies and its own criteria who has really departed to foreign battlefields, who has been killed, who has returned, who is still there, and who is a part of the network engaged in recruiting and transporting people or in ideological indoctrination and inciting people to depart. Yet, data are incomplete in a significant number of cases and there is often no clear evidence that a “person of interest” has indeed been on a foreign battlefield.

Currently, though each agency mainly uses the same source data, analyses based on different criteria bring different conclusions about the total number of Bosnian citizens who have been in or are still in Syria or Iraq, and the number of those who have been killed there or have returned. There is no doubt that a single database of these persons of interest at the state level would better facilitate the tracking of the foreign fighter phenomenon, and harmonization of the criteria used by various agencies would represent a first step in that direction. These criteria include the existence of photo or video evidence, statements from witnesses, and the records of border police on the entries and departures of Bosnian citizens. This kind of evidence has led to a growing list of Bosnian citizens – 67 people by the end of February 2016 – being sought by Interpol either because criminal proceedings have been instigated against them or they are wanted for questioning about their participation in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The Court of BiH has also indicted 18 returnees from the battlefields in those countries.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> See supra note 8.

<sup>24</sup> “BiH raspisala 67 potjernica za borcima na stranim ratištima,” *Večernji list*, February 23, 2016, <http://www.vecernji.ba/bih-raspisala-67-potjernica-za-borcima-na-stranim-ratistima-1062668> (accessed February 24, 2016). Also see: Vidi također, “Mektić: Podignuto 18 optužnica protiv osoba koje su se vratile iz Sirije i Iraka,” *Srna*, March 17, 2016

## Unofficial Estimate

Relying on open sources and having partial insight into the records kept by security agencies in BiH, one of the aims of this research was to establish the number of Bosnian citizens who have been in Syria and Iraq, or who are still there. Like the majority of police agencies, the authors often dealt with incomplete or unverified information, and also grappled with how to treat people who originate from BiH but have received citizenship in the countries they now live in – sometimes renouncing their Bosnian citizenship, sometimes keeping it but using travel documents from the other country.


Additionally, police records indicate that there are a significant number of people “who are linked with departures to the battlefields in Syria and Iraq,” but for whom there is no evidence they have ever actually been there. Some of them are reported to have departed to Turkey, some have not been seen for some time at their registered residence; and based on such intelligence, combined with information about social contacts and ideological affiliations, they are assumed to have departed to Syria or Iraq. For this study, the authors estimated how likely it was that an individual mentioned in police records had indeed departed for Syria or Iraq using their own criteria. Thus, it is possible that the estimates presented here do not entirely match those of law enforcement agencies in BiH.

One discrepancy in estimates comes out of the fact that this study is aimed at analyzing the *community* (and its clan-like structure) that has migrated to Syria and Iraq. Along with individuals who officially hold BiH citizenship and corresponding personal and travel documents, this community is also composed of people who do not have formal Bosnian citizenship, including a small number of individuals who are citizens of countries in the immediate region – Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and FYR of Macedonia – and who have become integrated through marital or other family relationships. It also includes people who originate from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but for some reason do not hold BiH citizenships or passports. In short, this research is focused on the community, or clan, as an essential survival unit. Bosnian security services, however, need to distinguish between individuals with and without citizenship status in BiH because they have legal grounds to investigate and prosecute only those who are formal citizens of the country.

This research covers the period from the end of 2012 through the end of 2015. However, in the first three months of 2016, amidst data processing and in the final phases before publication of this study, a number of Bosnian citizens were killed in Syria and Iraq (including men, women, and children), and others were prevented from traveling or were extradited (from Turkey). In late May

2016, the deportations of two more Bosnian families from a detention center in Turkey were underway. Although these developments do not significantly impact this analysis, they do exemplify how difficult it is to monitor and accurately report on the travels of fighters in both directions.


Still, we have concluded that, since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, 188 men, 61 women, and 81 children who were citizens of BiH or originated from it departed for Syria and Iraq or were born there.<sup>25</sup> When it comes to the number of children or minors, it is important to note that this estimate is cumulative, counting the total number of people under 18 years of age who were taken to Syria and Iraq from the end of 2012 through the end of 2015, and some who were born there. During those years, some of these minors came of age, though, so that they no longer fall under the category of child, and an unknown number were also born in Syria and Iraq to Bosnian citizens. When it was possible to confirm these births, newborns have been included in this estimate.



**Figure 3. Bosnian contingent in Syria and Iraq (December 2012-December 2015)**

Contextualizing these results is important. Researchers who deal with the phenomenon of departures to foreign battlefields are frequently challenged to present their data through statistics, and one of the most frequent methods calculates the number of foreign fighters per one million inhabitants of their home country. However, such calculations are subject to the (un)reliability of the initial counts of these individuals and should be interpreted within the appropriate framework.

<sup>25</sup> Among these 61 women, four are foreign nationals married to men from BiH.



**Figure 3a. Bosnian men in Syria and Iraq (December 2012-December 2015)**

For example, if Bosnia is compared to Belgium, as it often is on this topic, it has a higher rate of citizen engagement in fighting in Syria and Iraq. The population of Belgium is around 11,000,000 and estimates are that there are about 451 Belgian foreign fighters, or 41 per one million inhabitants. Estimating that there are 249 Bosnian citizens of fighting age, both men and women, in Syria and Iraq, and the population of Bosnia is around 3,800,000, the rate of foreign fighters from Bosnia is around 65.5 per one million inhabitants.<sup>26</sup> Yet, appreciating that the people accounted for in this type of data are almost exclusively Muslims or converts to Islam (again, Muslims), statistics on radicalization and recruitment in Belgium and Bosnia look rather different. In that context, there are 64 foreign fighters for every 100,000 Muslims in Belgium (the total number of which is around 700,000), meaning one foreign fighter in every 1,552 Muslims in Belgium. If one assumes the disputable fact that all ethnic Bosniaks in BiH (estimated at some 1,760,000) are Muslim, then there are close to 14 foreign fighters for every 100,000 Bosnian Muslims, or one in every 7,068 Muslims in BiH. Presented in this manner, ISIL's recruitment of followers in Belgium could be viewed as 4.5 times more successful than in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In addition to determining a number of people from BiH who may have been in Syria and Iraq in the last four years, this study also attempted to establish what has happened to these people over time and where they are currently living. The research has established that by the end of 2015, 43 men had returned to BiH from Syria or Iraq.<sup>27</sup> It is believed that 44 have been killed, though


<sup>26</sup> At the time of this writing (in April/May 2016), official results of the 2013 BiH census have not yet been published.

<sup>27</sup> The authors are aware of at least four Bosnian citizens killed in Syria and Iraq since the beginning of 2016, and at least four who have returned. Police checks at the registered residences of some individuals have shown in several cases that people who were believed to have been in Syria and Iraq never were. New data will be elaborated on in a separate addendum to this research, currently being prepared.



no sufficiently reliable data were found for 10 of them. In the same period (2012-2015), 6 women returned from Syria, one was killed, and data is unreliable for 2 others.<sup>28</sup>

Based on these numbers, it is most likely that 91 men remain in Syria and Iraq, along with 52 women and some 60 children – meaning that up to 55% of the Bosnian contingent in those countries may be comprised of noncombatants. And indeed, the official, more conservative estimate of numbers of Bosnian citizens in Syria and Iraq provided by the BiH Prosecutor’s Office corroborates this ratio of combatants to noncombatants.



**Figure 4. Bosnian contingent in Syria and Iraq in January 2016**


<sup>28</sup> In February 2016, a woman who was believe to be pregnant was killed, together with her husband and three children. See: "U Siriji poginula Bosanska porodica: Stradao Valdes Karić, njegova žena i djeca," *Slobodna Bosna*, February 23, 2016, [http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/27741/u\\_siriji\\_poginula\\_bosanska\\_porodica\\_stradao\\_valdes\\_karic\\_njegova\\_zena\\_i\\_djeca.html](http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/27741/u_siriji_poginula_bosanska_porodica_stradao_valdes_karic_njegova_zena_i_djeca.html) (accessed February 25, 2016).

## DEMOGRAPHY OF THE PHENOMENON: KEY TRENDS AND PATTERNS

### Gender and Age Distribution

Bosnian citizens who travel to Syria and Iraq have some unique characteristics compared to trends measured in other research of fighters from Western countries. For instance, the average age of both men and women émigrés from BiH is higher, and women make up far more of the Bosnian contingent in Syria and Iraq than is true of other foreign fighter contingents. These demographics of departure are largely due to the specific rhetoric of recruitment being employed in BiH, linked to *hijra* (migration).

Of those Bosnian men whose dates of births could be established (149) and who are believed to have been in Syria from the end of 2002 through the end of 2015, the average age was 31, and the most common age was 22.<sup>29</sup> The largest number of these men (64, or 42%) fall between the ages of 19 and 27, followed by those who are between 28 and 36 (45, or 30%). Thus, more than 70% of the men from Bosnia and Herzegovina who enter Syria are between 19 and 36 years of age. The same applies to other foreign fighters from the Western Balkans who were typically between 20 and 35 years of age.



**Figure 5. The average age of men from BiH in Syria and Iraq**


<sup>29</sup> The reference point used for age calculation was an individual's date of entry to Syria.

Similar research carried out in the West indicates that foreign fighters from Western countries are typically in only their early or mid-twenties, with an average age among American and French fighters of 25, and among Belgian and German fighters of just under 26 years of age.<sup>30</sup>

Upon their arrival in the war theater, a majority (61%) of men from BiH have not been married. But some of them clearly marry once they are in Syria and Iraq, where only 53% of these men are single.

The average age of women arriving from BiH to Syria and Iraq was 30 years of age, whilst the most common age of women migrants was 24. Most of these women fall into to one of two age groups – those between 19 and 27 (50%), and those between 37 and 45 (23%). Unlike men who depart for the Middle East, the vast majority (93%) of the women who arrive in Syria and Iraq are already married or are married upon their arrival.

At the time of this writing in the spring of 2016, research has established that there are 39 married couples originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Syria, as well as 12 widows with children.



**Figure 6. The average age of women from BiH in Syria and Iraq**

30 Bibi van Ginkel and Eva Entenmann, eds., *The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles, Threats & Policies*, International Center for Counter-Terrorism Research, April 2016, <http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Executive-Summary.pdf> (accessed April 8, 2016); Peter Bergen, Courtney Schuster, and David Sterman, *Isis In The West: The New Faces Of Extremism* (Washington, DC: New America, 2015); Daniel Milton, "The French Foreign Fighter Threat In Context," *CTC Perspectives*, November 2015, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspectives-the-french-foreign-fighter-threat-in-context> (accessed January 2, 2016); Reem Ahmed & Daniela Pisoiu, "Foreign fighters: An overview of existing research and a comparative study of British and German foreign fighters," Working Paper 8, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, December 2014, [https://ifsh.de/file-ZEUS/pdf/ZEUS\\_WP\\_8.pdf](https://ifsh.de/file-ZEUS/pdf/ZEUS_WP_8.pdf) (accessed July 7, 2015); "Who are Germany's Islamists?" *Deutsche Welle*, September 24, 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/who-are-germanys-islamists/a-18737894> (accessed September 26, 2015); and Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "December 2015: A new statistical update on Belgian fighters in Syria and Iraq," <https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2015/12/07/belgian-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-december-2015/> (accessed April 4, 2016).

Research in the West has found women who travel with foreign fighters to be considerably younger, with an average age around 21, and that a significant number of them are seeking husbands.<sup>31</sup> For instance, women from Kosovo who have left for Syria and Iraq are on average just over 23 years of age, nearly 7 years younger than Bosnian women who migrate.<sup>32</sup>

The share of women in the Bosnian contingent in Syria and Iraq has gradually, but constantly, risen. It is believed that from the end of 2012 through 2014, there were 36 women in those countries, making up less than 20% of the contingent. From the end of 2014 through 2015, however, we estimate that 25 more women departed to Syria and Iraq. If we take into account the number of women who have been killed or have returned to BiH or to the diaspora, the authors believe that by the end of 2015, the proportion of women in the Bosnian contingent in Syria and Iraq reached just over 36%. Even more conservative official estimates suggest that the rate of women is over 30%.

This number of women is considerably higher than that among contingents in Syria and Iraq from the European Union, where one in six people is a woman. Indeed, the French and German contingents have the highest rate of women among EU countries, at 22% and 20% respectively.<sup>33</sup> And more locally, statistics from Western Balkans countries for the most part appear to be in line with Western European trends. For example, our research determined that among 314 Kosovars thought to have been in Syria and Iraq, 38 have been women (12%), and out of 150 Albanians, between 13 and 29 have been women (9-19%).

The fact that men and women departing BiH for Syria and Iraq are older than their European counterparts, and the fact that more Bosnian women are migrating, can be attributed to the *hijra* trend that picked up from the second half of 2013 in some Salafi communities. In a number of cases, entire families have moved to Syria or Iraq with three generations in tow. This may also explain a shift in the proportion of women and noncombatants among Kosovars believed to remain in Syria and Iraq. As of May 2016, the Kosovo contingent is thought to be one-third women and the overall share of noncombatants has reached 46%, nearing the rate in the Bosnian contingent.<sup>34</sup>

31 For more on this, see: Anita Perešin, "Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 3 (2015), <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/427/html> (accessed January 2, 2016); and Anne Speckhard, *Bride of ISIS: One Young Woman's Path into Homegrown Terrorism* (McLean, VA: Advances Press, 2015).

32 Arbana Xharra, "Few but Fanatical – the Kosovo Women Who Go Over to ISIS," *Balkan Insight*, January 26, 2016, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/few-but-fanatical-the-kosovo-women-who-go-over-to-isis-01-22-2016#sthash.yq32FfwK.dpuf> (accessed March 3, 2016).

33 van Ginkel and Entenmann, 4.

34 From intelligence and police sources.

## Bosnian Children in Syria and Iraq

One practice linked to this phenomenon, which has yet to be sufficiently researched, involves taking children to war affected areas of Syria and Iraq. The authors are familiar with cases in which families with a number of children have departed for these destinations (in one case, this involved 9 children, including a 5-month-old baby). It is also known that children are being born to Bosnians who have departed to Syrian and Iraqi battlefields, the number of which can only be estimated based on photos posted by their parents on social networks.

In earlier research encompassing the period from the end of 2012 through the end of 2014, the authors established that at least 25 children had been taken from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Syria. Based on certain patterns, we estimate that this number had increased threefold by the end of 2015, with more than 80 children either taken from BiH to Syria or Iraq, or born there. This is a particularly difficult number to establish since the birth of some of these children – even those born in BiH – are not registered and, further, some of them have come of age during the years they have been in Syria and Iraq.

This research has also established that more than 20 children from BiH in Syria and Iraq have lost at least one of their parents, most often their father. We estimate that at the beginning of 2016 there were at least 12 widows with 24 children among women from BiH in these countries.

Statements of witnesses and activity on social networks indicate that young boys between 13 or 14 undergo military training almost as a rule, before being deployed into fighting formations. At least one minor (a 16-year-old) from BiH has been killed as a combatant so far, while three other Bosnian children are known to have been killed as noncombatants, along with their parents, in an air strike launched at the beginning of 2016.<sup>35</sup> Bearing in mind the proliferation of cases in which parents are purposefully taking their children to one of the most dangerous regions in the world – exposing them to war and to the influence of retrograde and violent ideologies – the authors believe that domestic laws and commitments to international conventions enable and compel Bosnia and Herzegovina to undertake additional measures to protect children and minors from such experiences.<sup>36</sup>

35 "Bh. Djeca u vojnim formacijama ISIL-a," *FTV*, February 12, 2016, <http://www.federalna.ba/bhs/vijest/156312/mreza-hod-bh-djece-pod-palicom-selefskih-roditelja> (accessed February 14, 2016); "U Siriji poginuo Tuzlak Valdes Karić sa trudnom suprugom i troje djece" *Saff*, February 23, 2016.

36 Family Law in the Federation of BiH, Republika Srpska, and the Brčko District provides for this possibility (for example, under Articles 127, 130, 134 135, 136, 138), as does the Convention on the Rights of the Child from 1989 (under Articles 11, 19 i 38), of which BiH is a signatory.



Figure 7. Bosnian children in Syria and Iraq



Figure 8. Bosnian children in Syria and Iraq

## Fatalities

Estimated at around 25%, fatalities among Bosnians in Syria and Iraq since 2012 are rather high, and almost twice the European average rate (14%). Bosnian security officials claim that most of these deaths occurred in skirmishes with competing paramilitary factions, rather than in battles against the Assad regime, Kurdish Peshmerga forces, or Free Syrian Army troops.

This higher rate of fatalities among Bosnians could be attributed to a lack of proper military training prior to their departure to Syria and Iraq. While sensationalist media headlines in the region often warn of the existence of “jihadi training camps” in BiH, extensive police investigations have thus far found no evidence to corroborate these reports and traditional military camps that would include training and accommodation facilities have never been discovered. There are known cases of groups or individuals attending one-day or weekend religious seminars in secluded areas in the Bosnian highlands that have also included martial arts training and basic shooting practice. However, no organized training system for aspiring foreign fighters has come to light.

## Patterns of Travel

Records of the BiH Border Police and other security agencies demonstrate quite clearly the dynamics and patterns of migration between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Syria and Iraq. Even though these records are often incomplete or missing, it is apparent that, after four years of back-and-forth traffic, returns to BiH ceased completely in 2015 as departures dramatically decreased, and departures have finally stopped in 2016. Further, in the first half of 2016, at least three individuals have been extradited from prisons in Turkey, with several more extraditions expected before the end of the year. Bosnian law enforcement agencies, in close cooperation with regional and international partners, have also stopped at least three individuals from departing to Syria.

In general, most travel between BiH and Syria and Iraq occurred in 2013 and 2014, when men typically returned from Syria to marry and then took their brides back to the war theater. Men who were already married sometimes also returned to BiH, to collect their spouses and children to take them back to Aleppo or Raqqa. Police logs reveal that some of these individuals traveled this route multiple times.




Figure 9. Patterns of travel for men (2012-2015)






Figure 10. Patterns of travel for women (2012-2015)






**Figure 11. Overall patterns of travel (2012-2015)**

The travel of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq became more complex, dangerous, and expensive over time. In the initial phase, up to the summer of 2014, Bosnian foreign fighters travelled to Syria mostly from the Sarajevo International Airport, and to a lesser extent by road through Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Some 55% of men and 36% of women flew to Istanbul, and further to Gaziantep or Hatay (Antakya). From there they used local smuggling routes to reach Syria – from Gaziantep to Kilis and Azaz or from Antakya to Reyhanli and the Bab al-Hawa border crossing. And these Bosnians were not alone, as an estimated 42% of Western foreign fighters also made their way to Syria or Iraq via Turkey.<sup>37</sup>



**Figure 12. Overall patterns of travel for men (2012-2015)**

37 Bergen, et al., *Isis In The West*.



**Figure 13. Overall patterns of travel for women (2012-2015)**

Some 25% of Bosnian women in Syria and Iraq traveled there by car, typically in passenger vans, which provide more comfort and space to accommodate children and luggage.



**Figure 14. Vehicles used for road trips to Syria**

While it is quite certain that much of the travel of foreign fighters has gone unregistered by BiH authorities, especially departures from countries with large Bosnian diasporas, there is enough data to develop an accurate understanding of the patterns and dynamics of these journeys from 2012 until the end of 2015. Since late June 2014 – amidst increased efforts, both in BiH and internation-


ally, to prevent and disrupt aspiring foreign fighters from traveling to Syria or Iraq – the numbers of individuals departing decreased dramatically. Consequently, though, a new level of sophistication in radicalization and recruitment emerged. Even our limited access to police and court files revealed that an increasingly organized and international network supports these activities.

In just one example of the developments being seen in the tactics of recruitment networks, aspiring foreign fighters used to be provided with passwords to access instant messaging services like Vibe, Skype, Kik, and WhatsApp, and new IDs and passwords were then provided for every stage of their trip – from initial contact with a recruiting network, to contact with individuals tasked with providing instructions, money, and transportation. Recruits were supplied with phone numbers they were instructed to call only from designated public phone booths. But an examination of recent investigation records indicates that, in order to evade police detection and prosecution, recruitment networks have begun to take more elaborate efforts to conceal their activities. Communication between Syria-based recruiters and their operatives in Bosnia is now being maintained through cloud-based messaging services with optional end-to-end encryption and self-destruct timers. And this type of communication is moved to the next more secure messaging application as soon as it becomes available. Through these platforms, recruits are given instructions on how to remain undetected throughout their journey to Syria or Iraq; advised, for instance, to take particular caution to blend in and behave like tourists once they reach Turkey. They are also told where to stay, how to dress, and what tourist destinations to visit while waiting for their contacts to pick them up.

For prospective fighters or migrants that have money to spend, there is another, more sophisticated smuggling network that offers “all-inclusive” travel arrangements to Syria, using roadways through Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. After they sign up for the journey, travelers rely on the network to arrange everything for a safe trip to their final destination, typically at the Turkish-Syrian border. While self-arranged trips from Bosnia to Syria cost between 300 and 500 euros, prices for these all-inclusive journeys start from 2,000 euros.

## Geography of the Phenomenon


Registers of permanent residences indicate that the vast majority of Bosnian citizens who are believed to have departed for Syria or Iraq come from the Federation of BiH, at around 95%; with 4% from the Republika Srpska and 1% from the Brčko District.



**Figure 15. BiH Citizens in Syria and Iraq by registered residence**


But these registers are sometimes inaccurate. In fact, local police agencies face serious problems in efforts to establish the actual residences of individuals from BiH who are thought to be linked to the pipeline to Syria and Iraq because registered permanent addresses frequently turn out to be false. In some cases, the individual in whose name a property is registered has never resided at the address. In other cases, they have moved away but have neither unregistered their previous residence nor registered a new one. Other people have registered a number of permanent residences, most often in different cantons, some of which are also sometimes false. In any case, it is difficult to establish whether these inconsistencies are due to irresponsibility on the part of these individuals or a more intentional effort to conceal their whereabouts.

Considering this problem with establishing true permanent addresses, our analysis has been additionally informed by police records on the movement of certain persons of interest, including to and from locations where they actually reside, which are well-known to the police. Since a significant number of people linked to departures to Syria and Iraq live in the Salafi communities in Gornja Maoča and Dubnica, or visit them often even though their permanent address is registered elsewhere, the highest number of departures to foreign battlefields is attributed to the Tuzla Canton, where these communities are located. The Zenica-Doboj and Sarajevo Cantons follow close behind, and a significant number of departures have also been registered from the Una-Sana and Central Bosnia Cantons. The fewest number of departures have originated in the Herzegovina-Neretva and Livno Cantons and, interestingly, nobody with a permanent residence registered in the Bosnia-Podrinje and Posavina Cantons is known to have departed for Syria or Iraq.




**Figure 16. Breakdown by canton**

A partial analysis of police records shows that more than a quarter (27%) of the men and women who have departed for Syria and Iraq have temporarily or permanently lived in or paid regular visits to well-known Salafi communities such as Gornja Maoča, Dubnica, Ošva, Liješnica, and Bočinje. The assumption is that this number is actually even higher.



**Figure 17. Previous affiliation with known Salafi communities**

The residential areas with the largest number of individuals who have left for Syria and Iraq are: Gornja Maoča – 52 (38 men and 14 women), Sarajevo – 38 (29 men and 9 women), and Zenica – 27 (20 men and 7 women).




**Figure 18. Residential areas with the largest number of individual departures**

Still, while the locations from which the largest number of individuals have left for Syria and Iraq have in some ways been consistent, a mapping over time confirms that the base from which foreign fighters are being recruited is gradually expanding as Salafism and Salafi settlements in BiH increasingly spread from traditional and isolated enclaves into larger towns and suburban areas.


### Ties to the Diaspora

Ties to the Diaspora are shared among a large number of Bosnian citizens linked with departures to Syria and Iraq, and in fact, analysis undertaken for this study indicates that this is true in over one-fifth (21%) of cases.



**Figure 19. Ties to the Bosnian Diaspora in the West**


Some of these people have EU citizenship and a large number live, work (legally or illegally), or visit relatives and friends there. It is reasonable to assume that an even higher number of foreign fighters may have similar ties, but this is difficult to prove, because local security agencies do not track the movements of citizens originally from BiH who reside or live abroad. The majority of these ties are with people in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland – where traditional communities of guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) and economic migrants from BiH and the former Yugoslavia have lived since late the 1960s and early 1970s. Hundreds of thousands of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia joined them in the early 1990s, and then from Kosovo toward the end of that decade. There is also a sizeable Bosnian Diaspora in Scandinavia, especially in Sweden and Norway; but in the context of radicalization, recruitment, and departure to foreign war theaters, links to these communities appear to be of significantly less importance.



**Figure 20. Links to Diaspora: Breakdown by country**

## Pre-departure Criminality

A partial examination of police and court documents indicates that at least one quarter (26%) of Bosnian men believed to have travelled to Syria and Iraq from December 2012 to December 2015 had criminal records. It seems safe to assume that with greater access to these types of files and a more thorough analysis, we would find this percentage to be even higher. The criminal offenses that these individuals have most often been investigated, prosecuted, or sentenced for include: theft, armed robbery, extortion, child abuse, rape, domestic violence, assault and battery, counterfeiting, fraud, tax evasion, illegal possession and distribution of narcotics and/or arms, human trafficking, membership in organized criminal groups, and terrorism.



**Figure 21. Pre-departure criminality**

Among those prosecuted for terrorism were two alleged conspirators in the October 29, 2011 attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo, both of whom were acquitted by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Shortly after their trial, in late spring 2013, both Munib Ahmetašević and Emrah Fojnica left for Syria. Fojnica reportedly volunteered to join a unit of aspiring suicide bombers and died in August 2014, apparently in the process of trying to carry out a suicide mission in Tikrit, Iraq. Ahmetašević returned home only to travel again to Syria in July 2013, when he brought along his then teenage brother Mevludin Dawud, who was reportedly killed in coalition airstrikes in Kobane, Syria at the end of 2014.

Other known Bosnian foreign fighters with terrorism-related offenses in their criminal histories include Bajro Ikanović and Senad Hasanović, who were sentenced in 2007 for their role in a foiled



2005 terrorist attack in Sarajevo. Ikanović, a former drug dealer, served four years in prison for possession and supply of explosives to the two chief conspirators – Mirsad Bektašević (alias Maximus or Abu Imad As-Sanjaki) and Abdulkadir Cesur – and Hasanović was sentenced to six months for illicit possession of explosive substances.<sup>38</sup>

Bajro Ikanović departed for Syria in January 2013, leaving behind his family. Multiple accounts and interviews suggest that he rose over time within the ranks of ISIL's provincial hierarchy in and around Aleppo, first in military positions and then in local administration. He remarried twice in Syria (both brides were from the Caucasus), as his Bosnian wife – with whom he fathered two children – refused to join him there. According to various reports, Ikanović was killed in a coalition airstrike in mid-March 2016 alongside a group of high-ranking ISIL commanders; still, Bosnian law enforcement officials remain cautious, treating his death as “unconfirmed” because his body has not been recovered and a photo – the typical final testimony of one's martyrdom in *jihad* – has never emerged on social media. In the words of one Bosnian police officer who spoke on the condition of anonymity, “If anyone is able and ready to fake his own death, it's Bajro Ikanović.”<sup>39</sup>

Ikanović's protégé, Senad Hasnović, was first in Syria from March to May 2013. He embarked on another trip there in late September of that year, that time with his wife. Turkish authorities stopped him, but not her, at the Istanbul Atatürk Airport and sent him back to Sarajevo. But the next day, he boarded a bus from Sarajevo to Novi Pazar, Serbia and continued by road to Turkey, where he reunited with his wife. They both crossed soon afterward into Syria.

Another alleged Bosnian foreign fighter, Muradif Hamzabegović, also has an extensive criminal record. In May 2012, Hamzabegović was sentenced by the Court of BiH to a 6-year prison term (and given a 20,000 KM (€10,000) fine) for his involvement in organized human smuggling. The

38 See: Second-Instance Verdict, *Prosecutor v. Mirsad Bektašević and others*, No. X-KŽ-06/190, May 21, 2007. Available at: <http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/>. Mirsad Bektašević (18), a Serbian-born Swedish citizen, and Abdulkadir Cesur (20), a Turkish citizen with a registered residence in Denmark, were arrested in a rented apartment in Sarajevo on October 19, 2005 as they were assembling a homemade suicide belt. They were found in possession of 18 kilograms of explosives, as well as timing devices and detonators. Their intended target was believed to be a Western embassy in Sarajevo. Bektašević was also linked to terrorist plots in the UK, US, and Denmark. In a second-instance verdict, Bektašević and Cesur were sentenced to 8 and 6 years in prison respectively. In 2009, the Swedish government granted Bektašević's request to serve the remainder of his sentence in a Swedish prison; and he was released in May 2010, after serving two thirds of that sentence. In 2013, Bektašević was convicted in Sweden for a firearms violation, and in January 2016, he was arrested at a bus stop in Alexandroupolis, Greece alongside Al Hasani Amer (a Swedish citizen of Yemeni origin), apparently attempting to cross into Turkey. Machetes and military uniforms were found in their luggage. For more on this, see: Anthee Carassava, “Jihadist terror plotter held in Greece,” *The Times*, February 1, 2016, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4679502.ece> (accessed February 28, 2016).

39 A number of countries have already reported cases of citizens filming their alleged but fake deaths in Syria and Iraq. Some have done so to assume new identities and resettle elsewhere undetected, while others were reportedly preparing to engage in terrorism-related activities and were hoping to stay off the radar of security agencies by being officially listed as deceased.

Court also seized thousands of euros of proceeds from his criminal enterprise.<sup>40</sup> Yet, Hamzabegović never served his sentence. Instead, he fled to Syria in late spring of 2013, where he has since been identified by several sources as the key point person for the transport of newly arrived volunteers from the Balkans into Syria. One of these sources reported that Hamzabegović's nickname, *Hamzabeg*, is used as a password for incoming foreign fighters entering Syria from Turkey at the ISIL-controlled Bab al-Hawa border crossing.<sup>41</sup>

Intelligence sources also believe that the connections and skill set Hamzabegović developed during his smuggling operation were used to extract Nusret Imamović, the former leader of a Salafi community in Gornja Maoča, from Bosnia. He left the country illegally in January 2014.<sup>42</sup> Then, in September 2014, Imamović was one of ten individuals listed by the US State Department as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).<sup>43</sup> The UN also included Imamović on the February 2016 Al-Qaeda Sanctions List "for 'participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of' Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant."<sup>44</sup>

Police records reveal the particularly violent nature of some of the Bosnian men who have become foreign fighters. In a number of instances, officers have described these individuals as "aggressive, and prone to confrontations and disruptions of the public order." In one case, a suspect "declared that he did not recognize the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Another person of interest is described as "uncommunicative and closed, but at the same time extremely explosive and aggressive...[and] well known in the neighborhood for his aggressive propagation of Salafism and hostility toward the Islamic Community in BiH." This individual was said to have "verbally confronted local IC officials" on several occasions and had even "threatened to shoot and kill a local imam."<sup>45</sup>

A history of criminality appears to be common among foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, and not just those from the Balkans. While it is obvious that there is no single typical foreign fighter profile,

40 In close coordination with other groups, Hamzabegović arranged the transfer of migrants in passenger vehicles or by boat from Bosnia, through Croatia and Slovenia, to asylum centers in Western European countries, for a fee of €1,500. For more on this, see (in Bosnian): Presuda [First-Instance Verdict], *Tužilaštva v Muradif Hamzabegović et al*, No. S1 2 K 003606 11 K, May 8, 2012. Available at: <http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/> (accessed February 24, 2016). Also see: Interpol, Wanted Persons, "Hamzabegovic, Muradif," <http://www.interpol.int/notice/search/wanted/2014-8644>.

41 "Govoreći o životu u Siriji, optuženi plakao," *FTV*, March 17, 2015, <http://www.federalna.ba/bhs/vijest/124835/nastavljeno-sudenje-za-dzihadiste-srbiji> (accessed February 28, 2016).

42 From a conversation with an intelligence source who wished to remain anonymous.

43 "Designations of Foreign Terrorist Fighters," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, September 24, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/232067.htm> (accessed February 22, 2016).

44 UN Security Council Subsidiary Organs, Sanctions, ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Sanctions List Materials, Narrative Summaries, No. QDi.374, "Nusret Imamovic," February 29, 2016, [https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/individual/nusret-imamovic](https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/nusret-imamovic) (accessed April 2, 2016).

45 From police files.

a pattern of criminal histories among these individuals has been established in foreign fighter contingents from across Europe, including from Sweden, Belgium, and France. The offenses committed vary from petty crime (crimes of survival) to murder.

It has been reported that criminality among the Kosovo contingent of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is markedly high; some 40% have prior police and judicial records.<sup>46</sup> But a study of 670 German foreign fighters who had departed for Syria or Iraq by June 2015 found that more than half had a criminal record. The most common offenses were assault, theft, drug possession and abuse and, less often, sex crimes.<sup>47</sup> A January 2016 Europol report cites an even higher potential rate of previous criminality among foreign fighters, noting that “a large proportion of recruits (estimates are as high as 80 per cent) have criminal records varying from petty crimes to more serious offences.” The authors speculated that “it may be that recruiters specifically target criminals with an inclination for violence, or that some criminals find that, in joining IS, it provides the opportunity to give free rein to their violent impulses.”<sup>48</sup>

Many criminals are prone to defying and violating social and legal norms, and by providing an overarching ideological justification for their behavior – indeed, not only permitting it but asserting that it is stipulated by God – ISIL frees them from responsibility. Indeed, the recruitment strategy ISIL has devised to reach and mobilize just this audience is encapsulated in slogans like: “People with the worst past can sometimes create the best future” and “It doesn’t matter how you lived, what really matters is how you die.” Or, in the words of Husein Bosnić, the former Salafi leader and ISIL recruiter in BiH, “deeds are valued upon their completion. If you die as a Muslim, everything will be calculated in your favour. If you die as an infidel, everything will be annulled... We pray to Allah to be martyred. This is the best way of dying...”<sup>49</sup>

46 For more on this, see: Shpend Kursani, *Report inquiring into the causes and consequences of Kosovo citizens' involvement as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq*, KCSS, April 14, 2015.

47 See: “Who are Germany’s Islamists?” *Deutsche Welle*, September 24, 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/who-are-germanys-islamists/a-18737894>

48 For more on this, see: Europol Public Information, “Changes in the modus operandi of Islamic State terrorist attacks,” The Hague, January 18, 2016. Available online at: [https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/changes\\_in\\_modus\\_operandi\\_of\\_is\\_in\\_terrorist\\_attacks.pdf](https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/changes_in_modus_operandi_of_is_in_terrorist_attacks.pdf)

49 “Disc 5 – Sermon: The Danger of Media, Media Lies and Deceptions,” Exhibit, *Prosecutor v Husein Bosnić*, No. S1 2 K 017968 14 Kž, Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## Socio-economic Factors

In our previous study of the Bosnian contingent of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, which examined the period from the end of 2012 through 2014, we noted that a significant number of these individuals have come from the geographic, social, and economic margins. With very few exceptions, most have finished only primary school, possess few if any marketable skills, have little work experience, and live in dilapidated houses in remote places with other generations of close relatives.<sup>50</sup> In the last year, additional documentary evidence has confirmed these correlations. And while it cannot be assumed of course that all people departing for Syria and Iraq share the same socio-economic circumstances, it is clear that a specific socio-economic profile is dominant among these migrants.

Police records help illustrate this pattern. For instance, one man from Tešanj who travelled to Syria in the summer of 2013 was reported by police to have “a low level of education, [and to have] lived in very dire socio-economic conditions.... In Syria he received a house, and then had his wife and nine children sent to him.” In a police note about a married couple who travelled to Syria, they were said to have “previously lived in the village of Gornja Maoča, where, due to catastrophic living conditions, their third child, a two-year old girl, died.”

In fact, police records feature remarkably identical descriptions of the socio-economic conditions of most of the men who have left BiH for Syria and Iraq:

“His father is a construction worker, works occasionally, and his wife is a housewife. They are very poor... Unmarried, poor, was unemployed, finished primary school... Unqualified worker, unemployed, poor, used to sell at the market... Married with two children, no income, did not finish primary school... Pensioner, married with six children, a cattle-breeder, poor financial situation... Unemployed, deals in digging and selling coal... Unemployed, lives off the sale of small household equipment, and the illegal trafficking of cigarettes and foreign currency... Married with five children, no regular employment... Lives modestly, collects old iron, furniture, books and sells them at the secondary waste landfills... Married with four children, no steady job, lives off illegal logging...”<sup>51</sup>

Still, police records and open sources do not provide sufficient information about the formal education of these individuals nor about their cognitive and intellectual abilities in general. It appears

50 Vlado Azinović and Muhamed Jusić, *The Lure of the Syrian War: The Foreign Fighters' Bosnian Contingent* (Sarajevo: Atlantic Initiative, 2015).

51 All quotations are taken from original police records provided to the authors.

that the majority of migrants from BiH to Syria and Iraq have only a primary-level education. In just a few cases, they have studied at university, though we are aware of only one case of a person with a university degree emigrating to Syria and Iraq.

Security sources in Serbia have also noted that most of the Serbian foreign fighters now in Syria and Iraq come from the economic and social periphery, often “with little resources and skill, usually no permanent job, and [having attended] just elementary or middle school.”<sup>52</sup> Yet, similar analyses conducted in other countries that are confronting the departure of their citizens to battlefields in the Middle East indicate that patterns seen in BiH and Serbia are reflected in some places, but not in others. Studies have shown that only one quarter of people who departed from Germany to Syria and Iraq have graduated from high school and that 96% of the Australian contingent of foreign fighters has lived on social welfare – echoing our findings in Bosnia – but research in the United Kingdom has found that a large number of British émigrés to Syria and Iraq are well educated and come from wealthy families.<sup>53</sup>

A more focused analysis of individual cases of foreign fighters from Bosnia and Herzegovina reveals that socio-economic and educational background likely played a role in their decision to emigrate to Syria, but also that we must avoid reducing our understanding of the incentives driving radicalization to just socio-economic marginalization, deprivation, poverty, or experiences of injustice. Indeed, for more than a quarter century now, a majority of Bosnians have been exposed to at least one of these factors, or to a convergence of many, and very few have become radicalized as a result.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, one doesn't have to be marginalized or deprived to embrace a seemingly bizarre belief system. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, tens of thousands of young, intelligent university students and graduates from Japan's top institutions, as well as 300 scientists with advanced degrees, joined the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo. Aum accumulated more than 1 billion US dollars in assets and cash and the group's charismatic leader Shoko Asahara – who claimed to be a reincarnation of both Buddha and Christ – frequently preached about a coming Armageddon that only his followers would survive.<sup>55</sup> In the case of Aum, it was not poverty, social exclusion, and injustice that pushed people toward a radical ideology and militant activism. Clearly, how people define and identify themselves and what they believe also matters.

52 From a conversation with sources in Serbia who wish to remain anonymous.

53 As quoted in: Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 4 (2015). Available at: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/446/html> (accessed March 20, 2016).

54 Since the early 1990s, BiH has been plagued by corruption, incompetence, a lack of political accountability, nepotism, unemployment, economic hardship, and a dysfunctional public administration that has impacted all but the most insulated citizens.

55 For more on Aum Shinrikyo, see Ray Kimura, *Aum Shinrikyo: Japan's Unholy Sect*, Book-Surge Publishing, 2002. Though the group has never confessed, members of Aum were responsible for the deadly 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway.

Analysis of the personal data of many Bosnians that eventually migrated to Syria and Iraq shows that they wished to escape lives that, for a variety of reasons beyond the purely socio-economic, were unsatisfying. Many anticipated brighter prospects in a society based on their adopted belief system. These individuals escaped unhappy marriages, domestic violence, debt, criminal prosecution, and substance abuse; or sought something, such as a spouse, an adventure, or belonging and purpose in life. And at the same time, calls from ISIL for *jihad* or *hijra* gave these migrants the added incentive of complying with a divine order.

### The Bosnian Community in Syria and Iraq

Once they reach the Turkish-Syrian border, émigrés from Bosnia and Herzegovina are usually welcomed by fellow countrymen who check the identities and credentials of newcomers upon arrival. Most people arrive with *tezkije* – letters of recommendation issued before their departure, usually by a religious authority respected among fighters in Syria. These were initially issued by Nusret Imamović, the former leader of the Salafi community in Gornja Maoča, and after his departure, reportedly by Husein Bosnić. Police agencies in BiH believe that, following the arrest of Bosnić in the fall of 2014, the task of issuing *tezkije* was transferred to an authority who resides outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Once they enter Syria, newly arrived fighters must submit their passports and cell phones to local (most often ISIL) authorities. They typically spend a few days in a collection center, awaiting other new arrivals until they comprise a group of about 40 individuals. A 7 to 8 week religious and military training program follows, during which recruits have no contacts with their families or friends and their freedom of movement is severely restricted. They are entrusted with personal weapons only at the end of this training process.

Most fighters are deployed in combat formations that, in some cases, bring together people linked by geographical or ethnic origin, or by the languages they speak and understand. Fighters from Bosnia and Herzegovina are usually placed alongside their fellow countrymen, subordinate to larger military units that are often commanded by Chechens. Our research has established the identities of at least two Bosnian citizens who, in the spring of 2016, were members of a unit responsible for carrying out ritual executions of foreign hostages, prisoners, and convicts, mostly by decapitation.



**Figure 22. Life in Syria**



**Figure 23. Life in Syria**

It has been noted that Bosnian émigrés in Syria and Iraq tend to keep together and replicate clan-like communities that resemble the ones they originate from.<sup>56</sup> These clans are considered essential survival units, back home in Bosnia and Herzegovina and even more so in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, at least one-third of people in the Bosnian contingent are somehow related by blood. The social dynamics of life in the vicinity of war zones act to bring further cohesion, and relatives and friends of soldiers who are killed often look after their widows and children.

Almost all the women from BiH in Syria and Iraq keep to traditional gender roles, looking after their children and husbands, and not engaging militarily. A fitting description of the expectations of Bosnian women who emigrate to Syria and Iraq was offered by one Bosnian fighter who took to the Internet to invite Bosnian citizens to migrate: “Sisters do come, leaving behind the land and air of infidels and *kafir*. Come here to live with the orphans and the Mujahideen.... We have unmarried brothers here, we have brothers who would like to have more women, we have brothers who would like to take you under their custody.... So, in short, we have a plenty of room.... Come, help the *Ummah*, give birth to the Mujahideen, nurture the Mujahideen.”<sup>57</sup>

The authors are familiar with only one case of a woman from BiH who reportedly carries arms and serves in the Al-Khansaa Brigade – an all-female police formation in charge of enforcing Islamic rules of conduct and punishment as dictated by ISIL. They sometimes respond brutally to deviations from the prescribed norms.<sup>58</sup> Introducing herself in social networks under the pseudonym “The Sand of Damascus” and “The Heart of the Caliphate”, this woman has posted a number of photographs of herself carrying weapons. One video clip allegedly shows her decapitating another member of the Brigade, whom “The Sand of Damascus” claims was a spy. But because the women in the video are completely covered, it is impossible to establish their identity.<sup>59</sup>

56 It is believed that, in a number of cases, ISIL formations have seized travel documents from their holders and have ordered them to settle in specific areas, reinforcing these ethnicity-based communities.

57 See: “Bosanac iz Sirije poziva muslimanke da se odazovu džihadu,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGe2oCv1U9w> (accessed May 2, 2016). Police agencies have identified the fighter as Edin Zukić, born in 1985 in Banovići.

58 Tumādīr bint ‘Amr ibn al-Ḥārth ibn al-Sharīd al-Sulamīyah, or just al-Khansā’, was an Arabic poet and contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad. The elegies she wrote – dedicated to her brothers who had been killed, and later to her four sons, who died in a conflict between Arabic Muslim forces and the Persian Army in today’s Iraq – made her the most famous of all Arabic poets. The women’s brigade that has been named for her operates in Raqqa and Mosul and is notorious for inflicting violence upon other women who are accused of violating Islamic rules of conduct. For more on this, see: Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, “Escaped Isis wives describe life in the all-female al-Khansa Brigade who punish women with 40 lashes for wearing wrong clothes,” *Independent*, April 20, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/escaped-isis-wives-describe-life-in-the-all-female-al-khansa-brigade-who-punish-women-with-40-lashes-10190317.html> (accessed June 2, 2015).

59 From the region, the only other woman in addition to Bosnian Elvira (Aiša) Karalić who claims to take part in fighting is Kosovar Qamile Tahiri, who the Kosovo Police allege runs a camp in Syria for women from Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo. This 23-year-old mother of two, originally from the area near Mitrovica, recruits others via social networks to come to Syria. See: Xharra.





**Figure 23. “The Sand of Damascus”**

Early Bosnian émigrés to Syria, especially after the declaration of ISIL’s “caliphate,” lived relatively well, although not everyone enjoyed the same circumstances. But coalition air strikes have gradually degraded pipelines and networks for oil smuggling, and Kurdish Peshmerga forces have advanced, undermining the initial stability of ISIL controlled territories and interrupting what was once a regular cash flow into these zones. Insight into communication between Bosnians in Syria and Iraq with their families and friends back home indicates that some fighters now face financial problems so severe that their relatives abroad have sent money.

Diminishing living conditions, frequent ISIL military defeats, and a loss of the territory under ISIL’s control have forced some individuals to contemplate a return to Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are indications that some may be willing to exchange their own freedom (by spending time in jail) for the safety of their families. However, returning to BiH is made more difficult by the fact that most of these people lost or intentionally destroyed their travel documents upon entering Syria. They must now obtain new passports, which is challenging and expensive. Some may decide the risk of apprehension in Turkey is less than the risk of remaining in Syria; and Turkish authorities have already detained several individuals from BiH who tried to leave Syria through Turkey using false documents. They were later extradited from Turkey to BiH in the first half of 2016, and at least two more Bosnian families await extradition.

## Motives for Departure

Numerous research studies produced across the world have so far indicated that there is no single, dominant motive inspiring people to depart for battlefields in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, there are always a variety of motives for any individual, and yet not all of them have an equally mobilizing effect; and ultimately, the individual characteristics of every person are most likely to determine how they prioritize the motives that compel them. Nonetheless, having tracked the departures of citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the battlefields in the Middle East for several years now, the authors believe that, overall, the motives driving these individuals have shifted since the summer 2014. And this has impacted a number of key trends.

Individual and group engagement in the civil war in Syria, which started in March 2011, initially had a universal humanitarian character, triggered by empathy toward the victims of a brutal aggression by a dictatorial regime. As time has passed, this motivation has been co-opted by narrower, theological arguments. Within this context, and due to divisions within opposition forces as well as the appearance of various military formations, foreign interests, and proxy forces, the Syrian conflict has been interpreted as *jihad*, and frequently as a Sunni-Shia conflict.

In the summer of 2014, circumstances in Syria began shifting significantly when ISIL imposed itself as the strongest and most successful military faction among the Syrian opposition, and then declared the establishment of a caliphate. Although ISIL does still use the term *jihad*, it is mostly seen as a mechanism by which to protect and extend the caliphate; instead, it is *hijra* (migration/exodus) that ISIL identifies as the key duty of Muslims outside the territory under its control. Through public appearances and the messaging of its leaders, through activities on social networks, and in particular through their magazine *Dabiq*, ISIL has called for its followers to undertake *hijra* – to move to the self-declared ISIL caliphate just as the Prophet Muhammad moved in 662 from Mecca to Yathrib, which he renamed Medina.<sup>60</sup>

This shift in motives is also visible, to some extent, in the patterns of Bosnian citizens who have travelled to Syria and Iraq from 2012 to 2015. Over time, the draw of solidarity and humanitarian activism against a dictatorial regime has been pushed aside by this strictly religious interpretation of the conflict that

<sup>60</sup> Here is just one quote typical of the calls issued by ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: "Therefore, oh Muslims, hurry up on your way to your country. Yes, this is *your* country. And, therefore, hurry up, since Syria is not only for the Syrians, nor is it only for people from Iraq. This country is the country of all Muslims. Oh, Muslims, wherever you are, whoever is able to migrate (*hijra*) to the Islamic State should do that, since emigration to the state of Islam is mandatory. Many things and great abundance shall await those who migrate, and those who happen to die on their way shall be rewarded. Muslims, make the *hijra*." See a video of this speech at: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uskkil07KRU](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uskkil07KRU) (accessed April 14, 2016). Also see: *Dabiq*, no. 2 (The Flood) and *Dabiq*, no. 3 (The Call to Hijrah). Available at: <http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq>.

calls for *hijra*. As we have already shown, individual and group departures of men from BiH at the start of the Syrian conflict have been increasingly followed by the departure of more and more women and children, and of entire families. While most of the men who left in earlier waves viewed themselves as freedom fighters, only temporarily leaving home in order to come to the aid of their oppressed Syrian brothers, it is our opinion that these later departures of families are in response to the call to migrate to the ISIL caliphate; and they are made with no intention to voluntarily return to BiH.<sup>61</sup> It is very likely that this new motive for people leaving for Syria and Iraq (of *hijra*) explains why there were no registered returns of Bosnian citizens from either of those countries in 2015. Notably, due to the emigration of several generations of some families, Bosnian immigrants in Syria are, on average, older than other immigrants and the proportion of women and children among them is significantly higher.

There is no doubt that, along with any general motivation shared among people who depart for Syria and Iraq, every individual also has other, very personal motives influencing their decision. A comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic, educational, and demographic status of these people, as well as of their intellectual, work, and mental health histories, would certainly enable us to better understand what drives them, and what drives them to leave for Syria and Iraq. Because a more complete analysis of this nature was not part of this study, the indicators presented herein should be viewed with some caution. Nonetheless, in the following chapter, we will try to assess the correlation between these factors and the likelihood that an individual or group will migrate to the ISIL caliphate; however, we should not forget the simple truth that the way people behave often determines the perception they have of themselves, which values they identify with, and what they believe in, as much as the other way around.

---

61 Members of ISIL originally from BiH have been responsible for transmitting this message to their fellow Bosnians in videos. The following quote is from a short video entitled "Honor is in Jihad," which appeared online on June 4, 2015 and exemplifies the tone of this messaging: "Many of you over there complain that you cannot wear a beard, the niqab, that you are having a hard life... So, now seize the chance. Make *hijra* if you must complain that much... Those who believe and migrate, and fight on Allah's path, with bullets and their lives, shall receive rewards of the highest value..." The video is available at: <http://jihadology.net/2015/06/04/al-ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-honor-is-in-jihad-a-message-to-the-people-of-the-balkans/> (accessed June 5, 2015).

---

## IDEOLOGICAL PREPARATION AND RECRUITMENT FOR DEPARTURES

---

Five years of research into the phenomenon of departures by Bosnian citizens to Syria and Iraq has illuminated the existence of efforts to encourage individuals and even entire families to migrate. While such efforts seem at times to occur in isolation, or to be localized only to certain areas of BiH or to certain individuals carrying them out, their prevalence and coordination leads us to conclude that they may very well be quite organized and directed from one or more centers. As yet, the authors lack the information to precisely locate these centers, which could be both in and outside of BiH.

### General Characteristics of the Radicalization Process

Details of the larger (macro) recruitment network may remain unclear, but this research provided invaluable insights into the process of ideological radicalization that precedes departures to Syria and Iraq and occurs on the individual (micro) level. In existing Bosnian Salafi communities, where people who emigrate to Syria and Iraq are most often from, new departures are influenced most prominently by authority figures inside the community, as well as by visiting authorities, often from abroad. The notion that it is necessary for “true Muslims” to move from apostate environments to an Islamic caliphate is said to be a theological imperative, a command of God, from which only a few may be justifiably excluded.

For individuals who do not come from these communities, radicalization is usually initiated through contact with a person who is perceived or represents themselves as an authority figure, or with someone close to them, often a blood relative or good friend. Typically, these people invite potential adherents to some sort of spiritual, proselytizing, or missionary activity; and then, the process of radicalization continues gradually, intensifying through social dynamics and group interactions in which close relations with new, ideological brothers are made. In some cases, that process occurs partly through or is enhanced by online social media networks.

The goal of those who facilitate this process is not solely to inspire departures to Syria and Iraq. The larger desired result is a shift in individual and collective identity, and migration is simply one of the resulting outcomes.

## The Family Dynamics of Radicalization

The process of individual radicalization is, as a rule, very personal and emotional. However, the crucial influence on an individual in the midst of this process is group dynamics. The changes people undergo begin shortly after initiation, when an individual does not yet have to accept the group ideology but enters the radicalization cycle nonetheless, either by following the guide of someone they perceive as an authority figure or by conforming to the majority behavior standards, values, and general rules of the group.<sup>62</sup> This research also shows that young people fighting addiction are sometimes attracted to these communities by their hope to be healed, after they are told in the initiation process of others who have completely recovered from addiction after therapy with the group.

Belonging in such groups usually demands a deep loyalty to its authorities, members, and ideology. But, an important step precedes this level of commitment – an individual must first separate physically and emotionally from the group they belonged to before, and that group is usually their family. Our analysis of numerous witness statements from police investigations in BiH found that family dynamics, especially for youth, are crucially influential in the process of radicalization. And this influence is bidirectional. On one hand, a family can push a young person away and lead them to search for belonging, understanding, and support elsewhere, and very often in the wrong places; on the other, family can be the only remaining corrective force that can pull an individual away from radicalization.

One case offers a poignant example of how the awareness and commitment of parents can potentially combine with intervention by authorities to have a de-radicalizing effect. The authors are familiar with a mother who became worried about changes she noticed in her son, who had a falling out with his father. She feared that the people he was spending more and more time with – and with whom he had begun to live – could influence him to go to Syria. She asked for help from the police in her local community and, working patiently with no prior experience or training, two policemen had a series of friendly, over-a-cup-of-coffee chats with the young man and convinced him to give up on departing. The young man's mother participated by mediating

---

62 Social psychology experiments show how ordinary people are inclined to follow orders from an authority even if it causes someone completely innocent to lose their life. This obedience to authority is rooted in all of us through upbringing (Stanley Milgram). Indeed, the boundary between good and evil is very "permeable" and in certain situations almost anyone can be led to cross it (Phillip Zimbardo). See: Stephen D. Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, "Fueling Terror: How Extremists Are Made," *Scientific American*, March 25, 2016, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fueling-terror-how-extremists-are-made/> (accessed March 28, 2016).

these discussions, and remained his sole contact with the family. At a critical point in the process, she even hid the son's passport in an attempt to prevent him from traveling.<sup>63</sup>

The role of mothers is especially important in Salafi communities with high numbers of emigrants to Syria and Iraq. People in these settlements believe that departure from the community, especially to fight in war (*jihad*), without a mother's approval excludes one from the possibility of seeing her in the afterlife. It also undermines the legitimacy of *jihad*.<sup>64</sup> This is why some young men from BiH have called their mothers from Turkey seeking approval before crossing into Syria. In one such dramatic nighttime call from the airport in Gaziantep, a son who left for Syria that day without his mother's knowledge called to say goodbye and ask for her approval. Instead, an ad hoc intervention took place and his family members managed to dissuade the young man from continuing on his journey to Syria. The next day, he returned to Sarajevo.<sup>65</sup>

It is this kind of influence that makes family, and especially mothers, so crucial in dissuading individuals from radicalization – because their involvement disables the key element of de-identification, through which physical and emotional ties are broken so that new bonds can be made in their place. Where family ties are breaking, the radicalization process is easier, especially if a new community offers young people the things they feel they have been denied – such as attention, respect, understanding, and support – in their families. ISIL has recognized this potential corrective power of family, especially of mothers, and sees it as such a serious hindrance to the recruitment process that it issued a *fatwa* annulling the requirement of a mother's blessing before leaving for war.

If radicalization occurs *within* families, there is a good deal of evidence that the radicalization process is strengthened. The authors are aware of one case in which a father directly influenced his son to carry out a suicide bombing when the young man started to doubt his ability to do so. In various telephone conversations, the father encouraged his faltering son to do what he went to Syria and Iraq to do. This father's intervention is likely to have crucially influenced his son's eventual decision to follow through and blow himself up in Tikrit, Iraq in August 2014.<sup>66</sup>

63 As in other similar cases, the conflict in this family began over a seemingly trivial issue, namely whether or not the youngster could buy a motorcycle. The father objected, and the argument between them got out of control.

64 For more on the concept of *jihad* in Islamic jurisprudence and tradition, see Jusuf el-Kardavij, "Džihad: vrste i implikacije," The Vesatijja Center for Dialog and El-Kalem, Sarajevo 2013.

65 From conversations with witnesses.

66 From conversations with multiple individuals from security services and the judiciary, who wished to remain anonymous.

Indeed, it is not a coincidence that there are a number of close relatives among the perpetrators of terrorist attacks. In recent years, attacks have been carried out by brothers Khalid and Ibrahim el-Bakraoui in Brussels (2015), spouses Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik in San Bernardino, California (2015), brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi in Paris (2015), brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in Boston (2013), and 6 out of 19 hijackers on September 11, 2001 were also brothers. Blood relations have been members of terrorist groups in the past as well. For example, two brothers and two cousins made up the core of the Greek leftist organization 17 November, which was formed in 1975 and operated until 2002 – during which time it executed more than 100 attacks and killed 23 people.

Family closeness strengthens mutual ideological beliefs, deepens the internal cohesion of a group, and hinders its infiltration by unverified and unknown members that could be linked to police or intelligence services. In such circumstances, any act of group betrayal doesn't represent only a renunciation of the ideology and group, but also of the family. A similar potential, especially for young people, is present in peer groups. As in families, such groups can help dissuade an individual from the radicalization process, but can also accelerate the adoption of new ideological beliefs in a group dynamic. During this research, we found no cases where friends dissuaded someone from leaving for Syria or Iraq, but found instead that a rather large number of already close friends had traveled, resided, or are still residing together in those countries.

But family and friends are also best equipped to recognize the first subtle changes in the behavior of their loved ones. Based on insight from witness statements and the findings of investigations in BiH, these early indicators include no longer watching television programs or listening to music, changes in clothing, and changes in habits. Some people have also completely changed their diet.<sup>67</sup> In a number of cases, conflicts have arisen in families when individuals in the process of radicalization have tried to impose their lifestyle changes on other members of the family. In some of these cases, individuals have even used force to prohibit their parents or neighbors from watching television or listening to music, sometimes escalating to confrontations that result in police intervention.

Conflict with family members or friends often leads young people in the radicalization cycle to further isolate themselves. As the process advances, many sell or give away their personal belongings and then finally leave their homes, usually without notice. Their physical separation

---

<sup>67</sup> The perpetrator of the attack on the Zvornik police station in April 2015, Nerdin Ibrić, lost 20 kilograms over the two months during which his radicalization took place. The changes in his appearance were so dramatic that police investigators weren't sure at first if they had correctly determined the identity of the attacker.

from their family enables the radicalization process to continue almost unhindered, in some cases leading rather swiftly to departure to Syria and Iraq.

## Factors of Radicalization

### *Gender Relations and Dual Morality*

In the immigrant communities of Syria and Iraq, it is among Bosnians that women are represented in one of the highest proportions. Some of these women have left their homes in order to join or find their husbands or children.<sup>68</sup> Still, it's not clear what role, if any, many of these women have played in making the decision to leave Bosnia, or if they had any choice in the matter.

Of course, some women have chosen not to go with their husbands and have stayed behind; sometimes with the promise that his "brothers" will look after her while he is on the battlefield. According to the testimonies of some of these women, those brothers have indeed paid them visits, but instead of offering help they have offered sex or marriage. In some cases, husbands who have left send money back to their wives, but some of these men have married new wives – and sometimes more than one – in Syria or Iraq.

A third category of women have departed to Syria without their families, leaving their husbands and children in BiH. Allegedly driven by theology and often accompanied by men they have never met before, except perhaps virtually via social networks, they have moved into entirely new lives. Some of them may have married new husbands prior to their departures, in line with Sharia Law, and some have started new families upon arriving in Syria, giving birth to children there.

The virtual relationships built between recruits, or between recruits and recruiters, via social networks suggest that something of an online dating service has been established, interwoven with elements of proselytism, aimed at supporting efforts to recruit and send people from BiH to Syria and Iraq. Security sources in BiH claim that this process of "romantic recruitment" very often includes the exchange of explicit homemade pornographic content; and Bosnian police agencies are familiar with at least one man, a former criminal and drug addict, who managed to recruit three women in this way. He finally managed to travel with one of these women to Syria, where

<sup>68</sup> The authors are familiar with the case of a mother from the Srebrenik area who left for Syria to find her son. She was killed there in September 2014.



he abused her and kept her under house arrest until her family – through a combination of their utmost efforts and pure luck – managed to free her from imprisonment and bring her home.

These cases exemplify that the morality of many of these men and women is in complete contradiction to what they convey by their conservative physical appearance. Indeed, their choice to take on the aesthetic of traditional conservatism has been narrowed only to form, as proof of their chosen values system, and yet, there may in fact be very little change in their real values or spirituality. This adherence to form can be one of the characteristics of the newly faithful in both Christianity and Islam – usually manifesting in a dedication to physical appearances, symbols, customs, and rituals.

A dual morality is also evident in the way of life of some Salafi leaders in BiH and in the Diaspora. As a rule, they teach their followers to abhor the transience and absurdity of this secular, material life in return for “rewards” that await them in another world; and all the while, these leaders enjoy lives of abundance and luxury.<sup>69</sup> Needless to say, this dynamic is not specific to the Salafi movement. This discrepancy – between a declarative allegiance to poverty and unconditional service to God, and the real world behavior of religious authorities, very often marked by excess and lust – led centuries ago to deep divisions within Christianity and the emergence of a number of sects and branches. And today, it may be even harder to resist the sweet temptation of global consumerism.

### **The Recruitment Power of and Radicalization among Bosnian Diaspora**

Bosnia and Herzegovina has one of the largest diasporas in the world in relation to its current population, estimated at about 3.8 million. Recent analyses show that almost 1.7 million citizens born in BiH live abroad; and counting their descendants, the Bosnian Diaspora comprises approximately 2 million people.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup> According to police sources, a majority of inhabitants in the Salafi community in Gornja Maoča live without basic household amenities. When Nusret Imamović was leader of that community, he reportedly lived in a very comfortable house equipped with modern furniture and accoutrements. Salafi leader Husein Bosnić also stood apart from the community he led in a similar way. And during a search of the apartment of a Salafi authority in Vienna, Mirsad Omerović, alias Ebu Tejma, the police found large sums of money, bank books, and jewelry. Omerović was also known to admire and own expensive sports cars. For more on this, see: “Islamic hate preacher who recruited ISIS poster girls travelled through Europe ‘like a popstar on tour as he brainwashed teenagers,’” *Daily Mail*, 22 February 2016, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3458649/Islamic-hate-preacher-recruited-ISIS-poster-girls-travelled-Europe-like-popstar-tour-brainwashed-teenagers.html> (accessed March 2, 2016).

<sup>70</sup> According to information published by the Council of Ministers of BiH in mid-April 2016, 1,677,177 citizens born in BiH live abroad. The largest numbers live in: Croatia (409,357), Serbia (335,992), Germany (159,380), Austria (149,755), the US (132,255), Slovenia (96,921), Switzerland (57,542), and Sweden (56,477). See: “Vijeće ministara BiH: Poznato koliko Bosanaca i Hercegovaca živi van granica zemlje,” *Faktor*, April 13, 2016, <http://faktor.ba/vijece-ministara-bih-poznato-koliko-bosanaca-i-hercegovaca-zivi-van-granica-zemlje> (accessed April 13, 2016); and “BiH je država s razmjerno najvećom dijasporom na svijetu,” *Jutarnji list*, April 13, 2016, <http://www.jutarnji.hr/bih-je-drzava-s-razmjerno-najvecom-dijasporom-na-svijetu-gradani-najcesce-sele-u-hrvatsku-srbiju-i-njemacku/1559802/> (accessed April 13, 2016).

The immigrant communities from BiH living in the EU, the US, Canada, and Australia are usually cited as examples of successful and complete integration into those societies, and a large majority of people in these communities lead typically peaceful lives. Still, history proves that diasporas, in general, are more susceptible to radicalization into violent extremism. This is related to the fact that members of minority communities living outside their original identity corpus are easily blamed by the majority community surrounding them for real or imagined injustices. The mobilizing narrative of ISIL relies on this dynamic.

Available documentation, as well as consultations with police sources, suggest that a part of the Bosnian Diaspora – especially in Austria and Germany – plays an important role in the process of radicalization and provides logistic support for departures to Middle Eastern war theaters. Travel from those countries into BiH is often used to transport money and courier messages among certain communities and individuals. This kind of outside assistance is also believed to partly facilitate the upkeep of existing Salafi communities, mostly in rural areas of BiH, and their expansion to new locations. This usually includes buying and reconstructing abandoned or ruined houses in former villages near one-time zones of conflict.

The amount of money brought into BiH is not limited by special regulations, and reporting large amounts when entering the country is recommended only in cases when a larger amount yet will be taken out of the country later (a private person can take up to 10,000 KM out of BiH).<sup>71</sup> Members of the Bosnian Diaspora who support recruitment networks usually carry relatively small amounts of money into BiH – from several hundred to a few thousand euros. The messages they are tasked with passing along are usually written down, and according to police sources, messengers are instructed to swallow these notes if they think they may be scrutinized at the border.

The role Bosnian Diaspora play domestically in supporting networks of radicalization, recruitment, and travel is often difficult for BiH authorities to discern since much of the activity of these individuals occurs outside of Bosnia, and this highlights the necessity of inter-agency cooperation across state lines. In the last few years, such cooperation has helped local and foreign police agencies establish that a significant number of people from the Bosnian Diaspora have traveled to battlefields in Syria and Iraq, and that some are key parts of the networks that recruit and support foreign fighters. It is also important to note that many Bosnian returnees from Syria and Iraq have spent time abroad or travel there often.

71 When leaving BiH, there is no requirement to report money or checks of up to 2,500 euro or 5,000 KM.

In some cases, Bosnians have even been at the center of recruitment schemes originating in Western countries. For instance, in early March 2016, Fikret Begić, born in Konjic, was sentenced in Graz, Austria to 8 years in prison for participating in a terrorist organization and recruiting young boys and girls originally from BiH for departure to war theaters in Syria and Iraq. Right before his arrest, Begić ended the lease on his apartment in Graz, presumably because he himself planned to travel to Syria to join ISIL. He was part of a group arrested in an Austrian police operation known as Palmyra, in which raids occurred simultaneously in Vienna, Graz, and Linz in late November 2014.<sup>72</sup> The leader of the group Begić was associated with was Mirsad Omerović (known as Ebu Tejma), born in Serbia and suspected by Austrian authorities not only of radicalization and recruitment but of murdering two underage girls from BiH. Austrian investigators believe Omerović's group took part in the radicalization and recruitment of some 160 people who ended up departing for the war in Syria and Iraq, and that "there was scarcely a single recruit in Europe for jihad in which he and his group were not involved."<sup>73</sup>

One of the most prominent Bosnian fighters in Syria and Iraq, Abdullah Ramo Pazara, came out of the Bosnian Diaspora in the US. In a relatively short period, he managed to rise to commander of one of the ISIL formations that consists predominantly of recruits from the Balkans; and it is believed that just before he was killed in clashes with Kurdish forces around Kobane in the autumn of 2014, Pazara had become a deputy to Omar al-Shishani, a leading ISIL commander in Syria.<sup>74</sup> During the war in BiH, Pazara – who was born in Teslić – fought together with his father in the Army of the Republika Srpska. In the mid-1990s, he emigrated to the United States where he worked as a driver and developed a passion for motorcycles. But in 2011, he lost his job, his marriage failed, and Pazara began spending more time in Salafi circles with ties to militancy. A few days after receiving US citizenship in 2013, he travelled to Syria.

Pazara's departure to the war zone was financially supported by a group of citizens from Teslić, also immigrants to the US. Three men and three women, now residents of St. Louis, Missouri, were arrested in February 2015 by American authorities on the charge that they had collected about 10,000 US dollars to help Pazara and the families of Bosnian soldiers in Syria and to buy military

72 "Austrian police arrest 13 in mass raids against jihad recruiters," *ABC*, November 28, 2014, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-29/austrian-police-arrest-13-in-mass-raids-against-jihad-recruiters/5927538> (accessed April 4, 2016).

73 "Jihadist 'mastermind' on trial in Graz," *Local*, February 22, 2016, <http://www.thelocal.at/20160222/jihadist-mastermind-on-trial-in-graz> (accessed April 2, 2016).

74 For excellent insight into Ramo Pazara's case, see: Lorenzo Vidino and S. Hughes, *ISIL in America: From Retweets to Raqqa*, George Washington University, December 2015, <https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf> (accessed January 4, 2016).

equipment that they intended to send to the battlefield. One was arrested at the airport in New York attempting to travel to Syria.<sup>75</sup>

Bosnian Adis Medunjanin was also arrested and sentenced for terrorist activities in the US. He received a life sentence in 2012 for his role in preparing a suicide bomb attack on the subway in New York City as a member of the group led by Najibullah Zazi.<sup>76</sup> That same year, Bosnian Anes Subašić was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in a seven-member group from North Carolina led by radicalized American Daniel Patrick Boyd. That group was accused of plotting to engage in “violent jihad” outside the US.<sup>77</sup>

On the other side of the globe, in Australia, police arrested five teenagers in April 2015 on suspicion of preparing and planning a terrorist attack, including the 18-year old son of Bosnian immigrants, Harun Čaušević. The group, apprehended in an operation code named Rising, was suspected of plotting attacks against policemen who would be securing a yearly Anzac Day commemoration ceremony for Australian and New Zealand citizens killed in wars and peacekeeping operations.<sup>78</sup> The young men, most of whom hailed from immigrant families, sought revenge for a friend, Numan Haider (originally from Afghanistan), who was killed in September 2014 after stabbing two police officers in Melbourne.<sup>79</sup>

Čaušević paid regular visits to the Al-Furqan Islamic Center in Melbourne, run by Harun Mehičević, a person of interest in several counter-terrorist investigations conducted by Australian police. Mehičević, originally from Mostar, has allegedly purchased land and a home in the Bosnian Salafi settlement in Ošve. In 2012, during a visit by Mehičević to BiH, Australian police searched the Al-Fur-

75 Ramiz Hodžić, Sedina Hodžić, Nihad Rosić, Mediha Salkičević, Jasminka Ramić, and Armin Harčević allegedly funneled these funds plus military gear including uniforms and rifle scopes to the cause. Rosić was picked up allegedly headed to Syria to join the fight. For more on this, see: Indictment, *United States v. Hodzic, et al.*, No. 4:15-cr-00049 (February 5, 2015); and Robert Patrick, “Allegations of St. Louis Terrorism Support Rooted Back in Bosnian War,” *St. Louis Today*, April 11, 2015. Also see: “U Siriji Poginuo Ramo Pazara, Komandant Džihadista iz BiH,” *Radio Sarajevo*, September 25, 2014; “U Siriji Poginuo i Ramo Pazara iz Teslića,” *SAFF*, September 24, 2014; and “Ramo Abdullah Pazara: Sprski Ratnik i Islamski Fanatik,” *Slobodna Bosna*, February 19, 2015.

76 “New York bomb plotter Adis Medunjanin sentenced to life,” *BBC News*, November 17, 2012, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-20371785>, (accessed December 2, 2012).

77 “North Carolina Resident Anes Subasic Sentenced for Terrorism Violations,” press release, US Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of North Carolina, August 24, 2012, <https://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2012/north-carolina-resident-anes-subasic-sentenced-for-terrorism-violations> (accessed April 2, 2013).

78 See: “Terror accused Harun Causevic will be forced to wear tracking device,” *Herald Sun*, September 16, 2015, <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/terror-accused-harun-causevic-will-be-forced-to-wear-tracking-device/news-story/f1fd37e3d551a86239c64648dfdf1864> (accessed April 2, 2016); and “Dropping of Harun Causevic terrorism charge ‘will erode confidence in police,’” *The Guardian*, August 25, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/aug/25/dropping-of-harun-causevic-terrorism-charge-will-erode-confidence-in-police> (accessed March 30, 2016).

79 “Terror suspect shot dead after two police officers stabbed in Endeavour Hills,” *Age*, September 24, 2014, <http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/terror-suspect-shot-dead-after-two-police-officers-stabbed-in-endeavour-hills-20140923-1015d4.html#ixzz44poCT1Hg> (accessed April 2, 2016). Also see: “Melbourne shooting: Abdul Numan Haider may not have been alone before attacking counter-terrorism officers,” *ABC*, September 25, 2014, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-25/police-stabbing-prompts-calls-for-arming-of-all-officers/5768006> (accessed April 2, 2016).

qan Mosque and Mehičević was interrogated by officials at the SIPA Regional Office in Mostar.<sup>80</sup> According to some sources, his questioning in connection to the April 2015 arrests in Operation Rising and another raid of his Al-Furqan Mosque at that time were seen as potential triggers for an act of retaliation in BiH. This concern was linked to a warning about a possible terrorist attack on international or local targets issued by security agencies just days before the attack on a police station in Zvornik on April 27, 2015.<sup>81</sup>

## Mental Health

Even with only limited access to police documentation, we were able to discern another apparent trend among a significant number of individuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina believed to have departed for battlefields in Syria and Iraq. Based on just some police records and media reports, it is clear that a number of them come from dysfunctional and very often broken families, or from single mother homes. In some cases, there are indications that they were exposed to domestic violence at a young age, usually along with alcoholism or some other kind of addiction on the part of a parent, most frequently the father. These psychosocial conditions are known to impact long-term mental health.<sup>82</sup>

Early life experiences have also been cited as an influencing factor by some of the people close to individuals who have departed. The friend of one of the most notorious fighters from BiH currently in Syria (as of April 2016) claims that he was “a gorgeous child with a painful life experience.” He lost his father at 9 years old, and when his mother remarried, he went to live with his grandmother. Since his grandmother’s death when he was 15, he has been taking care of himself. “He was a good student, interested in studying global conspiracy theories,” his friend said in an interview, but “something triggered him to go through an emotional transformation.”<sup>83</sup>

80 Harun Mehičević is also connected with another Australian of Bosnian origin who is suspected by the authorities of “assistance in a terrorist attack.” Adnan Karabegović was arrested in September 2012 in Melbourne. For more on this see: “Trial of terror accused Adnan Karabegovic set for October,” *Age*, March 20, 2015, <http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/trial-of-terror-accused-adnan-karabegovic-set-for-october-20150319-1m3mk3.html#ixzz44sMmhkoY> (accessed March 28, 2016); and “Melbourne’s al-Furqan Islamic centre a key focus for ASIO,” *Australian*, April 22, 2015. Also see: “I Harun Mehičević kupio zemlju u Ošvama,” *Nezavisne novine*, July 27, 2015, <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/I-Harun-Mehicevic-kupio-zemlju-u-Osvama/317325> (accessed July 27, 2015).

81 Only three days before the attack in Zvornik, the Bosnian intelligence service, the OSA, delivered a warning to domestic police agencies that recent arrests of Bosnian citizens in Australia on terrorism charges could trigger revenge attacks in BiH. The OSA called for increased caution, “especially... [at] public gatherings, embassies, religious shrines, and military and police buildings,” but said it lacked “information that would point to a concrete site of attack.” Still, multiple police and intelligence sources interviewed for this analysis saw no connection between the OSA warning and the Zvornik attack, expressing their belief that the attack only coincidentally occurred at the same time. For more on this, see: Vlado Azinović, *Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Nexus with Islamist Extremism*, AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis, Policy Note, No. 5, November 2015.

82 See: Lynn Hecht Schafran, “Domestic Violence, Developing Brains, and the Lifespan: New Knowledge from Neuroscience,” *The Judges Journal* 53, no. 3 (2014).

83 “Instead of being at the faculty, they ended up in the battlefields,” *Dnevni avaz*, December 16, 2013.

A Europol report from the beginning of 2016 found that 20% of the EU citizens who have left for foreign battlefields had been diagnosed with severe mental health disorders prior to their departures to Syria and Iraq. According to some sources, this percentage is actually substantially higher.<sup>84</sup> And indeed, a police study of 500 cases in the UK found that 44% of the individuals involved in radicalization into violent extremism have “vulnerabilities related to mental health or psychological difficulties.” In that study, an additional 15% of yet unconfirmed cases also indicated these vulnerabilities.<sup>85</sup> If confirmed, this would mean that well over half of individuals from the UK linked to extremist violence exhibit signs of mental instability.

Still, caution must be taken in declaring any correlation between mental illness and the “success” of radicalization. Only experts can validly evaluate the impact of medical diagnoses in such cases. And, making frequent connections (especially in publicly-viewed media) between mental illness and radicalization into violent extremism may create the impression that only mentally ill people are attracted to radical ideologies. Further, psychologists claim that about 20% of the general population suffer from some kind of mental health disorder; meaning that Europol’s determination of the rate among foreign fighters is consistent with the general rate of mental illness.

Because we are not medical experts, and are therefore unable to make qualified judgments concerning mental health, we rely here on notes made by police. The documents made available to us frequently mention mental illness in connection with individuals who have either been to Syria and Iraq or are still there. In a number of cases, these records describe a person as “psychologically unstable” or “addicted to drugs.” One case file says that a person who departed for Syria was “diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.” Another is said to have “received hormonal and psychotherapy in childhood due to growth slowdown and a decline in mental development.”<sup>86</sup>

Notably, in at least 20 cases, the authors found notes or testimony about men and women who had departed to Syria having first confided to family members and friends that *jinn* (supernatural evil spirits) had overcome them. Due to the stigma attached to mental illness in many traditional communities, these people rarely seek assistance within the healthcare system, instead visiting “folk healers” for alternative and more discrete treatment. Traditionally, the clerics of religious communities in BiH provide this type of assistance; and this may have opened a door to opportunistic recruitment in some instances.

84 Europol, *Changes in the modus operandi of Islamic State terrorist attacks*, 8.

85 Vikram Dodd, “Police study links radicalisation to mental health problems,” *The Guardian*, May 20, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/may/20/police-study-radicalisation-mental-health-problems> (accessed May 21, 2016).

86 From notes taken by police.

Police notes indicate that some of the individuals who have departed for Syria and Iraq received spiritual healing known as *ruqya* from Nusret Imamović and Husein Bosnić, two key leaders of the Salafī movement in BiH.<sup>87</sup> Essentially, *ruqya* – sometimes called Qur’anic healing – is a form of exorcism, aimed at casting out evil spirits (*jinn*) from a person who is obsessed and haunted by them. Various afflictions, from severe personality disorders to addiction, may be seen as resulting from *jinn*, depending on a person’s world view.

In one documented case of Imamović using *ruqya*, he removed 19-year-old Mevludin Ahmetspahić from the healthcare facility where he was hospitalized in May 2013 upon his return from Syria, after he had “a nervous breakdown” at the Sarajevo airport, which later manifested as “homicidal and suicidal ideations.” The police reported that Imamović took the young man to Gornja Maoča and “healed him by the Qur’an.” Later that year, in the beginning of August, Ahmetspahić travelled again to Syria; and by the end of 2014, had been killed somewhere in the vicinity of Kobane.<sup>88</sup>

Husein Bosnić seems to have made something of an industry out of providing *ruqya*, opening up his home near Bužim, where he lived with his four wives and sixteen children, as a spiritual rejuvenation center. During a search of the property carried out during a September 2014 police operation known as Damascus, State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) officers found 10 people waiting to receive treatment, sleeping on the floor of a single room.<sup>89</sup> People from outside BiH – from Slovenia, Italy, Austria, and elsewhere – came to see Bosnić, also known as Bilal, to undergo *ruqya*. In some cases, individuals reportedly went almost immediately from treatment with Bosnić to foreign battlefields.

Jure Kurelec (29), from Slovenia, sought *ruqya* from Bosnić several times before departing for Syria, where he was killed in the fall of 2014.<sup>90</sup> According to Slovenian sources, two other Slovenian citizens had similar experiences – receiving *ruqya* from Bosnić prior to departing for Syria or Iraq – and one is known to have spent significant time with Bosnić, who took him to visit Islamic congregations in the West. Eventually, the young man was hospitalized in a psychiatric clinic.<sup>91</sup>

87 To watch a *ruqya* treatment given by Bosnić, see (in Bosnian): “Rukja – Liječenje Kur’anom – istjerivanje đinna/šejtana [Ruqyah – Qur’an Healing – casting out *jinn* and Satan], Bilal Bosnić,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SW1-rXWfnuo> (accessed April 2, 2016).

88 From notes taken by police. The Court of BiH acquitted Mevludin’s brother, Munib, of charges against him for aiding the attack at the US Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011. On May 14, 2013, the brothers departed together from Sarajevo International Airport to Turkey, and on to Syria.

89 From a conversation with officers who took part in this action.

90 Ksenija Koren, “Slovinci se za sveto vojno urijo v Bosni,” *Slovenske novice*, December 20, 2014, <http://www.slovenskenovice.si/novice/slovenija/slovinci-se-za-sveto-vojno-urijo-v-bosni-0> (accessed December 23, 2014); Ksenija Koren and Pia Pangos, “To je Jure Korelec, v džihadu izgubljeni Slovenec,” *Slovenske novice*, October 1, 2014, <http://www.slovenskenovice.si/novice/slovenija/je-jure-korelec-v-dzihadu-izgubljeni-slovenec> (accessed October 3, 2014).

91 “Islamist Matevž pristal na psihiatriji,” *Slovenske novice*, October 2, 2014, <http://www.slovenskenovice.si/novice/slovenija/islamist-matevz-pristal-na-psihiatriji> (accessed April 3, 2016).

There is also the case of Ismar Mešinović (36), who faced difficulties breaking free from drug addiction and also asked Bosnić for help. He lived in Italy with his wife – whom he had in fact met at a commune where they had both been trying to overcome addiction – and their 3-year-old son. After treatment with Bosnić in BiH, Mešinović returned to Italy. Yet, by the end of 2013, he had departed for Syria and had taken his son with him, without his wife's permission. Only three months later, Mešinović was killed. His young son was adopted by the family of a fellow fighter, Seid Čolić, who was also killed, at the beginning of 2015.<sup>92</sup>

Elvira Balić-Karalić (29) sought assistance from Bosnić, too. Police records, based on witness statements, explain that “in the course of 2013 Elvira started to behave aggressively, saying that everybody in her house was an infidel and that she was the only true believer, and then she started neglecting her children and her husband and no longer kept the house tidy.” One witness claimed that Elvira had visited Bosnić at the end of October 2013 in order to “cast *jinn* from her.” Just two weeks later, Elvira left her husband and two children (3 and 10 years old at the time). In line with Sharia Law,<sup>93</sup> she married Said Huseinović – who had until then lived in France and whom she met through Facebook – and in November 2013, they crossed the Uvac border in BiH by car and left for Syria. There, they had a son in 2014, and Huseinović died in February 2016.

Though he was not known to have contact with Imamović or Bosnić, Emrah Fojnica, the first suicide bomber from BiH, had also complained to people close to him about being haunted by *jinn*. It remains unclear whether he was killed detonating his vest in Tikrit on August 8, 2014 or whether he was killed in another manner while wearing it, but it is clear that he had volunteered to become a member of ISIL's suicide bomber platoon. Yet, based on insight from communications between Fojnica and people from BiH, it is also clear that he became conflicted over time, with his determination to blow himself up shaken, and he attributed this indecisiveness to possession by *jinn*. Despite this, he was encouraged by his father in BiH to follow through on what he had volunteered for; and when the news arrived that he had been killed, his father reportedly “celebrated” Emrah's martyrdom by firing bursts from an automatic rifle.<sup>94</sup>

92 “Izmar iz Doboja u Italiji oteo sina i odveo ga u ISIL u Siriju,” *Nezavisne novine*, December 10, 2015, <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Izmar-iz-Doboja-u-Italiji-oteo-sina-i-odveo-ga-u-ISIL-u-Siriju/341584> (accessed December 12, 2015); “Kupuju zemlju u Maglaju: Ratnici Islamske države dolaze u BiH?,” *Dnevni avaz*, May 25, 2015, <http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/179549/kupuju-zemlju-u-maglaju-ratnici-islamske-drzave-dolaze-u-bih?url=clanak/179549/kupuju-zemlju-u-maglaju-ratnici-islamske-drzave-dolaze-u-bih> (accessed May 26, 2015).

93 In the strict Salafist interpretation, only Wahhabi/Salafi adherents are true Muslims; and thus, marriage between a female adherent and a male non-adherent is considered void, as marriage between a Muslim woman and non-Muslim man would be considered void under Sharia Law.

94 According to a number of police and judicial sources who wished to remain anonymous. Fojnica (along with Munib Ahmetpahić) had earlier been acquitted by the Court of BiH of the charge of aiding the attack at the US Embassy in Sarajevo on October 28, 2011.



It seems worth remembering Nerdin Ibrić here as well. Although not directly linked to departures to foreign battlefields, he was responsible for a lone wolf attack on the police station in Zvornik on April 27, 2015. Ibrić had also complained to friends that he was obsessed with and haunted by *jinn*. He eventually received the treatment from a well-known Bosnian Salafi authority, a few weeks before his attack in Zvornik. The authors are familiar with several more similar cases, subject to ongoing investigations, in which suspects have admitted to having problems with mental illness and to seeking help outside the healthcare system.<sup>95</sup>

Due to our limited capacity to gain thorough insight into these and similar cases, it is impossible to solidly corroborate a connection between mental illness and ideological radicalization, much less its link to the commission of violence after departure to Syria and Iraq. Indeed, it may be that mental illness itself does not predispose one to radicalization, but it may nonetheless be seen by recruiters as a weakness that can be exploited. Either way, the frequency with which records indicate that people who have left for Middle Eastern battlefields from BiH have suffered from apparent psychiatric disorders demands additional and reliable research on this topic.

### **Salafi Settlements in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

After the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended in 1995, demobilized foreign fighters and their families, already established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, joined others who had embraced Salafism and began settling in remote and isolated locations along former military front lines. Over the past two decades, they have purchased and rebuilt devastated and abandoned homes in these rural parts of the country, moving into them with their extended families. In this time, the number of such settlements has gradually increased; and while the majority of people in these settlements live in peace and seclusion, occasional support for terrorism by Salafi authorities and their followers, both international and domestic, brings them into conflict with the law.

When the war broke out in Syria, a portion of the male population of these settlements went immediately to the Syrian battlefields. Over time, women and children followed them, leaving Bosnian society because they consider it infidel for straying from their interpretation of God's Law. And so, since the declaration of the so-called Islamic Caliphate in the summer of 2014, Syria and Iraq have become the destinations not only of fighters but also of anyone who seeks to live

<sup>95</sup> From a conversation with a source that investigated the Zvornik attack. There are a number of similar cases reported elsewhere. In the UK, Michael Adebowale, who stabbed and hacked to death off-duty soldier Lee Rigby in May 2013, was reported as having "psychotic symptoms before the attack." He also believed that "spirits called Djinn would make him do things and were 'playing with him.'" Experts believe he felt "his religion lessened the effects of the psychosis." For more on this, see: Dodd, "Police study links radicalisation to mental health problems."

in a country organized according to the values of Salafism. Adherents no longer needed to find seclusion and shelter in remote Bosnian mountainsides – ISIL called for the faithful to meet their religious obligations by migrating, and a number of Bosnians have responded. Indeed, this study has shown that a significant number of the Bosnian nationals who have travelled to Syria and Iraq have lived in, stayed for some time in, or visited traditional Salafi communities in the past. In some cases, former inhabitants of these settlements have sold their property or assigned ownership of it to another person, reducing the population of some of these settlements in a short span.

Nusret Imamović, the one-time leader of the Salafi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, sold, donated, or re-assigned ownership rights to his properties before emigrating to Syria with his wife and four children. Unlike most of his followers, Imamović joined the Al-Nusra Front – a choice that has caused division among some Bosnian Salafists, even in the Gornja Maoča Salafi community where Imamović was the absolute authority until 2014.<sup>96</sup> In fact, he was publicly disowned and condemned by some former followers, including Husein Bosnić and Abid Podbićanin. The movement was shaken further in the fall of 2014 by a police operation known as Damascus, which resulted in the arrest and subsequent trial of Bosnić.

The perceived importance of the isolated Salafi settlements in Gornja Maoča, Ošve, Dubnica and elsewhere to the Salafi movement has been tempered by immigrations from these settlements to Syria and Iraq, and by the collapse of the previous hierarchy of the movement and internal fractures caused by loyalties to clashing factions in the Middle East. Further, stigmatization of the movement after the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, and in particular Rajlovac, led its leaders to temporarily reduce its visibility and members to retreat to the privacy of their homes. Still, while those earlier settlements in rural Bosnia were foundational for the movement, Salafism has begun to spread noticeably into suburban and even urban centers, particularly in and around Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla.<sup>97</sup> And this trend has been accompanied by the development of an infrastructure for material and spiritual support that is propping up adherents. Accordingly, a typical form of small entrepreneurship has emerged in cities, wherein adherents run small shops that sell and repair mobile phones and computers, operate car washes and garages, or have kiosks that sell religious literature alongside staples like honey, eggs, fruits, and vegetables.

96 Several sources interviewed for this study claimed that about 90% of the Salafists who remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina support ISIL, which has fought against the Al-Nusra Front since 2014. A similar level of support for ISIL is reported among Bosnians in Syria and Iraq.

97 Despite this trend, the interest of foreign journalists and experts who visit the Balkans remains steadfastly focused on the Salafi settlements in Gornja Maoča and Ošve. The “research” that comes from visits to these settlements usually results in reports brimming in stereotypes and enriched by images of bearded men and women in burkas but lacking any real understanding of the local context.

In interviews conducted for this research, several security sector sources also pointed to the recent emergence of a network of small real estate companies, especially in Sarajevo, established to purchase land for the construction of residential complexes for tourists from Arab countries – who, over the past couple of years, have begun spending a part of their summer holidays in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Security agencies believe that a part of the profits generated from the re-sale of this land to Arab investors has been used to finance parallel, unregistered, and illegal organizations that support the immigration of Salafists to cities.

### **Para-jamaats**

Since mid-2015, the Islamic Community (IC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been working to gain insight into the actions of Muslim organizations, groups, and individuals who carry out religious services and teaching outside its authorization. Some of these organizations have actually usurped the property of the Islamic Community, hindering its own work, and some operate from private houses and apartments. Among these are Salafi and Shiite congregations, i.e. *jamaats* (Arabic for “assembly”). According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Law on Freedom of Religion and the Position of Churches and Religious Communities, only the Islamic Community is authorized to organize and conduct religious activities based on Islamic teaching. Any groups operating outside its purview are known colloquially as “*para-jamaats*.”

The Islamic Community has found that members of *para-jamaats* are mostly younger, though their social and economic statuses vary. These members criticize the Islamic Community, *inter alia*, for embracing apostates, for being preoccupied with material over spiritual matters, and for promoting the traditional practices and customs of Bosnian Islam – which is regarded in fundamentalists circles as a “novelty.”<sup>98</sup> These *para-jamaats*, which often operate out of private residences, are led by Islamic missionaries called *da'is*, who have graduated from universities outside of Bosnia without completing any secondary religious schooling through the Islamic Community, meaning they do not qualify to work under the auspices of the IC.

According to a report of the executive body (*Riyasat*) of the Islamic Community on negotiations with these groups, these missionaries “follow the ideals of Islamic leaders who do not live in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” After months of talks with representatives of 38 *para-jamaats* (13 in Zenica, 12 in Sarajevo, 17 in Tuzla, 3 in Bihać, 2 in Mostar, and 1 in Travnik), 14 have agreed to join the Is-

98 The phenomenon of *para-jamaats* is not specific to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and has also been noted in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania.

lamic Community.<sup>99</sup> In the aftermath of this process, some of the para-*jamaats* that refused to join the Islamic Community have been fined or closed by Bosnian authorities because they are unable to produce official authorizations for their activities, as required by law.<sup>100</sup>

Research conducted by the Atlantic Initiative, the results of which will be published in a separate study, indicates that the groups centered around these para-*jamaats* act as typical sects, i.e. religious congregations. Members blanket each other in “brotherly and sisterly love,” “kindness and respect,” and “good energy” and consider themselves morally superior to people in the community surrounding them, who they perceive as sinful and apostate. Indeed, members see themselves as part of a small, select group of true believers; and as such, they are particularly antagonistic toward the Islamic Community, which they claim teaches “*red Islam*” via imams they refer to as “*Muslims for hire*.”<sup>101</sup>

The activities of para-*jamaats* center around the missionary work of *da'is*, the number of which is estimated at more than 200. Most commonly, these *da'is* proselytize in religious lectures, or when teaching computer and foreign language courses, which are usually offered through these para-*jamaats*. Most of the locations accommodating these activities are relatively modest, but some have swimming pools, football pitches, and tennis courts, and some even organize summer camps and martial arts courses. Research has shown that members of these organizations are tightly connected, socializing with and visiting one another frequently.<sup>102</sup>

It is alleged that in 2015, the idea to prepare and carry out a terrorist attack in Sarajevo on New Year's Eve was born in one such informal community center, located in the Sarajevo neighborhood of Brijesće. On December 22, 2015, in Operation Cut, police apprehended 11 Salafists involved in this plan, on charges of terrorism, financing of terrorism, incitement and preparation of a criminal act, and recruitment of foreign fighters. They are further charged with violating the Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities.<sup>103</sup> If they are found guilty, the proof of their plot will highlight the ideas and intent that may potentially arise in these para-*jamaats*.

99 “Izvršitelj Rijasetu: Pročitajte koji su nelegalni džemati pristali da rade u okviru IZ, a koji su to odbili,” *Dnevni avaz*, April 23, 2016, <http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/232255/izvrstaj-rijasetu-procitajte-koji-su-nelegalni-dzemati-pristali-da-rade-u-okviru-iz-a-koji-su-to-odbili> (accessed April 23, 2014).

100 For more on this, see: “Bosnia's 'radical' Muslims defy crackdown,” *AFP*, May 28, 2016. Also see: “Počela inspekcija paradžemata u FBiH,” *Al Jazeera Balkans*, May 12, 2016, <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/pocela-inspekcija-paradzemata-u-fbih> (accessed May 16, 2016); and “Izet Hadžić iz sela Ošve kažnjen sa 500 KM,” *N1*, May 16, 2016, <http://ba.n1info.com/a96016/Vijesti/Vijesti/Izet-Hadzic-iz-sela-Osve-kaznjen-sa-500-KM.html>, (accessed May 17, 2016).

101 From interviews with members of these groups. The term “red Islam” insinuates that the practice of Islam in Bosnia was diluted or distorted by communism.

102 From Atlantic Initiative research that will be published in the summer of 2016.

103 “Akcija Rez: Uskoro moguća optužnica za terorizam,” *Dnevni avaz*, January 20, 2016, <http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/215471/akcija-rez-uskoro-moguca-optuznica-za-terorizam?url=clanak/215471/akcija-rez-uskoro-moguca-optuznica-za-terorizam> (accessed January 20, 2016).

The emergence of *para-jamaats* in Bosnia and Herzegovina has brought attention to a much more serious, accessory problem – that these ostensibly religious organizations do not limit their activities to the sphere of spirituality. In fact, they are becoming more noticeable in almost every sector in which the state, due to its weakened capacities (resulting from political obstruction, corruption, nepotism, and incompetence), is unable to meet the needs of citizens through public services. A significant number of congregations have established non-governmental organizations that independently, and in coordination, are filling the vacuum created by the failures of the state. They are establishing parallel or alternative structures for education, health, and social protection, providing services such as kindergarten, daycare, and support for female victims of domestic abuse, without registering their organizations, offering state-approved programs, or proving the qualifications of service providers.<sup>104</sup> These organizations are not only offering alternative services, but are carrying out a kind of conservative revolution that is fundamentally changing the values and identity of some Bosnians.

### ***Developments in Syria and Iraq Reflected in the Bosnian Salafi Community***

The conflict between the Al-Nusra Front and ISIL is only one of a number of clashes within the Salafi movement that was triggered by the war in Syria and Iraq. The core conflict in Salafism is actually between the Salafi-jihadism movement – which follows the Al-Qaeda model – and the newer, mutated version of this ideology developed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. But, the emergence of ISIL has also stirred conflict between traditional Salafists, who respect the official *ulema* of Saudi Arabia as the cradle of Salafism, and young followers of “Caliph” El-Baghdadi.

ISIL does all it can to show that only its followers are the true followers of Salafism, and thus the only true Muslims, arguing that the Saudi Salafi model has betrayed the fundamental principles of “pure learning of Islam” and “ruling upon God’s laws.” In territories under its control, ISIL prints and distributes books by Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab, the founder of Salafism, that feature the ISIL logo. If they succeed in wresting Salafism from the Saudi *ulema*, which they accuse of allegiance to corrupt rulers, ISIL will crack the foundation that props up the ruling Saudi family, the heads of which hold the honorary title of “Servant of Two Temples” (Protector of the Holy Towns of Islam, Mecca and Medina). Indeed, the Saudi political system depends on that foundation, and the ruling family will not willingly let it be compromised.

<sup>104</sup> The authors were advised of this phenomenon by several interviewees who wished to remain anonymous. In one interview, with a security sector source, a “parallel” daycare center in a suburb of Sarajevo was described as regularly showing ISIL films of the beheadings of captured hostages from the West. The children are reportedly instructed to stand up and cheer these acts.

Still, the conflict within Salafism has always been about more than Saudi Arabia, its ruling family, or its religious elite; and it has spread to all the parts of the world where Salafism has followers, including to the Balkans and to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In early September 2014, for instance, ISIL fighters allegedly threatened a former member of Bosnia's El-Mujahid Unit, Imad al Husin (known in BiH as Abu Hamza), after he condemned the group's actions in Syria to the American magazine, *The Nation*. These fighters said Husin would "be punished for the accusations brought against them."<sup>105</sup> And before that, in August 2014, an ISIL fighter from Brčko, Senad Grabus, urged in a Facebook post that journalists from the magazine *Saff* should be killed.<sup>106</sup> *Saff* is recognized as the media of traditional Salafists who respect official Salafi authorities, and it has received threats even from other (extremist) media outlets, including from the online news portal *The News of the Ummah*, which directly threatened the editor of *Saff*.

There is a tendency among analysts to view Salafists as a monolith, but even prior to the rise of ISIL, they were one of the Islamic movements with the largest number of factions – the majority of which have developed their own visions of the Islamic world and of the societies they interact with. What all Salafists have in common, though, is that they consider themselves the only true followers of the *Sunnah* (the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad) and believe theirs is the only valid interpretation of Islamic tradition. Before the emergence of ISIL, there were four main Salafist factions, and this is reflected in the branches of the movement in BiH.

The Salafi movement was established to adhere to the teachings of reformer Sheik Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab from the Arab peninsula. Official messaging supported by the Saudi royal family reflects the tone of the *taqlidiyun* – traditional conservatives who are explicitly apolitical and who claim that militant Salafists, such as Osama bin Laden, "only create disturbance in the world." One of the most conservative wings of this branch is led by Saudi Sheikh Rabee al-Madkhalee, who has yet to attract many followers in BiH but who has attracted some among the Bosnian Diaspora, particularly in Sweden. Still, there is a group of Salafists in BiH who advocate very conservative views in terms of their interpretation of Islamic tradition, though they do not support violent extremism. They do, however, criticize Bosnian Islam, refuse to recognize the authority of the Islamic Community, and advocate for parallel religious institutions – so-called "para-jamaats" – and the segregation of their communities from the rest of society.<sup>107</sup>

105 "Daesh threatened Abu Hamza: 'They have sent me a message that they will retaliate against me as I have condemned their actions in Syria,'" *Saff*, September 4, 2014, <http://saff.ba/idis-uputio-prijetnje-abu-hamzi-porucili-su-mi-da-ce-mi-se-osvetiti-jer-sam-osudio-njihovo-djelovanje-u-siriji/> (accessed February 11, 2016).

106 "Senad Grabus, member of ISIL from Syria stated that journalist from Saff should be killed," *Saff*, August 14, 2014, <http://saff.ba/senad-grabus-pripadnik-isil-a-iz-sirije-pozvao-da-se-pobiju-novinari-saffa/> (accessed February 11, 2016).

107 Fikret Karčić, "What is the 'Islamic tradition of Bosniaks,'" *Preporod*, December 7, 2006.

The *Sahwa* Movement (the Awakening Movement) of Salafi reformers enjoys the greatest support among Salafists both in Saudi Arabia and outside of it. They advocate for Islamization through gradual reforms, a strong focus on upbringing and education, and an eventual ideological confrontation with secularists and liberals. They oppose violent methods and are constantly evolving their views by increasingly accepting more open and liberal values, which is atypical for traditional Salafists. Supporters of the *Sahwa* in BiH are followers of *ulema* such as Selam al-Awadi, Safar al-Hawali, Nasser al-Omar, and other Saudi Salafi reformers. These clerics respect the authority of the Bosnian state and the Islamic Community, though they remain highly critical of them, and have supported the most recent decision of the Islamic Community that “para-jamaats” – which act outside its scope – should be put under its control.

Militant Salafism is the realm of *ihadists*. Those who advocate “legal jihad” see battle as a strict religious obligation of every Muslim, but only when Muslims are attacked and the enemy is clearly defined (as in conflict zones such as BiH was during the war). The majority of Bosnian Salafists who believe in “legal jihad” are fighters within units like Ahrar ash-Sham or are deployed in Syria alongside the Al-Nusra Front, though they do not agree with the activities of global Al-Qaeda.

The most extreme form of Salafi ideology was developed under the influence of militant Islamic movements in Egypt on battlefields and in training camps in Afghanistan – where Salafi religious conservatism was combined with the idea of *takfir* (the practice of declaring other Muslims are infidels). These jihadists are thus “takfiri jihadists.” After September 11, 2001, with the unconscious support of global media, these militants rose to become the sole representatives of Islamic extremism, undermining the identity of the *mujahid* – who advocate “legal jihad” and who are disinclined to terrorism but inclined to be “freedom fighters” when Muslims are under attack.

Followers of ISIL in BiH threaten other Salafists, as well as other Muslims, all of whom they consider heretical. And interestingly, they target other Muslims more often than members of other religious groups or media or public figures in Bosnian society. Indeed, the war for the soul of Salafism is being waged not only in Syria and Iraq, but among Salafists in Bosnia and across the region.

## The ISIL Narrative

The ISIL narrative is rich with references to the victimization of Muslims throughout history and it interprets the world through a lens of injustice and humiliation. This framing, meant to initiate sympathy for the collective suffering of Muslims, introduces violence as the only way to correct historic wrongs. Violence has a tendency to be romanticized as having the power to renew self-respect; and that is why revenge for real or imagined injustices can sometimes be an even stronger motivator than the reductionist interpretation of religion on which the ISIL narrative also relies.

To strengthen the theme of victimhood in its narrative, ISIL simply invents relevant constructs – for instance, emphasizing that Muslims are currently being victimized in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen, but failing to mention that those Muslims are mainly the victims of conflicts with other Muslims. Indeed, the majority of ISIL's own victims are Muslim; and yet, the oversimplified narrative of ISIL paints the conflict as a clash of civilizations – between Muslims and the Christian world – and identifies the French as the “main crossbearers in Europe.” In fact, France was among the first nations to separate the church from the state several centuries ago, and ranks at the bottom of the list for the number of practicing Christians, according to European statistics on devoutness. Applying this same lens to Italy, ISIL portrays its capital Rome as a mythical stronghold of Christianity and expresses an obsession with conquering and destroying it, echoing some Arab rulers of the early Middle Ages.

ISIL's target audience often lacks the education, knowledge, or cognitive capacity to place such constructs into context or think critically about them. ISIL is a populist movement, trying to position itself as a revolutionary and avant-garde force that is rectifying injustices against and avenging past humiliations of the community it claims to represent. For some marginalized, financially disenfranchised individuals, or those who are mentally unstable, ISIL may represent a fist of revenge striking back to right wrongs they could never confront on their own. These are the people who gloat at the sight of frightened and blood-stained citizens in Paris or Brussels, because the despair and humiliation felt by those citizens soothes their own sense of deprivation and powerlessness.

Individuals inspired and empowered by the ideology espoused by ISIL are now engaging in acts of violence across the world. They often come from the social and economic margins, and have criminal records as drug dealers or users. They have often been involved in family violence and frequently come from broken homes, and are also victims of discrimination, humiliation, violence, and sexual abuse. ISIL knows its audience, and it reaches out to people through personalized



messages, quickly establishing correlations between their personal experiences of injustice and the larger ISIL narrative.

ISIL skillfully uses strategic and public communication, and understands the importance and power of social networks better than many of the states and agencies fighting against it. Messaging from ISIL is clear, precisely composed, and directed with nuance toward target groups. Apart from that, the aesthetic of ISIL members is itself somewhat choreographed for propaganda purposes; they appear in public in all black dress, armed with modern weapons, and usually driving 4-wheel-drive SUVs. To many young people across the world, this is “cool” and even “sexy,” and in the absence of other or more visible influences, a role model for some.

ISIL's ideological narrative suggests that their end goal is to provoke a global confrontation and final showdown between Christian and Muslim armies. When Muslims are, of course, victorious, ISIL promises a global caliphate. But ISIL has no goals set in objective reality, and behaves like a typical Doomsday cult. Death is seen as an end in itself because it leads to eternal life, where the pleasures and delights of paradise await those on the right “side.”

It is interesting that, in the 21st century, segments of society that fail to understand or deal successfully with the challenges of modernity tend toward social models from an idealized and mythologized past. In some parts of the world, such a model is tailored in response to the question “What would Jesus do” (WWJD), and in others, is achieved through a literal imitation of the practices of the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers. They may be looking in different places, but all of these people – overwhelmed by the stresses and developments of modern society – are seeking a guide.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, young people especially are increasingly feeling the need for a guide or mentor whose wisdom can provide them with a confidence and clarity they otherwise lack. In religious terms, this guidance may enable them to deal with the uncertainties of everyday life without constantly questioning whether or not their actions or desires are permitted by God. The ISIL narrative, and its inference that a brutal force of justice is righting all the wrongs carried out against Muslims, has led some young Bosnians to believe that, by belonging to ISIL, their righteousness and eternal life is guaranteed.

Inspired by Islamic tradition and by the lifestyles of early Muslims and their corresponding jurisprudence, but extracted from its original context with only the shallowest understanding, ISIL ideologists have developed a religious interpretation that could at best be called a pseudo-the-

ology. With no respect for any other Islamic traditions, this pseudo-theology is being brutally enforced in order to create a new socio-political reality that rests on the hyper-religiousness of fanatical followers. These followers respond to simplified arguments that easily fit into their worldview, and so ISIL has adopted a black-and-white matrix that distills concepts to their least complex form. The “solutions” proposed by ISIL to problems of the Muslim world, as well as their portrayal of religion, Islamic tradition, and legislation, are so simplistic that they are clearly aimed the poorly educated and young. It is very important to understand this mobilizing narrative, and then develop a counter-narrative that educates the public about the context and complexity of Islamic rules and practices. This is a task not only for Islamic theologians, but for social historians and sociologists as well.

### **The Internet and Social Media Networks**

In general, the Internet and social media networks are considered to be very influential in the processes of radicalization and recruitment. In the European Union and the United States, the Internet is seen as the most powerful platform for these processes, alongside mosques and prisons. Recent research conducted in Germany, for instance, found that the Internet played a key role in the radicalization of at least one third of the people who departed from that country to Syria and Iraq.<sup>108</sup> And Western intelligence sources say ISIL sends out some 250,000 tweets a month from 58,000 accounts aimed at various target groups.<sup>109</sup>

While these platforms play an important role in ideological radicalization in Bosnia as well, they are secondary to traditional social and family ties and the group dynamics that take place within these circles. Most Bosnian Salafists report having their first encounter with Salafi ideology when a friend or family member invited them to attend a lecture or gave them literature; after which, many of these people sought more information online. Thus, the Internet and social media mainly serve as a force multiplier for radicalization in BiH – consolidating and reinforcing newly acquired ideas and connecting people who have similar beliefs.

108 “Who are Germany’s Islamists?” Deutsche Welle, September 24, 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/who-are-germanys-islamists/a-18737894> (accessed November 3, 2016).

109 “Online bid to protect youngsters: New scheme to combat brainwashing by ISIS terrorists,” *Sunday Express*, April 3, 2016, <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/657706/Online-bid-protect-youngsters-New-scheme-combat-brainwashing-ISIS-terrorists> (accessed April 5, 2016). Also see: “The Twitter jihadi: Man admits encouraging support for Islamic State by sending 8,000 tweets,” *Telegraph*, April 3, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/31/the-twitter-jihadi-man-admits-encouraging-support-for-islamic-st/> (accessed April 5, 2016). The number of these accounts may have been higher in 2015. Twitter announced in February 2016 that it had suspended 125,000 accounts connected to ISIL over the previous 6 months, after criticism from the US administration that the social media company had not policed these accounts closely enough. See: Jessica Guynn and Elizabeth Weise, “Twitter suspends 125,000 ISIL-related accounts,” *USA Today*, February 5, 2016, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/02/05/twitter-suspends-125000-isil-related-accounts/79889892/> (accessed May 6, 2016).

It is clear, though, that technology is an indispensable tool to the network of individuals involved in facilitating departures to Syria and Iraq. Several police investigations in BiH have demonstrated that a range of mobile phone applications and communication software are being used to transmit instructions to potential travelers and to enable individuals already in the Middle East to communicate with relatives and friends in BiH. These include social networking platforms such as Facebook, microblogging services such as Twitter, and conversation and messaging apps such as Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, Kik, Snapchat, and Telegram.<sup>110</sup>

Hand-in-hand with these more personalized recruitment efforts, the calls of several Bosnians on social media platforms for migration (*hijra*) to the so-called Islamic Caliphate have aimed to cast a wider recruitment net. Particularly active in these efforts were Ines Midžić and Elvira Balić-Karalić, two Bosnians now in Syria. The Internet has also been used to regularly transmit video messages from Syria and Iraq that feature fighters from BiH urging their supporters at home to perform *hijra*. These videos issue graphic threats against those who do not support the ideological matrix of ISIL.



In one video, Bosnian fighters in Syria have obvious difficulties memorizing the text they are supposed to speak into the camera, stuttering at times and grimacing, clearly unaccustomed to public speaking. They urge followers to give up their lives, families, and property, to put themselves in the service of God and migrate to the “caliphate.” To those who refuse, they threaten brutal punishment, which they justify with the alleged theological authority of quotations in Arabic.<sup>111</sup> The disproportionate and extensive airing of such messages in the media has, deliberately or accidentally, resulted in a sense of intimidation among the general public in the region, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby serving the purpose of these messages – to create the notion of the messengers as uncompromising and dangerous.

**Figure 24. “The Sand of Damascus”**

110 For more on this, see: M. Francis and E. Barrett, “Terrorists’ Use Of Messaging Applications,” Center for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, March 3, 2016, <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/comment/terrorists-use-of-messaging-applications/> (accessed March 14, 2016).

111 Among those that have received the most media attention are videos, posted on YouTube and LiveLeak, with titles such as: “Honor is in Jihad,” “We are an Islamic Caliphate,” “Muslims in Syria (Bosniaks and Syria),” “Bosniaks fighting against the Assad regime,” and “Bosnac iz Sirije poziva muslimanke da se odazovu dzihadu” (A Bosnian in Syria calls Muslim women to join the jihad). Some are still available; for example, see: [www.liveleak.com/view?i=d24\\_1433608825](http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d24_1433608825); [www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvQkLbShoU](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvQkLbShoU); [www.youtube.com/watch?v=pT1olxE9e1M](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pT1olxE9e1M); <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjSQndg3l8s>; and [http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=354\\_1377259737#dqyXGj1VOUzYlqoJ.99](http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=354_1377259737#dqyXGj1VOUzYlqoJ.99).

The latest example of such media exploitation involves a video recorded in Syria by Amir Selimović, in which he threatened to decapitate the Grand Mufti of the Islamic Community in BiH, Husein Kavazović. The video was uploaded to YouTube at the end of February 2016 and was played on television and web portals for days, leaving many citizens with the impression that Selimović – a former alcoholic whose wife and two children left him shortly before he departed to Syria – was relevant and his threat credible. In fact, before his departure to Syria, Selimović told a friend that he wanted “to do something that would make him famous not only in his native village of Svojat...but also in the whole country,” and the wide coverage his video received certainly afforded him his proverbial fifteen minutes of fame.<sup>112</sup>

Introducing fear seems to have been the sole purpose of ISIL's primary regional Internet portal, a site known as *Vijesti Ummeta* (The News of the Ummah), which was just suspended as of early May 2016.<sup>113</sup> The site featured reports from the battlefields, every issue of ISIL's *Dabiq* magazine, as well as video and audio content translated into local languages and transferred from other ISIL media platforms. *Vijesti Ummeta* was maintained by militant Salafists from Bosnia and the Sandžak region in Serbia, most of whom now live abroad. Similar sites, such as *Put hilafeta* (The Way of the Caliphate), which released a video of the execution of Croatian hostage Tomislav Salopek in August 2015, have also been suspended.<sup>114</sup>

Still, while these sites have been suspended, the ease with which websites can be created makes the emergence of new similar portals almost a given; and some damage has already been done. Direct links between *Vijesti Ummeta* and ISIL became obvious when it published the group's claim of responsibility for the November 2015 attacks in Paris, calling them “a blessed massacre.” Two days later, site administrators posted their own threat against BiH security agencies, warning of “retributions worse than Paris,” and saying that “heads would roll.”<sup>115</sup> And two days after that, Enes Omeragić killed two members of the Armed Forces of BiH in the Sarajevo suburb of Rajlovac.

Part of what makes the Internet and social media networks so attractive to those who seek to radicalize and recruit is that these platforms are mostly self-regulating. It is difficult for authorities to influence online content, which is readily available even when it is considered controversial. However, responsible editorial policies in the media can serve as a powerful tool to help contextualize and explain such content and dispute its relevance and credibility.

112 “RSE in the village of militants who threatened to Reis,” *Radio Free Europe*, February 23, 2016, <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/media/video/nakon-prijetnji-reisu-kavazovicu-rse-u-selu-amira-selimovica/27569277.html> (accessed February 24, 2016).

113 The site, <https://vijestiummeta.wordpress.com>, was suspended on May 5, 2016 for violating the Terms of Service of host company WordPress.

114 The site had been available at: <https://puthilafeta.blogspot.com>

115 “Liječenje grudi vjernika,” *Vijesti ummeta*, November 15, 2015, no longer available.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, media have yet to use the intrinsic corrective potential they have at their disposal. In their reporting on migrations to Syria and Iraq, and on foreign fighters and the security challenges emanating from this phenomenon, media are still more prone to employ emotionalism and sensationalism than professional standards. Instead of helping the public better understand the underlying issues that inform these problems, this journalistic approach induces fear and uncertainty. By so doing, consciously or not, media serves the interests of the people they sensationalize, who wish to achieve this precise effect. The potential for media to contribute to the prevention of ideological radicalization in BiH, and elsewhere, remains under-realized. Additional, specialized training of editors and journalists, as well as the establishment of basic media standards or guidelines for reporting on terrorism and radicalization into violent extremism, could support this potential.

## CRIMINALIZATION AND PREVENTION

### Bosnian Law Enforcement Agencies and the BiH Prosecutor's Office

Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first country in the Western Balkans to criminalize departures to foreign war theatres by adopting amendments to Article 162b of its Criminal Code in June 2014.<sup>116</sup> Security agencies and the BiH Prosecutor's Office immediately began preparations for implementation of this legislation and in early autumn 2014, the State Investigations and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the Intelligence and Security Agency initiated activities in Operation Damascus – a long-term effort which has been carried out in several phases and continues through this writing, in May 2016.

The first judicial proceeding in which someone was charged under the new law was instituted against Husein Bosnić, who was arrested in Operation Damascus. Bosnić, a leader of the Salafi movement in Bosnia, was indicted for publicly encouraging Salafi adherents to join ISIL. A number of individuals travelled to Syria under his influence, at least six of whom have been killed there. In November 2015, the Court of BiH sentenced Bosnić to seven years in prison.<sup>117</sup> Just one month before that, in October 2015, the Court also handed one-year sentences to both Nevad Hušidić and Merim Keserović, for attempting to depart for the battlefields in Syria and Iraq. SIPA officers had arrested them at the Sarajevo International Airport in February of that year. For organizing their departure, Husein Erdić was sentenced to three-and-a-half years, and for financing the trip, Midhat Trako received one-and-a-half years.<sup>118</sup>

At the beginning of 2016, the BiH Prosecutor's Office reached a plea bargain with Fatih Hasanović and Emin Hodžić, who pled guilty to organizing a terrorist group and assisting in the departure of BiH citizens to Syria and Iraq. The remaining ten members of the group to which Hasanović and Hodžić belonged have also been charged with the organization of a terrorist group, as well as with the illegal possession, production, and trafficking of weapons or explo-

116 Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 162b, "Illegal formation and joining of foreign paramilitary and para-police formations," *Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, No. 47/14, June 6, 2014.

117 Court of BiH, "Husein Bosnić sentenced to 7 years in prison," press release, November 5, 2015, <http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/vijest/husein-bosni-osuen-na-7-godina-zatvora-20174> (accessed May 6, 2016).

118 Court of BiH, "Husein Erdić sentenced to three-and-a-half years, Midhat Trako to one-and-a-half years, and Nevad Hušidić and Merim Keserović to one year in prison," press release, October 6, 2015, <http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/vijest/optueni-husein-erdi-osuen-na-3-godine-i-6-mjeseci-midhat-trako-na-godinu-i-6-mjeseci-a-nevad-huidi-i-merim-keserovi-na-godinu-zatvora-20152> (accessed May 6, 2016); "Bosnian court jails four over recruitment of militants for Syria", *Reuters*, October 6, 2015, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN0S021520151006> (accessed April 20, 2016).

sives. Court proceedings against them are still ongoing at the time of this writing.<sup>119</sup> Also ongoing are the trials of Safet Brkić and Mirel Karajić, charged with joining ISIL in Syria. And an indictment has been issued against Senad Košić for the same offense.

All told, the Prosecutor's Office has issued indictments against more than 20 individuals under the new legislation, and more are forthcoming. Along with partner agencies, the Prosecutor's Office is investigating 33 cases that pertain to 70 people suspected of organizing a terrorist group, publicly encouraging terrorist activities, recruiting for terrorist activities, illegally forming or joining foreign paramilitary and para-police formations, and terrorism and crimes related to terrorist activity.<sup>120</sup> Police agencies responsible for terrorism cases, including the State Investigations and Protection Agency (SIPA), the Federal Police Directorate, and the Republika Srpska Police, have increased the number of investigators working such cases.

After the murder of two of its members in Rajlovac, in November 2015, the Armed Forces of BiH also introduced new measures to additionally protect military facilities and personnel. Controlled areas normally found around military installations have been expanded to encompass larger numbers of Armed Forces members, including those working in the field, such as demining personnel. Each location now has an intervention formation responsible for the protection of property and lives and, since the Rajlovac attack, soldiers with long guns have been on guard at these facilities across BiH.

Following the terrorist attacks in Brussels on March 22, 2016, Bosnia's Joint Counterterrorism Task Force – which includes leaders of all key security sector agencies in the country – was revived.<sup>121</sup> There are attempts underway to restore its Operations Group, consisting of officers working in the field. The Group would be run from a joint center, with members exchanging information on the spot and coordinating the activities of their agencies. Such a center used to be located in the SIPA Headquarters building; but due to a lack of resources, representatives of agencies based outside Sarajevo stopped participating.

119 For more, see: Court of BiH, "Fatih Hasanović sentenced to one year in prison," press release, April 12, 2016, <http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/vijest/fatih-hasanovi-osuen-na-godinu-zatvora-20327> (accessed May 2, 2016); and "Emin Hodžić osuđen na godinu zatvora zbog ratovanja u Siriji," *Dnevni avaz*, March 21, 2016, <http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/226240/sud-bih-emin-hodzic-osuden-na-godinu-zatvora-zbog-ratovanja-u-siriji> (accessed May 2, 2016).

120 "Mektić: Udarina i operativna grupa o procesuiranju povratnika sa stranih ratišta," *BHRT*, April 12, 2016, <http://www.bhrt.ba/vijesti/bih/mektic-udarna-i-operativna-grupa-o-procesuiranju-povratnika-sa-stranih-ratista/> (accessed April 13, 2016). Also see: "Salihović: 124 borca iz BiH na stranim ratištima," *Nezavisne novine*, April 12, 2016, <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Salihovic-124-borca-iz-BiH-na-stranim-ratistima/364604> (accessed April 13, 2016).

121 The Task Force was created after the spring 2015 terrorist attack on a police station in Zvornik, but by the end of 2015, was described as lacking "real cooperation or synergy" and participating agencies were said to be "without real commitment." See: Bodo Weber, "The Police Forces in BiH: Persistent Fragmentation and Increasing Politicization," *AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis*, Policy Note, No. 6, November 2015.

## Efforts across the Western Balkans

In the autumn of 2014 and spring of 2015, most Western Balkans countries adopted either amendments to their criminal codes or brand new laws punishing the financing, organizing, or joining of foreign paramilitary formations. Following several police operations in the region, court proceedings have been instituted or finalized against a number of individuals found to have financed and organized departures to Syria and Iraq, or to have been in those war theatres themselves. Analysis of some of these cases indicates the existence of a regional recruitment and support network for departures, which relies on several NGOs and so-called *para-jamaats* that act outside the auspices of the Islamic Communities in the region.

In April 2016, a court in Skopje issued the first sentences for participation by Macedonian citizens in the recruitment, organization, and participation in foreign paramilitary forces. A plea bargain was reached with 6 of 11 indictees, with sentences from five-and-a-half to seven years in prison. Trials for the remaining 5 indictees are still ongoing, including that of Rexhep Memishi, the self-pronounced imam of the Tutunsuz Mosque in the Skopje neighborhood of Čair. His *para-jamaat* is believed to have recruited nearly 130 Macedonian citizens for the Syrian and Iraqi war theatres, at least 17 of whom have died there. This group of indictees was arrested in the summer of 2015, but the Macedonian Islamic Religious Community claims to have had no control whatsoever over Memishi's *jamaat* and another in Skopje for the past 4 years. Both facilities have hosted regional Salafi leaders Husein "Bilal" Bosnić and Shefqet Krasniqi.<sup>122</sup>

In Albania, a Tirana court convicted 9 individuals – including three self-proclaimed imams – for encouraging and recruiting fighters for Syria and Iraq, in early May 2016. Together, these indictees recruited over 70 individuals who departed to Syria. One was sentenced to 18 years in prison, two received 17 years, and the rest were issued sentences from 5 to 16 years.<sup>123</sup>

Currently, there are also court proceedings before the Special Court in Belgrade against a group charged with association for the purpose of facilitating terrorist attacks in support of ISIL, and with recruiting Serbian citizens to the war in Syria. The names of most of the individuals involved can be found in BiH police records since they have visited Bosnia often and have family ties with members of the Bosnian Salafi movement.

122 For more, see: "Седум години затвор за оцата од Тутунсуз џамија," *Вечер*, March 25, 2016, <http://vecer.mk/makedonija/sedum-godini-zatvor-za-odzhata-od-tutunsuz-dzhamija> (accessed May 4, 2016). Also see: "Cell' Case: Five Suspects to Go On Trial for Involvement in Islamic State," *Independent.mk*, April 8, 2016, <http://www.independent.mk/articles/30223/%22Cell%22+Case+Five+Suspects+to+Go+On+Trial+for+Involvement+in+Islamic+State> (accessed April 10, 2016).

123 "Albania jails nine men for recruiting jihadists," *AFP*, May 4, 2016.



And in Kosovo, police have arrested about 100 people since September 2014 suspected of having been in the Syrian and Iraqi war theaters, or organizing and financing such departures. So far, indictments have been issued against approximately half of these individuals, with 40 tried and sentenced by May 2016.<sup>124</sup>

## Prevention

In the summer of 2015, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a strategy for the prevention and fight against terrorism from 2015 through 2020. Similar documents have also been adopted in Albania, Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, and have been completed but await ratification in Serbia and Slovenia (as of April 2016). Depending on the specific threats assessed by each of those countries, they have given different ministries the leading role in coordinating and implementing their national strategies. (For a detailed overview of these strategies, see Annexes 1-5).

Bosnia's strategy is based on the understanding that the police and judiciary should be the last line of defense in a democratic society. It also recognizes that efforts to detect and prosecute individuals who instigate, organize, or carry out acts of violent extremism should be better coordinated and that information should flow more freely between Bosnia's 16 police agencies. But the strategy specifically refers, too, to the existing and still underutilized potential to combat radicalization through social influences – from families, to religious and academic communities, to civil society organizations.

Civic activism is not how society in Bosnia and Herzegovina has traditionally responded to social or political challenges. An overall apathy and sense of abdication of responsibility for key developments in the country instead characterizes social response. It seems, however, that the empowerment of small but vocal grassroots efforts in local communities to prevent radicalization into violent extremism could raise awareness about this challenge, and could engage unused social and civic capacities in meaningful activism. Currently, peace coalitions and associations seeking to prevent violence operate in several BiH municipalities doing very important work with at-risk groups. Some of these organizations coordinate their activities and work closely with the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in BiH (OSCE).

<sup>124</sup> See: Liridon Rama, "Kosovo Jails ISIS Recruit for Three Years," *Balkan Insight*, March 11, 2016, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-isis-suspect-receives-prison-sentence-03-10-2016> (accessed May 2, 2016); Labinot Leposhtica, "Kosovo Jails ISIS Facebook Propagandist," *Balkan Insight*, April 13, 2016, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-jails-isis-facebook-propagandist-04-12-2016> (accessed May 6, 2016); and "Kosovo jails 3 for trying to join Islamic extremists," *Daily Mail*, March 25, 2016, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3509415/Kosovo-jails-3-trying-join-Islamic-extremists.html> (accessed April 2, 2016).

In recent years, “CVE” (countering violent extremism) has become a buzzword. Increased fear of terrorism has led many governments to provide funding, often generously, for the support of CVE projects. International organizations and professional associations that have been supporting transition processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina for more than two decades suddenly see CVE as their new *raison d’être*. Maintaining regional offices, apartments, and consultancy agreements now depends on the success of the rapid transformation of institutional expertise in a new area. After human trafficking, gender equality, and protection of the Roma and LGBT communities, a new brand of international ad hoc knowledge gained in other parts of the world is now readily available to help prevent radicalization into violent extremism in BiH.

No matter how well intended, these efforts: (1) are mainly based on assumed rather than previously researched drivers and patterns of radicalization, (2) do not fully account for the specificities of the local context, and (3) do not rely on or incorporate available local expertise. In the complex and hypersensitive Bosnian context, these inadequacies could simply produce more harm by: (1) focusing efforts on the wrong areas, target groups, and causes of radicalization, (2) jeopardizing authentic efforts to prevent radicalization being undertaken by local communities, and (3) creating the impression that the prevention of radicalization into violent extremism is another unwanted meddling in domestic affairs by international actors. This may be best avoided by supporting already existing and new initiatives that develop in local communities, which are best positioned to understand the context and are most invested in preventing violence.

The odds of success would also be improved by further research on radicalization. A research-based policy development center, possibly with regional participation and focus, would be a welcome addition to any genuine CVE effort. However, the likelihood of this seems rather unrealistic; for as one high-ranking Western diplomat in Sarajevo recently observed, “We do not support research. We only support policies.”

---

## POSSIBLE SECURITY THREATS TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

---

### Returnees

As is true in most of the countries facing the phenomenon of citizens departing for foreign war theaters, Bosnia and Herzegovina still lacks standardized tools for more reliable assessment of the existence and level of threats posed by the approximately 50 men and women who have so far returned from Syria and Iraq. Since many returnees do not permanently reside in BiH, this assessment becomes even more difficult. In the long run, the number who will return from battlefields in the Middle East, and what their intentions may be, are completely unknown. But there is reason for concern; some returnees claim that ISIL demands that all its warriors who originate from Europe commit terrorist acts upon returning to their home communities.<sup>125</sup>

Over the past few months, the Court of BiH has been processing a majority of the returnees who have been charged with departing to foreign war theatres, which was declared a crime in mid-2014. For the time being, these individuals are receiving relatively mild punishment – one-year prison sentences, on average – in exchange for their testimonies in other similar proceedings. This may disengage these individuals from violence temporarily, but there are no reliable indicators as to whether they will simultaneously disengage from radicalized ideology.

What also remains unclear is what will happen within the prison system once a number of individuals with radical views enter its custody. For now, there are no special regulations, recommendations, or best practices for the placement of such convicts among general prison populations. And, a lack of special rehabilitation and social reintegration programs for radicalized individuals raises further concern. Indeed, the experiences of other countries indicate that radicalization toward violent extremism can occur swiftly in prisons. Some prisoners may perceive convicted returnees from Syria and Iraq as proven leaders and even heroes; and an influx of returnee prisoners could create a new platform for ideological radicalization and recruitment in a prison system unprepared for their admission.

---

<sup>125</sup> A German returnee from Syria, Harry S., told *Der Spiegel* that every European fighter is asked to perform a terrorist attack upon returning to their homeland. ISIL “wants something that will occur everywhere at the same time,” he said. See: Hubert Gude and Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt, “Back from the ‘Caliphate’: Returnee Says IS Recruiting for Terror Attacks in Germany,” *Der Spiegel*, December 16, 2015, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-jihadist-returns-from-syria-and-gives-testimony-a-1067764.html#spRedirectedFrom=www&referrer=https://t.co/GfdFKw5Rw3> (accessed December 23, 2015).

However, returnees who have come home disillusioned with what they saw in Syria and Iraq could provide authentic and credible testimony to support the kind of counter-narrative that could dispel and relativize the cognitive reductionism and justification of violence that dominate ISIL's recruitment campaign. Police files provide an abundance of such testimonies. In one, a returnee from Syria "expressed dissatisfaction with the poor condition of the brothers in Syria, pointing out that there's no order, system and organization." In another, an individual "... came back from Syria... disappointed with recent events...especially when the unit in which he served was attacked by other Mujahideen." That returnee reportedly said that "this was not the path he had chosen to follow, where a Muslim is killing other Muslims." The voices of the family members of people who have departed to Syria and Iraq, especially of those who have died there, would also be particularly important to developing a strong counter-narrative. At least 50 mothers and fathers from BiH have lost their children in these foreign war theaters.

### **"Unaccomplished Émigrés"**


Even prior to the series of terrorist attacks that struck different parts of the world in 2015 – and which involved the participation of returnees from the Syrian and Iraqi war theatres – the return of foreign fighters from Middle Eastern battlefields had been anticipated with unease, and even some fear. Interestingly, though, it turns out that individuals with a tremendous desire to travel to Syria and Iraq but the inability to do so for some reason may be an equal or even bigger security threat. Some of these unaccomplished warriors, who were unable to reach ISIL's caliphate, have carried out terrorist attacks more locally.

ISIL's rhetoric frequently addresses such individuals, offering the possibility of redemption to those who are faced with an unbridgeable gap between their desire and capability to heed the call to battle in Syria and Iraq, encouraging them to bring the battle home:

If you cannot make an improvised explosive device or find a bullet, take an infidel... Break a stone over his head, slit his throat with a knife, run him over with a car, throw him off high ground, strangle him, or poison him. Do not hesitate. Be merciless. If you are unable to do even that, then burn down his house, car, store, or destroy his crops.

This message, initially released in the summer of 2014 by ISIL's spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani as-Shami, has been repeated many times. A similar message, localized to the Balkans, came from Syria in video form a few months later, featuring fighters from the region who spoke to the camera in Albanian, Bosnian, and Serbian. Ines Midžić, a former student of the Bihać Faculty of Pedagogy and an activist with the local NGO "Solidarnost,"<sup>126</sup> was among them, and he offered an alternative to all those unable to perform the *hijra* and move to the caliphate:

"...fight over there! Fight them! If you can, put explosives under the cars, in their houses, all of them. If you can, take some poison and put it in their drink or food. Kill them! Kill them with poison and misery! Kill them everywhere, wherever you can – in Bosnia, in Serbia, in Sandžak [a region in south-west Serbia]. You can do it, Allah will help you. Allah is helping a small group of believers."<sup>127</sup>



**Figure 25 . Ines Midžić, aka Salahuddin al-Bosni**

126 "Umjesto na fakultetu, završili na ratištu," *Dnevni avaz*, December 16, 2013. Midžić is known in Syria as Abu Salahuddin el-Muhajer or, as in this film, Salahuddin al-Bosni.

127 The video is available online at: [http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d24\\_1433608825](http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d24_1433608825) (accessed April 2, 2016). Also see: "Isis targets vulnerable Bosnia for recruitment and attack," *The Guardian*, June 25, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/25/isis-targets-vulnerable-bosnia-for-recruitment-and-attack> (accessed June 26, 2016); and "Šokantan video balkanskih džihadista uoči dolaska pape: 'Postavite im eksploziv, otrujete im hranu... Neka crknu!'" *Jutarnji list*, June 5, 2015, <http://www.jutarnji.hr/isilovci-muslimane-pozvali-na-ubijanje-i-trovanje-po-balkanu/1361547/> (accessed June 5, 2015).

Another Bosnian, Jasmin Keserović, also appeared in the video and urged these unaccomplished warriors to “smash the traitorous government that surrendered the mujahideen – who helped the defense of Bosnia – to the Americans.” He warned that, “otherwise, Muslims will experience another genocide, just like the ones in Srebrenica, Goražde, Mostar.”

ISIL offered an additional rationale for “noble deeds” accomplished off the battlefield in its August 9, 2015 issue of *Dabiq* magazine, noting that: “the Muslim who is unable to perform hijrah... [can] strike out against the kafir enemies of the Islamic State... In addition to killing crusader citizens anywhere on the earth, what, for example, prevents him from...targeting the Japanese diplomatic missions in Bosnia, Malaysia, and Indonesia? Or targeting Saudi diplomats in Tirana, Sarajevo, and Pristina?”<sup>128</sup> This narrative can also be heard in some of the public statements made by Husein “Bilal” Bosnić on social networks. Until his arrest in the autumn of 2014, Bosnić was considered one of the most influential Salafists in BiH and beyond. He used to tell followers that “what makes the Lord of the servant, Allah, happiest is when his servant, with no armor, confronts a group of infidels and fights until he is killed...”

Such rhetoric can hardly influence reasonable and stable individuals or have any serious impact on their decision making. But, to those who do not or cannot think critically, the consequences of such messaging can be assessed with much less certainty. How unstable individuals, people with cognitive limitations, or mentally ill people may respond to calls for violence is difficult, if not impossible, to know. But frequent calls of this nature directed at a target group of people with psychosocial problems may lead some of them into violence that could threaten the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The two individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in BiH in 2015 could be said to fit this profile.

These attacks – on the police station in Zvornik in April 2015, and on members of the Armed Forces of BiH in Rajlovac (near Sarajevo) in November 2015 – were both perpetrated by individuals who cannot be considered typical militant Salafists. They were young, unstable, and vulnerable individuals with histories of trauma, and both carried out lone wolf attacks after having only “superficial” contact with members of the radical Salafi communities in Briješće and Dubnica, but without becoming members themselves. Neither of them were considered dangerous by security agencies, and evidence obtained through the investigation of each attack indicates the possibility of an external triggering event in both cases, which induced a personal crisis (such as an acute psychosis) that led these young men to violence. Still, if the attacks were committed

128 “From the Battles of Al-Ahزاب to the War of Coalitions,” *Dabiq*, August 9, 2015, <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-11e280b3.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2015).

spontaneously amidst mental incoherence and the attackers were not influenced by radicalized Salafists they encountered, it is interesting that they both chose police and military targets – the state symbols most frequently exposed to terrorist attacks since the war's end in 1995.<sup>129</sup>

The attack in Rajlovac, which killed two soldiers, occurred just five days after the coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris. In the first 72 hours following the Paris attacks, Bosnian security officials had to weed through myriad potential threats. Several anonymous bomb threats were called in but turned out to be false. A couple days later, three hand grenades were thrown at a police station in Zavidovići. One exploded.<sup>130</sup> A local drug addict known to police was also found walking the streets of Konjic carrying a Kalashnikov rifle, and during his arrest, he shouted slogans in support of ISIL.<sup>131</sup>

## BiH in ISIL's Plans

In order to conduct a security threat assessment of this type, it is important to understand how ISIL perceives Bosnia and Herzegovina and how it positions the country in its plans for the future. Although it has not been mentioned explicitly, Bosnia does not appear to be among the areas ISIL identifies in strategic documents as requiring the use of mass and indiscriminate violence, such as that which is directly or indirectly encouraged by ISIL of its followers in France, Belgium, and other Western European countries. One of those documents – *The Management of Savagery* – divides the “infidel world” outside the caliphate into three groups of countries: (1) states in which authorities should be swept from power with brutal terror and orchestrated violence through an Islamic revolution, (2) countries that should be exhausted and brought to their knees by long-lasting terror, and (3) countries where no violent revolution is needed, which should be used for the rest and recuperation of fighters, the hiding out or transfer of fighters to or from EU countries, and should be bases for missionary (proselytizing) activities aimed at facilitating and accelerating the

129 For more on these cases, see: Azinović, *Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Nexus with Islamist Extremism*.

130 “Eksplozija u Zavidovićima: Bačena bomba na policijsku stanicu, nema povrijeđenih,” *Dnevni avaz*, October 24, 2015, <http://m.avaz.ba/clanak/206605/eksplozija-u-zavidovicima-bacena-bomba-na-policijsku-stanicu-nema-povrijeđenih#sthash.uhhtySpv.dpuf> (accessed October 25, 2015).

131 “Konjic: Lukman Hadžihusejnović s ‘kalašnjikovom’ šetao čaršijom, a pri hapšenju veličao ISIL!” *Dnevni avaz*, December 4, 2015, <http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/208217/konjic-lukman-hadzihusejnovic-s-kalasnjkovom-setao-carsijom-a-pri-hapsenju-velicao-isil> (accessed December 4, 2015). These were not the first examples of individuals expressing public support for ISIL. In October 2015, a mentally ill individual was arrested while waving an ISIL flag in front of the BiH Presidency building. The perpetrator, from Konjic, happened to come from a local reputable family and was released immediately from police custody, but was subjected to involuntary hospitalization. See: “Ispred Predsjedništva BiH: Mahao zastavom koja podsjeća na ISIL-ovu,” *Slobodna Bosna*, October 14, 2015, [http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/24374/ispred-predsjednistva-bih-mahao-zastavom-koja-podsjeća-na-isil-ovu\\_foto.html](http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/24374/ispred-predsjednistva-bih-mahao-zastavom-koja-podsjeća-na-isil-ovu_foto.html) (accessed October 15, 2015); and “Alen Tahmišćija na liječenju zbog psihičkih problema,” *Nezavisne novine*, October 15, 2015, <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/hronika/Alen-Tahmišćija-na-liječenju-zbog-psihičkih-problema/330938> (accessed October 15, 2015). And, at the beginning of 2015, also in Sarajevo, three men – including a returnee from Syria known to the police for a history of theft, fraud, violence, narcotics abuse, and illegal drug trafficking – interrupted a Friday noon prayer in a mosque. The group's leader was wearing a T-shirt bearing the ISIL logo. See: “Incident u Sarajevu: Ekstremisti upali na džumu u džamiju Stara Breka!” *Dnevni avaz*, January 23, 2015, <http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/159962/incident-u-sarajevu-ekstremisti-upali-na-dzumu-u-dzamiyu-stara-breka> (accessed January 24, 2015).

ideological preparation and recruitment of new followers. The character of activities undertaken in BiH during the past several years appears to place it in the third category.

## The Final Assessment

Considering the factors mentioned above, and with due caution, we may assume that BiH is currently less at risk from indiscriminate or coordinated attacks on “soft targets” such as those carried out in Paris and Brussels, aimed at killing and frightening as many people as possible. However, the possibility of that sort of attack cannot be fully excluded. The larger risk in Bosnia and Herzegovina appears to be from selective attacks, though, on the symbols of a secular state and on international targets. These attacks could be committed by domestic perpetrators inspired by ISIL, acting in groups or as individuals, who select these targets because the police, and the army in particular, are part of the state security apparatus. Thus, a strike against them would not be likely to cause civilian casualties, making it easier to justify via common ISIL rhetoric.

There are several reasons to believe that members of the Islamic Community of BiH and their facilities may also become targets of groups or individuals inspired or directed by ISIL. Public statements by Grand Mufti Husein Kavazović, who has repeatedly and unequivocally condemned departures to foreign battlefields and the terrorization of innocent people, have already led to threats on his life.<sup>132</sup> Kavazović especially angered members and sympathizers of ISIL with his decision to postpone noon prayers in mosques across Bosnia by five minutes on November 16, 2015, because a commemoration for the victims of the Paris attack was scheduled for noon that day.<sup>133</sup>

The initiative of the Islamic Community to abolish *para-jamaats* has additionally antagonized militant Salafi communities in BiH. Imams of the Islamic Community have been the target of animosity before, particularly in smaller towns, but with the spread of militant Salafism to more urban centers, incidents have also occurred in larger cities, including Sarajevo. ISIL sees the families and the imams of potential young recruits as the most significant obstacles to their ideological radicalization; and thus seeks to eliminate their interference. And antagonism toward more moderate

132 “Prijetnje smrću reisu Kavazoviću, Gološu i Hadžiću” N1 BiH, January 4, 2016, <http://ba.n1info.com/a76169/Vijesti/Vijesti/Prijetnje-smrcu-reisu-Kavazovicu-Golosu-i-Hadzicu.html> (accessed January 5, 2016); “Zbog kritikovanja ISIL-a: Fanatici prijetje smrću reisu Kavazoviću i hafizu Gološu!” *Slobodna Bosna*, January 4, 2016, [http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/25757/zbog\\_kritikovanja\\_isil\\_a\\_fanatici\\_prijete\\_smrcu\\_reisu\\_kavazovicu\\_i\\_hafizu\\_golosu.html](http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/25757/zbog_kritikovanja_isil_a_fanatici_prijete_smrcu_reisu_kavazovicu_i_hafizu_golosu.html) (accessed January 5, 2016); “Pripadnik isil-a Amir Selimović prijeti da će reisa ‘zaklati nasred Baščaršije,” *Dnevni avaz*, December 20, 2016, <http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/221275/pripadnik-isil-a-amir-selimovic-prijeti-da-ce-reisa-zaklati-nasred-bascarsije> (accessed February 21, 2016).

133 “Reisu-l-ulema Kavazović: U ponedjeljak se ezani uče u 12 sati i pet minuta,” *Radio Sarajevo*, November 15, 2015, <http://radiosarajevo.ba/novost/207145> (accessed November 15, 2015); “IZ BiH povodom Dana žalosti: Ezani će se učiti u 12:05 sati,” *Klix.ba*, December 15, 2015, <http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/iz-bih-povodom-dana-zalosti-ezani-ce-se-uciti-u-12-05-sati/151115069> (accessed November 15, 2015).



imams is not restricted to BiH. Indeed, the April 2016 issue of ISIL's *Dabiq* magazine invited followers to "kill the imams of *kufr* (infidels)" and reminded them of their obligation to either emigrate to the caliphate or kill infidels in other places, calling these imams "justified and mandatory targets in accordance with Sharia Law, which should serve as examples to others."<sup>134</sup>

ISIL published the names of 22 leading figures, including heads of the Muslim Brotherhood in several countries, on a "kill list."<sup>135</sup> For the time being, this list does not contain the names of imams from Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Western Balkans. However, more general references by ISIL to takfirism, by which all those – including other Muslims – who refuse to accept the ideological matrix put forth by ISIL are declared infidels, should inspire some caution on the part of employees of the Islamic Community in BiH.<sup>136</sup>

A key leader of anti-terrorism efforts in BiH, who asked to remain anonymous, reiterates this need for caution, expressing concern to the authors that "the next attack might happen in a mosque." The assumption that a future terrorist attack in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be selective and directed against symbols of the state, foreign targets, or employees and property of the Islamic Community in BiH should be seriously considered, especially if the BiH Prosecutor's Office proves allegations that arose from the December 2015 police operation known as Cut (*Rez*). Eleven individuals were arrested in that operation, in the Sarajevo neighborhood of Briješće, for allegedly planning to hijack a police car, equip it with an improvised explosive device, and detonate it in one of Sarajevo's squares on New Year's Eve.<sup>137</sup>

If the existence of this plan can be proven, it will be the first confirmation of an evolution in the goals and character of terrorist attacks in BiH, to include indiscriminate targets. Such disengagement from earlier practices has also been seen in France, where selective attacks between 2012 and 2014 were directed against state symbols and the local Jewish community.<sup>138</sup> Attacks then became indiscriminate at the end of 2014.<sup>139</sup> There, violence escalated in 2015, first with a series of attacks in the Île-de-France region (including on the headquarters of *Charlie Hebdo* magazine)

134 The article states that "one must either take the journey to dār al-Islām, joining the ranks of the mujāhidin therein, or wage jihād by himself with the resources available to him (knives, guns, explosives, etc.) to kill the crusaders and other disbelievers and apostates, including the imāms of kufr, to make an example of them, as all of them are valid – rather, obligatory – targets according to the Shari'ah, except for those who openly repent from kufr before they are apprehended." See: "Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West," *Dabiq*, no. 14, April 13, 2016, <https://www.clarionproject.org/docs/Dabiq-Issue-14.pdf> (accessed April 23, 2016).

135 Although its ideology originated under the auspices of the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIL titled its April edition of *Dabiq* "The *Murtad* (Heretic) Brothers." See: *Dabiq*, no. 14.

136 The article asserts that "There is the religion of Allah, which is Islam, and then the religion of anything else, which is kufr. ... anyone who falls into kufr has left Islam, even if he claims to be a Muslim."

137 A senior police official who participated in planning and carrying out the operation told the authors that police had "stepped on a snake's head."

138 In 2012, in Toulouse and Montauban; in 2013, in La Défense; and in 2014, in Joué-lès-Tours.

139 For instance, in Dijon and Nantes.

at the start of the year and then with a devastating coordinated attack on six targets in Paris on November 13, 2015, killing 130 people and injuring over 360. ISIL claimed responsibility for these attacks and several of the nine perpetrators, including the group's leader, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, are returnees from the war in Syria and Iraq.

It would be irresponsible and unsubstantiated to predict that an escalation of this sort is likely in BiH. But, it would be equally irresponsible to reject the possibility altogether; and the behavior of some people supporting or preparing for departures to Syria and Iraq is reason for particular caution. It is clear that these individuals have become more concerned with trying to conceal their residences and their identities. They often register several addresses and shave their beards before having their passport photos taken. The authors are also aware of cases in which people have changed their name. In at least two instances, returnees from Syria have legally changed their names in EU countries, including a mother of three children (one of whom was born in Syria) who changed her own name and those of her children to obtain new EU passports. She and her children then returned to Syria with new identities, which they needed in order to re-enter Turkey, where she had been previously banned by authorities.

A certain increased level of organization among these individuals in BiH has also been observed by officials, who have often come up empty handed in recent police raids on facilities used by Salafists with links to radicalization and recruitment, leaving them with little proof of the suspected activities. During interviews with police officers and prosecutors, some people also provide identical answers to the same questions, leading police authorities to believe that they have been instructed to cooperate, but only within parameters – without mentioning the names of any Salafi “brothers” or discussing the structure of the group.<sup>140</sup>

These apparent efforts to obstruct the police in person, as well as obscuring their identities and places of residence, implies a level of sophistication among these individuals that has so far been lacking in BiH. And this behavior appears to be modeled in accordance with an ISIL manual published at the end of November 2015, titled, “To the lone wolves: Intensify your attacks!” The manual offers instructions on how to carry out reconnaissance activities without being noticed, details which encryption methods should be used to protect online communication, and stresses that recruitment of new members is to be undertaken only among family members and proven friends. Aspiring ISIL activists are advised not to keep any incriminating evidence in their homes,

<sup>140</sup> From discussions with several police officers who wished to remain anonymous.

including the Qur'an, and are encouraged to try to match the behavior and dress of the majority community, even if it requires shaving off their beard or wearing a cross.<sup>141</sup>

There is no doubt that ISIL wishes to crowdsource terrorism at the global level and expand its base for recruitment through aggressive ideological proselytizing. If we accept the estimate of security agencies that fighters from 113 of 193 UN member states are now in the war zones of Syria and Iraq, then we can – with due caution – speak of a nascent global revolt. It is unrealistic to expect this trend to bypass Bosnia and Herzegovina, and although departures of Bosnian citizens to Syria and Iraq have almost ceased, the country is likely to remain exposed to security challenges related to militant Salafism.

The form of those challenges will change over time, but the commitment of Salafists to the same goals will be steadfast; one of the most important of which is to deepen the division between the so-called world of believers and the world of infidels to bring about the disappearance of what ISIL refers to as the “grey area” of Islam – wherein Muslims still believe in a peaceful and constructive coexistence with their non-Muslim neighbors. Indeed, it is those Muslims who practice a moderate “middle-path Islam” that pose a considerable obstacle to preparations for the final apocalyptic confrontation that ISIL is trying to expedite. This is why terrorist campaigns such as those in Paris and Brussels must be understood not just as isolated acts of violence but rather as part of a well-prepared and brutal strategy aimed at antagonizing citizens and authorities toward Islam so that local Muslims, facing increased discrimination and oppression, will agree to join ISIL. Middle-path Islam has been a fundamental part of the identity of Bosnian Muslims for centuries. Thus, it is realistic to anticipate that this tradition, and the state which enables it, will similarly be a target of ISIL.

---

<sup>141</sup> Most prominent are recommendations about how to conduct activities on the Internet and mobile phones, including an edict to use the privacy-oriented TOR Browser and Tail OS. Protection of data storage devices is also recommended and the use of encryption tools such as TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt. For more on this, see: “Online Jihadis Disseminate Practical Guide for Lone Wolves: ‘How to Carry Out Effective Attacks Against the Enemy,’ Including Using TOR and VPN,” *MEMRI JTTM*, November 30, 2015, <http://cjlabs.memri.org/lab-projects/monitoring-jihadi-and-hackivist-activity/online-jihadis-disseminate-practical-guide-for-lone-wolves-how-to-carry-out-effective-attacks-against-the-enemy-including-using-tor-and-vpn/> (accessed December 2, 2015).

## A Closing Thought

Attempts to establish a functioning state in BiH have, for two decades, been stalled by the gradual institutionalization of interim political solutions. Meanwhile, the country has gone through processes that have marked failed attempts at democratic and economic transitions elsewhere. Political elites recognized early on that such transitions could indeed enable more equal access to resources; so, they blocked reform processes and restricted access to resources to themselves, their close associates, and their families. Instead of a fair share of limited resources, citizens were offered a placeholder – their *identity*, defined by religion, ethnicity, language, and territory.

Now, based on delusional interpretations of an idealized past, the “narcissism of small differences” is producing a Bosnian society reduced to and defined only by identity, and thus dominated by ethnocentric minds. One’s own collective identity is by default seen as exalted, superior to that of others, unquestionably good and, in particular, victimized. Collective victimhood, present and past, is the backbone of every Bosnian identity matrix. And any attempt at reasonable introspection or critical thinking about one’s collective identity is typically interpreted as an attack from within, the archetypal act of betrayal. Moreover, doubt about one’s identity is inexorably interpreted as proof of an ultimate weakness.

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s failing state is, over time, producing an underachieving and failing society, polarized and unfit to protect and restore the eroding system of common-sense values and norms on which it was once based. To believe that such a society could alone produce an effective counter-narrative to deter extremist ideologies is as naïve as it is improbable. However, a more steadfast commitment to European Union accession could help BiH restore its traditional values by providing a unifying narrative with which the vast majority of Bosnians still resonate.

An adjusted approach to BiH’s EU integration process, which still relies on conditionality but also recognize the need for preemptive action, could enable the opening of early accession negotiations on key EU Chapters 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (Justice, freedom and security). This could underpin the necessary and attainable goal of establishing a society based on political accountability, competence, and justice, which could serve as an effective counter-measure against radicalization into violent extremism.

But for this to happen, the EU will need to reinvent its strategy for Bosnian accession and Bosnian political elites will need to evolve beyond hypocritical attitudes to instead work in the true best interests of their respective constituencies.

---

## **ANNEX 1. ALBANIA: NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

---

### **Fostering a secure environment based on respect for fundamental freedoms and values**

The Albanian nation is founded on democratic values and a tradition of inter-faith coexistence. Our common vision is to cultivate a society based on shared respect for human rights, the rule of law, equality, and fundamental freedoms.

Peace, stability, and prosperity throughout the region are also of strategic importance to Albania. It is in Albania's interest to foster good relationships with its neighbors, based on mutual trust and inclusiveness, where inter-ethnic and inter-religious harmony prevails.

The protection and promotion of such values is increasingly important in our ever-changing world, where the threat of violent extremism recognizes no borders.

### **Albania's commitment to countering violent extremism and radicalization**

Violent extremism and radicalization, in all forms and manifestations, currently constitute the most serious threats to peace and security around the world. As such, the fight against these threats, regardless of where they occur or by whom they are committed, requires government actors to strengthen cooperation at the national as well as the regional and global levels.

In conceptualizing an Albanian response to violent extremism, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy will remain the common platform for all future endeavors. Moreover, Albania will continue to strongly support international counter-terrorism efforts, as well as promote UN counter-terrorism standards, while safeguarding human rights and reinforcing the rule of law.

Albania is committed to making a substantial and tangible contribution to international efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalization:

- ▶ Albania was among the first countries to respond to the challenges associated with violent extremism and is currently playing an active role as part of the global coalition in the fight against ISIL/Da'esh.
- ▶ Albania has signed and ratified all United Nations anti-terrorism conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, in addition to co-sponsoring UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.
- ▶ In May 2015, Albania hosted the Balkans Regional Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in Tirana, where country representatives from the region pointed out the need to improve cooperation, not only in countering extremism, but also in addressing the associated challenges facing the region.

Together with the May 2015 summit in Tirana, the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (February 2015) and the Leaders' Summit in New York (September 2015) are important milestones in the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

### **Domestic measures to counter violent extremism and radicalization**

Our generation bears a historical responsibility to create an environment that offers security and welfare to future generations. To this end, we must commit – both as individuals and as a society – to confronting contemporary security threats, demonstrating civic willingness and determination.

In June 2014, the Government of Albania reviewed and adopted its National Security Strategy, which outlines its constitutional obligations to guarantee national security, as well as to strengthen fundamental freedoms, human rights, and the rule of law, protect the interests of Albanian citizens wherever they may be located, and promote national identity.

An important component of the National Security Strategy addresses the concerns related to violent extremism and radicalization. In response to these concerns, the Strategy includes a series of actions aimed at:

- ▶ Enhancing and improving Albania's legislative framework to criminalize all forms of violent extremism as well as the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters;
- ▶ Strengthening the capacity and expertise of law enforcement officials to prevent violent extremism;

- ▶ Promoting the engagement of state institutions with local communities, religious representatives, and other stakeholders to identify vulnerable groups that are or may be targeted by violent extremism;
- ▶ Identifying and understanding the social concerns of local communities, so as to be able to address the root causes of radicalization and violent extremism;
- ▶ Developing tailored programs and policies to prevent the proliferation of violence and extremism and, simultaneously, raise awareness of these phenomena within society.

Furthermore, the annual review of the implementation of the National Security Strategy stipulates specific tasks to be undertaken by state institutions and other national actors to comprehensively increase effectiveness in the fight against radicalization and violent extremism.

## Aim of the Strategy

Given that violent extremism is a contemporary global phenomenon and currently constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security, the Albanian government considers countering violent extremism to be a core priority of its political agenda.

Successfully preventing the spread of violent extremism requires localized efforts, including the further empowerment of youth, family, women, and minorities. By channeling these efforts through religious, cultural, and educational networks, the Strategy will ensure the inclusion of civil society, as a whole, in the adoption of a tailored and proactive approach to addressing this phenomenon.

This Strategy will enable the Albanian government to devise guiding principles, policies, and actions to address radicalization and violent extremism. With the end goal of creating a prosperous and inclusive environment for citizens, this Strategy will also cultivate a culture of respect for fundamental freedoms throughout the country.

It is understood that policies and measures that are pursued through locally driven and cooperative initiatives, tailored to local contexts are the most effective in countering violent extremism over the long term. As such, a community-oriented approach will be instrumental in focusing and driving Albania's fight against violent extremism. This approach will be supported through increased coordination among government institutions and local community stakeholders.

Another important facet of this approach is developing a better understanding of community policing. The ability of the police to effectively interact with local communities is key to promoting a partnership-based effort to more effectively identify, prevent, and solve crimes, simultaneously addressing issues of physical safety and security while improving social cohesion.

In sum, successfully combating radicalization and violent extremism requires extensive coordination among various domestic and international efforts. Under this Strategy, sharing best practices and experiences in addressing violent extremism in all its forms will allow Albanian officials to enhance their capacities and expertise in the fight against radicalization, promoting national security as well as peace.

## Definitions

**Radicalization to violence:** a decision to forgo political processes or nonviolent methods of fostering change in favor of adopting violent methods to bring about change

**Violent extremism:** the use of violence to pursue political goals

**Counter-radicalization:** a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programs specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from resorting to terrorism

**Resilience:** factors, ideas, institutions, issues, trends, or values that enable individuals and communities to resist or prevent violence

**Foreign terrorist fighters:** (To be harmonized with Albanian Criminal Code) individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of perpetrating, planning, preparing or participating in terrorist acts, or providing or receiving terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.



## Mission

*The Albanian National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism aims to preserve the values of tolerance and religious harmony, to protect human rights, the rule of law and democracy, and to defend Albanian society from violent extremism.*

The Strategy has **four strategic objectives** that converge under its overarching goal to develop the capacities of the various actors involved in countering violent extremism in Albania to effectively address the conditions leading to radicalization. Engaging multiple stakeholders within and outside the Government, this Strategy will not only challenge the extremist narrative and prevent the spread of violent extremism within the country, but also beyond Albania's borders. To this end, this Strategy proposes an initiative to build regional countering violent extremism (CVE) capacity and cooperation.

In line with its mission, the measures proposed under this Strategy will:

- ▶ Strengthen coordination, collaboration, and partnership, at the local, national, and international levels, among government agencies, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, religious communities, and the media in designing and implementing effective CVE interventions;
- ▶ Bolster local research to improve the understanding of the conditions, factors and drivers of radicalization to violence as well as the existing levels of community resilience against violent extremism;
- ▶ Build community resilience and diminish the breeding ground for radicalization and violent extremism through tailored preventive community-based education, employment, and policing programs and policies;
- ▶ Reduce the impact of violent extremist propaganda and recruitment online by using social media to develop and disseminate alternative positive messages.

## Priority Areas and Measures

**Engaging communities, challenging violent extremist narratives and developing long-term comprehensive policies to counter violent extremism.**

The Albanian National Strategy proposes **10 measures, organized under three priority areas**, for developing capacities, policies, and mechanisms to address violent extremism and radicalization. These three priority areas are:

- ▶ Community outreach and engagement
- ▶ Countering extremist propaganda while promoting democratic values
- ▶ Developing long-term comprehensive CVE policies

## Community outreach and engagement

Communities are focal points for the formulation and implementation of CVE policies in Albania. Drawing on the guidelines and best practices of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the EU Radicalization Awareness Network, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, measures proposed under this priority area will incorporate a community-based approach to strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas. According to this bottom-up approach, community groups will be empowered to play an active role in preventing violent extremism in close partnership with government agencies, civil society organizations, the business community and the media.

The measures and actions proposed in the National Strategy will be implemented through locally driven, collaborative, and partnership-based initiatives, tailored to local contexts to increase their effectiveness and sustainability. Engaging communities will also be instrumental in strengthening public confidence and support for national CVE policies. While the proposed actions will primarily target youth in *hot-spot* areas, their success will depend on the involvement of all segments of society. Therefore, specific actions will concentrate on leveraging the competences of frontline workers: teachers, police personnel, social workers, religious leaders, and other individuals who are strategically placed to prevent radicalization.

In recent years, Albania has developed several models for providing community-based social services, all of which are particularly suited to addressing the needs of the vulnerable groups identified in this Strategy. Furthermore, various sector-based strategies and action plans already foresee the allocation of resources to further expand these services. Under this priority area, community-based methods of delivering public services will be streamlined to target the most at-risk communities.

### 1. Encourage critical thinking, civic participation, and promote values of tolerance through education

The “School as a Community Center – a friendly school for all” initiative, which was already introduced in the Albanian education system, will be extended to support CVE efforts under the Strategy. This initiative encourages partnerships between schools, families and the entire community.

In this sense, schools are not simply education providers but also catalysts of community cohesion and development. The “School as a Community Center” framework has the potential to become a powerful long-term policy tool to respond to the threat of violent extremism, offering counseling services and acting as a focal point in designing preventive programs. Teachers are important frontline workers who serve as liaisons within communities. Therefore, their ability to detect and respond to radicalization, and eventually prevent it, must be strengthened.

According to the Pre-University Education Development Strategy (2014-2020), the Ministry of Education and Sports plans to broaden the “School as a Community Center” network in the upcoming years. This measure will entail the following actions:

- a. Expand the “School as Community center” network to reach *hot-spot* areas.
- b. Empower and train teachers to recognize and respond to signs of radicalization.
- c. Enhance support for curricular and extracurricular efforts in targeted schools to prevent radicalization, including civic and religious education, arts and sports initiatives, debate clubs, and similar resilience-building activities.

## 2. **Address socio-economic drivers of radicalization through vocational education and training (VET) and employment services**

Jobless youth in areas with limited employment opportunities are vulnerable targets of extremist propaganda and recruitment. Albania’s National Employment and Skills Strategy (2014-2020) identifies social inclusion as one of its main objectives, and the National Employment Service intends to promote improved and diversified active labor market policies and programs that will be available to marginalized groups. Furthermore, existing plans to extend employment and vocational training services to rural areas will prioritize targeted *hot-spot* areas in line with the following actions:

- a. Extend national employment services and active labor market support to reach the most at-risk groups and individuals.
- b. Provide vocational training in targeted *hot-spot* areas (including through mobile or satellite units), tailored to the needs of the local population.

- c. Establish vocational training and employment assistance initiatives in correctional institutions to facilitate the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders.
- d. Support public and private initiatives generating employment opportunities, social entrepreneurship, and women's economic empowerment in the targeted *hot-spot* areas.

### 3. **Build trust and confidence and increase community safety through community policing**

As part of its Seven-Year Strategy (2007-2013), the Albanian State Police introduced a "community policing" model to be implemented throughout the country. Pro-active and collaborative problem solving focused on prevention is particularly useful when dealing with the threats associated with violent extremism. As such, expanding and developing community policing skills, with an emphasis on preventing radicalization and violent extremism, will be prioritized through the following action:

- a. Leverage community policing capacities in the targeted *hot-spot* areas.

### 4. **Empower civil society to build community resilience**

Engaging civil society organizations and volunteer groups in an effort to prevent violent extremism and counter radicalization is key to a successful CVE strategy. Potential joint projects may include those in targeted *hot-spot* areas that promote civic participation, socio-economic development, public awareness and discourse on violent extremism. The Government of Albania will explore funding options with the Agency for the Support of Civil Society, relevant ministries and international donors to establish the most suitable mechanism for supporting civil society projects in targeted *hot-spot* areas, in line with the following action:

- a. Issue Calls for Proposals for projects aimed at preventing radicalization and building community resilience against violent extremism.

### 5. **Countering extremist propaganda while promoting democratic values**

The Government of Albania intends to challenge the violent extremist narrative, particularly its transmission via online campaign materials and messages. With respect to this priority area, the Albanian National Strategy puts forth a two-pronged approach to discredit, and in turn mitigate the influence of, extremist propaganda.

First, the Government will improve communication with the public to raise awareness of radicalization and its associated threats. Through clear and effective communication channels, both online and offline, using credible voices such as community leaders, religious authorities, and other role models, the Government seeks to facilitate public discourse, empower local communities with information, dispel myths, and provide answers to the various concerns related to violent extremism. These efforts will serve to dissociate violent extremism from any particular religious group, emphasizing Albania's rich cultural heritage and history of religious tolerance. By providing the public with information on the Government's CVE efforts, this communication plan will increase transparency as well as elicit support and confidence among at-risk groups and the population in general.

Second, carefully crafted and contextualized messages and campaigns will be created to counter violent extremist propaganda online, using channels and methods most likely to reach and influence at-risk groups and individuals.

#### **6. Propose a creative and innovative communication strategy to complement the Albanian National Strategy**

Through this measure, the Government of Albania will develop a narrative designed to keep the public informed on how they can contribute to preventing violent extremism. For maximum impact, the following actions will be undertaken:

- a. Establish a Communication Working Group engaging various actors such as state officials, academics, media and technology companies, civil society, religious communities, and frontline workers.
- b. Issue communication guidelines for local partners implementing initiatives on the ground.
- c. Continuously raise awareness through regular meetings in targeted communities, bringing together local interlocutors to provide practical insight into how to address radicalization and violent extremism locally.

#### **7. Influence attitudes and behaviors towards violent extremism through contextualized campaigns and other communication initiatives**

Effective strategies and techniques for countering the spread of violent extremist messages and narratives will be identified and scaled up under this priority area. More specifically, civil society

and religious communities, as well as the media, will be supported in the development and dissemination of powerful messages and alternative narratives, promoting tolerance, peace, human rights, and democratic values through the following action:

- a. Develop tailored social media campaigns, radio and TV programs, and other types of initiatives promoting counter-extremism narratives capable of reaching target audiences.

## 8. **Developing long-term comprehensive CVE policies**

The multi-stakeholder, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to countering violent extremism adopted by the Government of Albania in this Strategy requires the continuous improvement of policies and measures that have a significant impact on the ability of violent extremist narratives and recruitment efforts to penetrate Albanian communities. Aligning existing CVE policies in order to leverage preventive efforts, in conjunction with developing requisite capacities among public servants at all levels to implement such policies, and gathering policy evidence through research, monitoring, and evaluation require a long-term commitment. In light of these observations, this priority area presents measures to enhance evidence-based policy making to counter violent extremism in Albania and the broader region of Western Balkans.

## 9. **Develop knowledge and expertise on countering violent extremism through research and increased information sharing**

Actionable intelligence, data, research and analysis of both the drivers of violent extremism and the levels of community resilience will inform future CVE policies. Information sharing will be enhanced to further improve the general understanding of the radicalization process and how to counter it. The following actions will support this measure:

- a. Develop information-sharing protocols and systems to regularly collect, collate, and share data from a wide variety of sources to ensure timely and effective responses and prevention efforts.
- b. Support and utilize local research on conditions, factors, and drivers of radicalization to violence as well as existing levels of community resilience against violent extremism.

## 10. Enhance capacities of practitioners and frontline workers

For professionals in direct contact with individuals at risk of radicalization, i.e., frontline workers such as teachers, social workers, local police and corrections officers, the ability to assess and support persons being drawn to violent extremism is central to the successful implementation of the Albanian National Strategy. CVE training courses, materials and guidelines will, therefore, be developed and distributed to frontline workers through the following actions:

- a. Provide comprehensive training to a variety of actors who will deal with violent extremism in the scope of this Strategy.
- b. Develop guidelines for frontline workers on identifying signs of radicalization and intervening in individual cases.

## 11. Evaluate CVE policies: apply and share lessons learned

Effective CVE policies require horizontal and vertical coordination as well as integrated, comprehensive and long-term cooperation across the security and development sectors. The Government of Albania will, therefore, adopt a holistic approach to CVE in line with the following actions:

- a. Establish a monitoring mechanism to gather data for reporting and analysis.
- b. Assess the impact of the individual measures of this Strategy and compile relevant lessons learned from interventions in the targeted *hot-spot* communities.
- c. Further adjust integrated CVE policies to increase their impact and effectiveness based on evaluation findings, in consultation with local communities.

## 12. Develop partnerships at the regional and international levels

To further advance domestic CVE capacities and expertise, as well as share lessons learned and best practices, the Government of Albania will build on regional and international platforms, frameworks and organizations such as the South-East European Cooperation Process and the Regional Cooperation Council, the EU Radicalization Awareness Network, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, Hedayah, and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.

In addition, the Government of Albania will spearhead **a regional initiative dedicated to building CVE capacity and cooperation** in the Western Balkans, based on experience, expertise and skills developed through the implementation of this Strategy. Programs and activities within this regional initiative will include sharing and expanding local research on the drivers of violent extremism and the measures to counter it; training law enforcement in community engagement and identifying early signs of radicalization; and coordinated public campaigns on social and traditional media platforms to counter, and offer alternatives to, violent extremist narratives. The following actions will be undertaken in support of this measure:

- a. Continue to take a pro-active role, at both regional and international levels, in organizing and participating in thematic events such as roundtables, conferences, and discussions to showcase Albanian achievements in countering violent extremism and share best practices.
- b. Launch a region-wide CVE capacity-building initiative in the Western Balkans to leverage Albania's commitment to developing advanced tools to combat violent extremism and to contribute to countering violent extremism on a larger scale.

## Implementation

To effectively implement the National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism, the Government of Albania will develop corresponding procedures and regulations as well as an inter-agency structure. The Prime Minister's office will lead the initiative, with contributions from the Ministry of Education and Sports, the Ministry of Social Welfare and Youth, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense, the latter of which will be engaged to perform a facilitating role throughout the implementation process.

The priorities, measures, and actions outlined above are largely cross-cutting and inter-institutional. However, the Ministry of Social Welfare and Youth will be the lead institution in covering community outreach and engagement as well as targeting groups that are marginalized, vulnerable, unemployed, or in need of social assistance.

The Ministry of Education and Sports will guide the activities related to education, where teachers will have a primary role in implementing the objectives by targeting students, parents, and communities.

Lastly, the Ministry of Internal Affairs will oversee the information-sharing processes.



## Annex: Overview of the Albanian National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism

Priority	Measure	Proposed Action
Community outreach and engagement	1. Encourage critical thinking, civic participation, and promote values of tolerance through education	<p><b>a.</b> Expand the “School as Community Center” network to reach <i>hot-spot</i> areas.</p> <p><b>b.</b> Empower and train teachers to recognize and respond to signs of radicalization.</p> <p><b>c.</b> Enhance support for curricular and extracurricular efforts in targeted schools to prevent radicalization, including civic and religious education, arts and sports initiatives, debate clubs, and similar resilience-building activities.</p>
	2. Address socio-economic drivers of radicalization through vocational education and training (VET) and employment services	<p><b>a.</b> Extend national employment services and active labor market support to reach the most at-risk groups and individuals.</p> <p><b>b.</b> Provide vocational training in targeted <i>hot-spot</i> areas (including through mobile or satellite units), tailored to the needs of the local population.</p> <p><b>c.</b> Establish vocational training and employment assistance initiatives in correctional institutions to facilitate the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders.</p> <p><b>d.</b> Support public and private initiatives generating employment opportunities, social entrepreneurship, and women’s economic empowerment in the targeted <i>hot-spot</i> areas.</p>
	3. Build trust and confidence and increase community safety through community policing	<p><b>a.</b> Leverage community policing capacities in the targeted <i>hot-spot</i> areas.</p>
	4. Empower civil society to build community resilience	<p><b>a.</b> Issue Calls for Proposals for projects aimed at preventing radicalization and building community resilience against violent extremism.</p>
Countering extremist propaganda while promoting democratic values	5. Propose a creative and innovative communication strategy to complement the Albanian National Strategy	<p><b>a.</b> Establish a Communication Working Group engaging various actors such as state officials, academics, media and technology companies, civil society, religious communities, and frontline workers.</p> <p><b>b.</b> Issue communication guidelines for local partners implementing initiatives on the ground.</p> <p><b>c.</b> Continuously raise awareness through regular meetings in targeted communities, bringing together local interlocutors to provide practical insight into how to address radicalization and violent extremism locally.</p>
	6. Influence attitudes and behaviors towards violent extremism through contextualized campaigns and other communication initiatives	<p><b>a.</b> Develop tailored social media campaigns, radio and TV programs, and other types of initiatives promoting counter-extremism narratives capable of reaching target audiences.</p>
Developing long-term comprehensive CVE policies	7. Develop knowledge and expertise on countering violent extremism through increased information sharing	<p><b>a.</b> Develop information-sharing protocols and systems to regularly collect, collate, share data from a wide variety of sources to ensure timely and effective responses and prevention efforts.</p> <p><b>b.</b> Support and utilize local research on conditions, factors, and drivers of radicalization to violence as well as existing levels of community resilience against violent extremism.</p>
	8. Enhance capacities of practitioners and frontline workers	<p><b>a.</b> Provide comprehensive training to a variety of actors who will deal with violent extremism in the scope of this Strategy.</p> <p><b>b.</b> Develop guidelines for frontline workers on identifying signs of radicalization and intervening in individual cases.</p>
	9. Evaluate CVE policies: apply and share lessons learned	<p><b>a.</b> Establish a monitoring mechanism to gather data for reporting and analysis.</p> <p><b>b.</b> Assess the impact of the individual measures of this Strategy and compile relevant lessons interventions in the communities.</p> <p><b>c.</b> Further adjust integrated CVE policies to increase their impact and effectiveness based on evaluation findings, in consultation with local communities.</p>
	10. Develop partnerships at the regional and international levels	<p><b>a.</b> Continue to take a pro-active role, at both regional and international levels, in organizing and participating in thematic events such as roundtables, conferences, and discussions to showcase Albanian achievements in countering violent extremism and share best practices.</p> <p><b>b.</b> Launch a region-wide CVE capacity-building initiative in the Western Balkans to leverage Albania’s commitment to developing advanced tools to combat violent extremism and to contribute to countering violent extremism on a larger scale.</p> <p><b>c.</b> Further adjust integrated CVE policies to increase their impact and effectiveness based on evaluation findings, in consultation with local communities.</p>

---

## ANNEX 2. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING AND COMBATING TERRORISM

---

### 1. Introduction

The Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Prevention and Combating Terrorism (hereinafter referred to as the Counter-Terrorism Strategy) is endorsed to pursue combating terrorism and terrorism-related phenomena in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in order to meet the commitments undertaken by Bosnia and Herzegovina internationally, in particular those arising from the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (overview of international instruments that served as a basis for the adoption of this Strategy are listed in Annex).

The Strategy is an expression of continuity and readiness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to further strengthen national capacities in the areas of prevention and counter-terrorism, but also to combat all other terrorism-related phenomena. This document is a clear demonstration of the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue the activities started back in 2001, when BiH became a member of the Antiterrorist Coalition. In this context, the Counter-Terrorism Strategy follows and promotes the principles set in the 2006 BiH Security Policy and two previous strategies adopted in 2006 and 2010 respectively. The Strategy also takes into account the recommendations of the Report of the Supervisory Body on the Implementation of the Previous Strategic Document, the findings under the Situation Assessment prepared by the Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH, as well as the findings of the academia in the context of new terrorist challenges in particular foreign terrorist fighters (document available in Annex to the Counter-Terrorism Strategy).

It is important to emphasise that the Strategy is adopted at the time of intensifying security challenges on a global scale, including, among other, foreign terrorist fighters, violent extremism and crime and hate speech, abuse of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Therefore, the following sections give a special emphasis on challenges of the new dynamics of terrorism and terrorism-related phenomena.

Furthermore, it is important to stress that the Strategy was made in consultation with representatives of non-governmental sector, especially academia, citizens' associations dealing with security issues, and representatives of religious communities in BiH and international organisations present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such methodology facilitates the principles of transparency

and openness, general social acceptance of the document and full future inclusion of all relevant segments of society in the implementation of strategic measures.

In the context of the current security situation, both at the national and international level, it should be stressed that the Strategy developed at the times of increasingly frequent and potentially more dangerous terrorist and violent extremist threat to Bosnia and Herzegovina and its security interests. The dynamics of these threats and their unpredictability, as well as dispersion, both in terms of its sources and selection of possible terrorist targets, all come as challenges primarily from the perspective of the security sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also our entire community.

A special challenge in itself is the early detection of future terrorist activities, including those aimed at promoting terrorism, whether by individuals or violent extremist groups. In the global

context, the greatest threat to safety and security interests of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at present, comes from the following terrorist organisations, or individuals and groups inspired by their ideologies: Al Qaeda, ISIL and Al-Nusra Front. Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina is essentially facing and is to counter the very same global terrorist threats as all other member states in the Anti-Terrorist and Anti-ISIL Coalition.

In parallel to countering challenges of violent extremism that can lead to terrorism, another significant security challenge is the presence of large quantities of weapons remaining from the last war, especially small arms and light weapons, as well as mines and explosive devices, coupled with relatively easy availability of improvised explosive devices. In addition to these challenges, the Strategy addresses the inter-relation between terrorism and other criminal phenomena, in particular, the financing of terrorist activities and money laundering, organised crime, corruption and abuse of narcotics, and illegal migration.

This document outlines the principles, vision, mission, and objectives established in accordance with the relevant documents of the United Nations, NATO and the European Union. Similarly, the future strategic program to achieve the goals is based on the principles of prevention and combating terrorism established under the Global UN Anti-Terrorist Strategy, the European Union's Strategy for Combating Terrorism and Combating Radicalization and Recruitment for Terrorism, as well as other relevant international instruments, taking into account the most recent, such as the Conclusions and Recommendations on Combating Violent Extremism, the White House Summit (February 2015), Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Riga, January 2015),

Joint Statement of Belgrade (April 2015), Joint Statement of St. Polten (May 2015), and a number of other documents.

The objectives are to be met by implementing the measures as set out in the Strategic Programme.

## 2. Principles in Drafting the Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The basic principles of this Strategic Document are as follows:

- ▶ **General acceptability of the document** - Preventing and combating terrorism, as well as eliminating conditions conducive to the emergence of terrorism requires a universal commitment of all segments of a community. This strategic document is an expression of commitment and readiness of the society to face the challenges of violent extremism and/or terrorism. This principle implies the active fight against all forms of violent extremism and terrorism as a priority objective of all institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the relevant institutions of Cantons, and Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- ▶ **Legality** - Compliance of objectives and measures with the Constitution and effective legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and international commitments;
- ▶ **Unity of vision** - All measures and activities are based on jointly identified and common view of challenges associated with violent extremism and terrorism;
- ▶ **Coordination and cooperation** - All practical actions in prevention and countering terrorism are based on unique concepts of strategic and operational actions and cooperation between the public and private sectors;
- ▶ **Professionalism** - Combating violent extremism and terrorism implies constant improvement of human and material technical resources, as well as operational procedures in accordance with international standards;
- ▶ **International cooperation** - Active cooperation with other countries in combating terrorism, especially with member States in the Anti-Terrorist and Anti-ISIL Coalitions, and in the context of accession to Euro-Atlantic integration;
- ▶ **Full implementation** - Monitoring the implementation of strategic measures that will be provided in an efficient manner, namely through clear definition of implementing bodies, deadlines and implementation indicators, as well as through establishing a supervisory body to monitor the implementation of the Strategy;
- ▶ **Analytcs and analysis** - Periodic analysis and evaluation of achieved goals and measures undertaken;

- ▶ **Confidentiality and protection of personal data** - All information of personal and operational nature, collected in preparation and implementation of the Strategy, will be protected and processed in accordance with the applicable legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- ▶ **Transparency** - The measures taken, as well as the achieved objectives and outcomes of the Strategy, will be made available to the public to the extent possible, in accordance with the applicable legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Implementation of strategic measures must be transparent, and activities undertaken need to be open and accessible to all citizens and their organisations to the extent possible;
- ▶ **Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms** - None of the measures and activities must not be conducted in a way that threatens the basic human rights and freedoms.
- ▶ **Openness** - Monitoring innovation of international and national instruments and the needs in combating terrorism.

### 3. Vision and Mission

Guidelines for the vision and mission are contained in the overall goal of the Strategy.

Objectives can be achieved only through adequate and proactive approach of all segments of society.

In repressive terms, this primarily involves the collection and timely analysis and subsequent assignment of all available intelligence, conducting systemic, full and coordinated investigations of all phenomena of violent extremism and terrorism, enhanced exchange of information at the international level, application of best investigative practices and other procedures and guidelines. Development of an early warning system.

In terms of prevention, an emphasis is placed on eliminating all causes that can lead to violent extremism and terrorism, cooperation with NGOs, including religious communities, and achieving support and active involvement of the widest social community especially the youth in the processes of combating hate speech, hate crimes and terrorism. Encourage all activities in society that are focused on the development of a democratic society which ensures the full rule of law, as well as activities aimed at promoting dialogue and tolerance.

**VISION:** Create a framework and support the development of the driving forces, aimed at preventing hate crimes and the spread of violent extremism, so as to establish an adequate response focused on positive communication and action.

MISSION: Establishing legislative and institutionally strengthened capacities to implement the objectives of the Strategy as follows:

- ▶ Researching drivers behind violent extremism at all levels; Coordinating response to the increasingly violent and extreme events;
- ▶ Strengthening the role of civil society, especially the youth, women, religious leaders and victims of extremism and radicalism that leads to terrorism, through the development of local strategies;
- ▶ Promoting tolerance and an 'early warning' system in cases of appearing ideologies of violent extremism, the curricula of educational institutions;
- ▶ Rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremists and returnees from foreign battlefields, with a focus on those convicted under final judgements;
- ▶ Development of economic and educational opportunities of groups indoctrinated into violent and radical behaviour.

#### 4. **Goal of the Strategy and Four Objectives**

The Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Preventing and Combating Terrorism (for the period 2015 to 2020), is based, primarily, on the approach of the European Union in preventing and combating terrorism. This strategic approach was chosen especially bearing in mind fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina shares the same geo-political space with other European countries, and the same democratic, cultural, civilizational and other values. Furthermore, the security challenges faced by BiH are not significantly different from those faced by other European countries, including Member States of the European Union. In addition, the fact that the European path of other Southeast European countries is unquestionable further strengthens our commitment to this strategic approach, for it ensures a strong regional harmonisation.


Also, now with the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU coming into force, Bosnia and Herzegovina now also has a legal obligation to harmonize its legislation with the EU legislation. Harmonisation of national counter-terrorism measures with measures taken by the European Union therefore has an additional goal in this important security segment, namely, to bring Bosnia and Herzegovina closer to candidate status for membership in the European Union and closer to Euro-Atlantic integration as a whole.

### GOAL OF THE STRATEGY

TO COUNTER ALL FORMS OF EXTREMIST AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY RESPECTING THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY, RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS - MAKE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA A PLACE SAFE FOR LIFE AND WORK OF ALL ITS CITIZENS, AND OTHERS WITHIN THEIR TERRITORIES.

### OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY

- ▶ PREVENTION OF HATE CRIMES, RADICALISM AND TERRORISM IN ALL ITS MANIFESTATIONS;
- ▶ CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION;
- ▶ IMPROVE PROCEDURES IN INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TERRORIST OFFENCES AND RELATED CRIMES;
- ▶ RESPONSE / REACTION TO POSSIBLE TERRORIST ATTACK AND AFTERMATH RECOVERY.



#### 4.1. Prevention

Strategic measures in the area of prevention are aimed at preventing vulnerable people and groups from opting for violent extremism and terrorism as a means of achieving their goals. In this context, special focus is given to measures to prevent the processes of indoctrination in ter-

rorist ideologies, especially its forms containing clear elements of incitement to terrorism, either directly or indirectly, public glorification/promotion of terrorist acts and recruitment for terrorism.

A key element of this process is the strengthening the role of the so-called social correctives, starting from family, social services, to education and other services. In addition, there is the need for synergy in local communities along the lines of the public sector and religious communities, so that the prevention segment would have its full form, while measures to be taken would yield the best possible results.

Bearing in mind that motivation for the selection of violent extremism and terrorism differs from one person to another, special attention in the implementation of preventive measures will focus on achieving direct contact with vulnerable persons in all situations when realistically possible.

The intention is to achieve significant preventive impacts through cooperation with citizens and civil society organisations, community policing, development of specific security program for vulnerable communities, special emphasis will be placed on increased participation of local religious leaders, as well as youth and women. The role of the public and private sector in all these processes should be concrete and visible at the local level.

Special preventive measures foresee combating misuse of the Internet for terrorist purposes, as well as the widespread hate speech and incitement to hate crimes and discrimination.

The key priorities of preventive activities are as follows:

- ▶ Develop an early detection system for all forms of extreme behaviour that can lead to terrorism;
- ▶ Develop an early detection system, including preventive action and checks conducted to prevent manifestations of extremism in procedures of inviting foreign nationals to come to BiH, issuance of visas in the Diplomatic and Consular Offices of BiH abroad and procedures for granting residence to foreign citizens in BiH;
- ▶ Eliminate possibilities to encourage and recruit vulnerable groups and communities for terrorism;
- ▶ Develop a positive communication strategy and work actively with the media to promote it;
- ▶ Promote the values of democracy, rule of law, tolerance and dialogue - create specific education programmes for young people through both curricula and extra- curricular activities;
- ▶ Provide support to the activities of citizens and civil society organisations aimed at preventing hate and promoting positive narratives (opposing violent extremist narratives by highlighting positive examples of social values, tolerance, openness);



- ▶ Support inter-religious dialogue and activities carried out by the Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- ▶ Encourage and assist the academia to continue research into terrorism, hate crimes, hate speech and other security phenomena in the society, so as to identify key issues and develop and improve prevention measures.

#### 4.2. Protection

Second objective of the Strategy is to reduce overall vulnerability to terrorist attacks and protect critical infrastructure. A significant part of measures is designed to improve the protection of borders in order to prevent or minimise the possible entry of persons of security interest from other countries and postoperative follow-up of BiH citizens who are associated with terrorism. In this regard, the plan is to also include early preventive detection of connected with terrorism and extremism, appearing as applicants for BiH visa before the Diplomatic and Consular Offices or the Service for Foreigners' Affairs. A set of these measures does not imply only control in the field of cross-border passenger traffic and visa issuance, but also goods and finances, in order to prevent attempts of giving any support to terrorist activities. In terrorism cases prosecuted before the Court of BiH, it is evident that cross-border movement of perpetrators and instigators in the crimes of terrorism is significant, and also, that they were seeking, and in some cases were given, either resources or financial means to carry out their terrorist activities.

Under measures to achieve this strategic objections goal, it is also foreseen to establish mandatory adoption of minimum standards for the protection of critical infrastructure and other facilities of interest, as well as to improve procedures for assessing the real risk and vulnerability. This part of measures will be implemented in accordance with the legal competence at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its entities and Brcko District.

In addition in sections on the transport and storage safety, special attention will be placed on issues of transport and storage of weapons, explosives and dual-use goods, as well as chemical, biological and nuclear materials (CBRN).

A separate set of measures provides for activities to protect critical cyber infrastructure, with the establishment of CERT in BiH being essential to this process.

The key priorities are as follows:

- ▶ Introduce a system of collection of biometric data fully in the process of issuing visas;
- ▶ Introduce a system of collection of biometric data and taking biometric data from the Service for Foreigners' Affairs in the process of issuing residence permit and imposing measures of expulsion for foreigners and make it operational and accessible for use to security agencies;
- ▶ Improve the Information System for Migration ISM and make it operational and accessible for use to security agencies;
- ▶ Improve the visa information system and make it fully operational;
- ▶ Fully develop a system of risk analysis, relevant to the Strategy;
- ▶ Link security databases, relevant to the Strategy;
- ▶ Full implementation of international standards in the field of cyber security in particular those relating to the establishment of CERT in BiH and mechanisms for monitoring and combating the misuse of the Internet for terrorist purposes;
- ▶ Develop procedures for monitoring analysis and projects to improve safety storage of weapons, military equipment, explosives and dual-use goods and their transport through or across BiH.

#### 4.3. Investigation and Criminal Prosecution

Measures foreseen in the field of investigation and criminal prosecution are focused primarily on further building and strengthening of legislative and institutional capacities of intelligence and security, police and judicial sectors. The main objective of these measures is early detection of terrorist plans and activities, and prompt repressive actions against individuals, groups and networks that demonstrate terrorist intentions. In addition, a special focus of investigative and repressive activities will be put in the following areas: terrorist propaganda and incitement (especially via the Internet), recruitment for terrorist activities, terrorist financing, giving any kind of support to terrorists, and giving instructions or making available any means to terrorists that can be used for the commission of crimes of terrorism.

A further upgrade of legislative capacities and compliance with new international instruments, especially those of the UN Security Council and the Council of Europe, will contribute to even better and more efficient repressive actions of the relevant authorities. This part of the measure implies the implementation of systems analysis and substantive and procedural norms of the criminal legislation in BiH.

A separate set of measures envisaged to strengthen cooperation mechanisms between the competent authorities and improve the system of unified coordination of the implementation of all investigative activities. The mentioned include the establishment of a system for the collection of operational data, analytical processing of the same, and the ongoing risk assessment of terrorism or disclose these findings to all competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The measures that are relevant to the improvement of international cooperation include further strengthening of judicial, police and intelligence cooperation with countries in the region, countries key partners in combating terrorism. A special part of measures relates to strengthening cooperation with INTERPOL, and the conclusion of operational agreements with EUROPOL and EUROJUST.

Development of new and improvement of the existing information systems and databases are measures to be taken in order to increase the availability of operational information and accelerating the flow of such information between relevant agencies/institutions. In this way, all law enforcement agencies will be able and required, after collecting operational data, to enter such data in an information system, in accordance with the laws of BiH and timely disclose all information that may be of importance for safety and impact undertaking of counter-terrorism measures, thus making the actions of law enforcement agencies faster and more efficient.

In addition to foregoing, improving the system of application of international restrictive measures and the establishment of a national list of violent extremists/terrorists, and a systemic application of administrative restrictive measures against such persons, will all contribute to the full harmonisation of our capacities according to the requirements of the FATF and MONEYVAL. Such measures should include further efforts to combat money laundering and financing of terrorist activities, particularly in the area of abuse of non-profit sector for financing terrorism, and the investigations of suspicious investment. In line with the European Union standards, every investigation carried out on indicia of terrorism must include financial investigations; hence, financial investigations are therefore an integral part of all terrorism investigations.

Key priorities are as follows:

- ▶ Improving the legislative framework for combating terrorism and violent extremism (alignment with international standards and harmonisation of this framework with the
- ▶ criminal codes in Bosnia and Herzegovina), including regulations related to control of movement and residence of foreigners. Ratify international instruments relevant to combating terrorism;

- ▶ Improving the legal framework for coordinating all operational and investigative activities, gathering, analytical processing and exchange of information; In this way, all law enforcement agencies will be able, after continuously collecting operational data, to enter all data and information related to terrorism in mutually compatible information systems under the principles of the ROS (Register of Certain Foreigners) available with the Service for Foreigner's Affairs, then timely have available all information that could substantially impact undertaking timely measures to combat terrorism and avoiding inefficient handling of such information.
- ▶ Strengthening of human, material and technical resources for the implementation of operational and investigative activities;
- ▶ Strengthening cooperation at the international level, countries in the region, countries of interest, and through a system of INTERPOL. Signing operational agreements with the neighbouring countries and countries of interest for BiH and operational agreements with EUROPOL and EUROJUST.
- ▶ Analyse risks and develop repressive measures against enabling illegal access to weapons and explosives by violent extremists/terrorists, including the parts that can be used for making improvised explosive devices, or access to CBRN.
- ▶ Prevent financing of terrorism, through continuation of harmonisation of legislation according to the requirements of the FATF and MONEYVAL, and consistently applying other standards, especially the duty to conduct full financial investigations in investigating the crime of terrorism;
- ▶ A special focus to be given to offences related to criminal offences of terrorism, and primarily to undertake investigative activities in the direction of cutting the channels of illegal arms and explosives and other materials that might be used to execute the criminal offence of terrorism.

#### 4.4. **Response / Reaction to Terrorist Attacks**

The risk of terrorist attacks cannot be completely excluded. We must face the fact that terrorist attacks are very likely to happen in future regardless of the measures taken or intend to be taken. The response to terrorist attacks and elimination of its consequences should be built within the existing system, in particular the protection and rescue system, that is, response to the aftermath of natural and other disasters. It is also necessary to conduct assessments and analyses of both

risks, as well as capacities of relevant agencies, that is, identify available resources and improve ways to mobilise it, be it civilian, military or private sector resources.

The first part of measures from the strategic programme implies measures to establish a coherent and comprehensive system of rapid exchange of operational and police information, cooperation with the media, and modalities of the use of resources of civil protection and rescue, and military

resources. Extension of the Agreement on Civil-Military Cooperation in case of terrorist attacks in 2010, and its improvement in terms of clearly defining the operational procedures will significantly improve our capacity, uniqueness and speed of response in case of terrorist attacks with serious consequences.

Bearing in mind the limited financial and other resources, the system in its preventive segment must be based on risk assessment, as well as methodology and standards to be established by the Council of Ministers of BiH, at the proposal of competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Another element of these measures is the general society, solidarity towards potential victims of acts of violent extremism and terrorism. In this sense, it is necessary to establish mechanisms for any form of assistance to victims, in particular social and medical assistance.

Key priorities are as follows:

- ▶ Strengthen capacities of protection and rescue at all levels and improve the coordination system in BiH, and clearly define all operating procedures and providing mutual support in case of terrorist attacks,
- ▶ Conduct an analysis of existing legislation in the field of protection and rescue, especially in relation to international obligations and propose measures for improvement in the case of terrorist attacks,
- ▶ Develop a common methodology for risk assessment in accordance with international standards, and attend to risk analysis at the level of BiH, the Federation of BiH (including cantons), Republika Srpska and Brcko District. This analysis should serve to further development of capacities to respond to a terrorist attack,
- ▶ Upgrade and improve the Agreement on Civil-Military Cooperation,
- ▶ Improve cooperation with other countries, international organisations regarding the response to terrorist attacks and other disasters,
- ▶ Develop modalities for programmes to obtain assistance to victims of terrorism and their families.

## 5. Strategic Programme for Implementing Priority Objectives

5.1. Prevention			
	Measure	Implementing Body	Deadline
5.1.1.	Develop systemic and common approaches for combating hate and violence between different groups.	Ministry of Security of BiH, law enforcement agencies, other competent authorities in BiH and local community	2 years
5.1.2.	Particularly explore areas with observed examples of incitement and recruitment (closed communities, places and areas where there are conflicts between various ethnic and religious groups, prisons, etc.); mapping crisis areas from the aspect of indoctrination to radical ideology and areas from which the largest number of persons was sent to foreign battlefields.	Intelligence and Security Agency, State Investigation and Protection Agency, the police and other law enforcement agencies in BiH, SPS, academia – experts	1 year
5.1.3.	Conduct an analysis of causes and structure of recruitment, incitement and departures to foreign battlefields, punishable under the Criminal Code of BiH.	State Investigation and Protection Agency, the police and other law enforcement agencies in BiH, academia – experts	1 year
5.1.4.	Conduct an analysis of earlier criminality and incriminated behaviour of persons who were detected as radically violent.	State Investigation and Protection Agency, the police and other law enforcement agencies in BiH, academia-experts	1 year
5.1.5.	Strengthen inter-religious dialogue and tolerance.	Inter-religious Council in cooperation with all relevant institutions in BiH	Continuous
5.1.6.	Development of projects of young people, women and religious communities in combating violent radicalism and extremism, development of projects of so-called recognition of religious legitimacy (as the most vulnerable group).	Inter-religious Council (active participation of all religious communities in projects to combat violent extremism by developing positive communication approach in the delegitimisation of infectious ideology)	5 years
5.1.7.	Investigate and implement best practices in Europe in the field of prevention of terrorism and terrorism-related crimes.	Ministry of Security of BiH, Ministry of Justice of BiH, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH in cooperation with all competent authorities in BiH and governments of entities and BD	Continuous
5.1.8.	Promote rule of law, democracy, create appropriate educational and academic programmes.	All institutions in BiH	Continuous
5.1.9.	Continue with the research of areas of preventive action, and in consultation with relevant government and non-governmental sector, permanent work on developing new preventive measures.	Ministry of Security of BiH in cooperation with all competent authorities in BiH and governments of entities and BD	Continuous
5.1.10.	Strengthen the role of local communities and authorities at the local level as a contact point for cooperation on violent extremism - adopt local plans and develop local contact points for cooperation with the competent authorities on the issue of violent extremism.	Governments of entities, Brcko District, cantons and local communities	Continuous
5.1.11.	Develop special projects of safety culture in the media, educational and development programmes, particularly in the area of investigative journalism and relating to hate speech, violent extremism and other acts that may lead to terrorism.	Ministry of Transport and Communications of BiH, Communications Regulatory Agency, Press Council and broadcasters, Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH in cooperation with relevant educational authorities in BiH as well as other relevant competent authorities in BiH.	Continuous
5.1.12.	Strengthening the existing and developing additional monitoring programmes of incitement to violent extremism and terrorism through social networks with an appropriate response.	Police and other law enforcement agencies in BiH	Continuous

5.1.13.	Preparation of re-socialisation programmes for those convicted for terrorism or participation in foreign paramilitaries.	Competent judicial authorities in BiH, judicial police in BiH with the support of the Ministry of Security of BiH	2 years
5.1.14.	Collection of information, exchange of information and detecting subjects of financial support to violent extremism or terrorism, with proposed measures (in accordance with FATF guidelines).	State Investigation and Protection Agency- Financial Intelligence Department, Intelligence and Security Agency od BiH, SPS, police and other law enforcement agencies in BiH	Continuous
5.1.15.	Conduct operational checks of persons working on the analysis, lists and destruction of surplus weapons and military equipment in BiH, in terms of their contact or any other cooperation with individuals of violent and radical beliefs, and which may lead to terrorism.	Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH, Ministry of Defence of BiH	Continuous
5.1.16.	In consultation with relevant educational bodies to supplement or develop thematic curricula in the field of	Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH and ministries of education in BiH	2 years
	security culture, prevention of all forms of hatred, hate speech and violent extremism that can lead to terrorism.		
5.1.17.	Development and participation in RAN network for the Western Balkans countries.	Ministry of Security of BiH	3 years
5.1.18.	BiH's participation in international activities aimed at the prevention of terrorism and violent extremism..	Ministry of Security of BiH and the police and other law enforcement agencies in BiH	Continuous

5.2. Protection			
	Measure	Implementing Body	Deadline
5.2.1.	Link all relevant systems and databases related to border security. Inter-sectoral exchange of relevant information and collect data on persons, passengers from travel and other private agencies. Enable the use of biometric data for the control of persons and travel documents, align and update.	Border Police of BiH, Service for Foreigners' Affairs, Diplomatic and Consular Missions, all police and other law enforcement agencies in BiH	Continuous
5.2.2.	Establishing a system of collection of biometric data in the Service for Foreigners' Affairs and taking biometric data of foreign nationals in the process of approval of residence and the imposition of measures of expulsion and placement of persons in the Immigration Centre.	Service for Foreigners' Affairs	1 year
5.2.3.	Establishing a system of collection of biometric data in Diplomatic and Consular Missions regarding approval of issuance of visas and the process of issuing visas.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH	3 years
5.2.4.	Full implementation of video surveillance at border crossings.	Indirect Taxation Administration and other	3 years
		services included in the IBM Strategy	
5.2.5.	Establishing a system of automatic reading of license plates at border crossings.	Border Police of BiH	3 years
5.2.6.	Establish a database in accordance with the law on the implementation of international restrictive measures.	Ministry of Security of BiH	2 years

5.2.7.	Identify the weakest spots in the context of safety of cross- border traffic of goods and strengthen the security of transport routes and control of goods which are transported and/or in transit through BiH	Indirect Taxation Authority, Border Police of BiH and police agencies in BiH, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH, Ministry of Security of BiH	2 years
5.2.8.	Participation in projects of the EU CBRN CoE.	Ministry of Security of BiH, State Regulatory Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety and the police and other authorities in BiH	Continuous
5.2.9.	Take measures and action to address issues of availability of explosives, weapons and mines that can be used for improvised explosive devices..	Ministry of Security of BiH, Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH – Demining Agency, Ministry of Defence of BiH, police agencies in BiH	Continuous
5.2.10.	In accordance with the agreed indicators by law enforcement agencies, establish a special Watch List, available and compatible in all police agencies in BiH, and develop measures against such persons in accordance with the indicated level of threat, including a ban on the entry of certain foreign nationals into BiH and increased control of BiH citizens with dual citizenship of another country with	Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH, all police agencies in BiH, Service for Foreigners' Affairs and the competent prosecutor's offices	3 years
	which BiH has not signed a bilateral agreement on dual citizenship, while they are staying in BiH		
5.2.11.	Introduce instructive obligation in accordance with the provisions of the Strategy through action plans relating to the notification of all changes of identity, loss of passport and other documents, and the residence of persons from the Watch List referred to under 5.2.11.	All police agencies in BiH	2 years
5.2.12.	Establish an effective mechanism of cooperation in implementation of activities of prevention and combating terrorism, in accordance with this Strategy	All police and other law enforcement agencies in BiH, Intelligence and Security Agency, competent prosecutors' offices in BiH	Continuous
5.2.13.	Create special analytical instruments for analyses of available information. Establish a system of joint analysis and exchange of information between police and judicial structures in BiH; make the system compatible with the systems of INTERPOL, EUROPOL and EUROJUST.	All police law enforcement agencies in BiH, Service for Foreigners' Affairs	
5.2.14.	Increase measures of protection in Diplomatic and Consular Missions abroad	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH	Continuous
5.2.15.	In cooperation with the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH, develop special procedures to establish possible internal or other controller for oversight of content of critical and inciting websites for terrorism and radicalism, and establish sanctions for providers who do not comply with the instructions of these controls, and also tighten the criteria for obtaining a license for providers. <sup>1</sup>	Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH, prosecutor's offices in BiH, Ministry of Transport and Communications of BiH	2 years
5.2.16.	Prepare a black list of websites inciting to hatred, hate speech, radicalism and violence and incitement to terrorism.	Ministry of Transport and Communications of BiH, Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH, police agencies in BiH,	2 years



5.2.17.	Collection and timely entry of prescribed data on foreign nationals in the ROS database and the analysis, and if needed, the exchange of information with security and other law enforcement agencies, prosecutors' offices and courts competent for foreign nationals who can be linked to any manifestations of radicalism and illegal conduct including persons from the watch list, who are foreign nationals.	Service for Foreigners' Affairs in cooperation with the relevant law enforcement agencies in BiH	
5.2.18.	Monitoring of economic and commercial consequences in terms of prevention – terrorist act – recovery of terrorist implications.	Ministry of Justice, offices of attorney general in BiH, High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (number of claims in previous cases), competent bodies in entities and BD.	1 year

5.3. Investigations			
	Measure	Implementing Body	Deadline
5.3.1.	Work towards the establishment of effective mechanisms for the collection and exchange of operational information between relevant agencies in the security system at all levels concerning the objectives of the Strategy..	Prosecutor's offices in BiH, the police and other relevant agencies in BiH, Intelligence and Security Agency, SPS	Continuous
5.3.2.	Strengthen mechanisms of judicial and police cooperation with countries in the region and other countries of interest.	Ministry of Justice of BiH, prosecutor's offices in BiH and police agencies in BiH, SPS	Continuous
5.3.3.	Work on the timely exchange of information with countries in the region and other countries of interest for BiH on information on dual citizenships of persons of safety interest, and persons who have changed their identity to avoid legal sanctions	Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH, Ministry of Security of BiH in cooperation with other competent authorities in BiH	Continuous
5.3.4.	Strengthen and speed up the investigation and corresponding sanctions for perpetrators of acts of hate speech and hate crimes particularly those with religious and ethnic motivation. Identify and prosecute individuals and members of extremist and terrorist networks that encourage, recruit new terrorists or fund their activities and harmonise the legal framework for these actions.	Police law enforcement agencies in BiH, prosecutor's offices in BiH, Ministry of Justice of BiH and Ministry of Security of BiH	Continuous
5.3.5.	By using the available investigative activities and special investigative actions, and introducing new elements of the Criminal Procedure Codes (in order to effectively fight the planning of terrorist activities and actions), track communication channels of terrorists, and prevent the spread of terrorism knowledge, especially through the Internet.	All police law enforcement agencies in BiH, prosecutor's offices in BiH and Ministry of Justice of BiH	Continuous
5.3.6.	In particular, develop a network for co-operation relating to the exchange of evidence through EUROJUST and MPPIS in conjunction with radicalisation in prisons in accordance with the relevant international instruments.	Ministry of Justice of BiH	Continuous
5.3.7.	Training of judges and prosecutors and police officers in the conduct of investigations for crimes of terrorism, financing of terrorism, hate crimes and hate speech.	High Judicial Prosecutorial Council of BiH	Continuous
5.3.8.	Work on the applicability of the special investigative actions in the field of legal and technical capacity to change the identity of undercover agents, as well as the license plates of vehicles.	IDDEEA in cooperation with all law enforcement agencies, law enforcement agencies in BiH	1 year

5.4. Response			
	Measure	Implementing Body	Deadline
5.4.1.	Timely exchange of operational information and ensuring effective coordination at alleviating the consequences of a terrorist attack.	T Prosecutor's offices in BiH, the police and other relevant law enforcement agencies in BiH, Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH, SPS	Continuous
5.4.2.	Establish solidarity mechanisms to help victims of terrorism and their families.	Council of Ministers of BiH, entity governments, cantonal governments	Continuous
5.4.3.	In case of need, provide necessary assistance to citizens of BiH, who were direct or indirect victims of terrorist attacks in third countries.	Entity governments and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH – Council of Ministers of BiH	Continuous
5.4.4.	Improve mechanisms of military assistance to civilian structures in case of need in order to remedy the consequences of a terrorist attack	Ministry of Defence of BiH, Ministry of Security of BiH, Civil Protection of Brcko District, the entity civil protection and other authorities in BiH	Continuous
5.4.5.	Ensure legal conditions for deployment of members of the Armed Forces and their material and technical resources and capacity in cases of "exceptional crisis", which were a result of a violent, extreme, radical behaviour in connection with terrorism, so that they could be engaged in cooperation with police agencies in BiH.	Ministry of Defence of BiH	Continuous
5.4.6.	Stricter penal policy with regard to all acts of violent extremism that lead or have resulted in terrorism.	Ministry of Justice of BiH, High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of BiH and courts in BiH	Continuous
5.4.7.	Expedite the process of destruction of surplus weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina and collected illegal weapons.	Ministry of Defence of BiH and civil protections in BiH	Continuous
5.4.8.	Improving the procedures of import and export of weapons and military equipment.	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH, Ministry of Security of BiH, Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH and Ministry of Defence of BiH	Continuous

Instruments required for implementation of the strategic programme:

- ▶ Quick exchange of information on searches and notices related to the criminal offence of terrorism
- ▶ Joint interagency investigative teams in BiH, ad-hoc or wider under the Convention on Police Cooperation
- ▶ Follow the principle of timely availability and transfer of all operational information relevant to criminal investigations
- ▶ Linking and comparing data collected in operational work in the field by using special investigative actions with private sector data, for example, from financial institutions, lists of passengers, goods, etc.
- ▶ All of the above to be elaborated under action plans.

## 6. **Coherence of the Strategy with other relevant national strategic, Euro-Atlantic and global documents**

The Strategy was developed in accordance with the Decision of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina on establishing the Working Group for Preparation of the Draft Strategy for Preventing and Combating Terrorism (2015 to 2020) (4th session of the Council of Ministers held on 23 April 2015). The Strategy is a document that represents a continuation of the efforts of BiH in preventing and combating terrorism, consistent with the Security Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2006), and earlier strategic documents in the area of combating terrorism, adopted in 2006 and 2010.

This document is based on internationally accepted instruments and obligations, as well as documents of the Report of the Supervisory Body on the Degree of Implementation of the Previous Strategy, the Situation Assessment by the Intelligence and Security Agency, and the analyses and recommendations made by representatives of the academia, non-governmental organisations, the Inter-Religious Council of BiH and international organisations present in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Strategy also foresees establishing the Supervisory Body that will monitor the implementation of the Strategy, and coordinate all activities guaranteeing a coordinated approach in meeting the strategic objectives.

Compliance with other relevant strategic documents was also taken into account in preparation of the Strategy. Also, to the maximum extent possible, the attempt was to ensure coherence with the relevant international strategic documents, in particular, the Global Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the EU Strategy for Preventing and Combating Terrorism and Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism.

Finally, the Strategy has established the obligation to set up the Supervisory Body tasked to monitor its implementation. This body is to be understood as an additional mechanism to ensure that the actual implementation of policy measures is in line with international instruments and in compliance with the measures to be taken on the basis of other national strategic documents.

Being an integral part of this Strategy and used as a basis for preparation of strategic guidelines, annexes are an addition to the strategic document for the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and will not be publicly available in relation to the Strategy itself.

## 7. **Monitoring the implementation of the Strategy**

Under the Special Decision of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an inter- sectoral body will be established to supervise the implementation of the Strategy and related action plans. The supervisory body will comprise representatives of competent institutions/agencies from all levels of government following the decision by the Council of Ministers of BiH, at the proposal of the Working Group. The mandate of this body will be linked to the period of implementation of the Strategy.

The Supervisory Body will submit annual report to the Council of Ministers of BiH on the progress in the implementation of the Strategy and action plans with a proposal for consideration by the Council of Ministers of BiH and submit these to consideration also to relevant Committees of the Parliament of BiH. These reports may include proposals for adoption of new measures, that is, developing additional programmes and projects in order to complete the primary goal, the vision and mission of the Strategy.

The Supervisory Body is to submit to the Council of Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina for consideration and adoption also the Final Report on the Degree of Implementation of the Strategy. This report shall be submitted no later than 31 December 2020.

## 8. **International partners in implementation of the Strategy**

Key international partners for the implementation of the Strategy include: OHR, EU, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe, the US Embassy to BiH (including ICITAP and ODC).

Activities on the implementation of this document will be done in cooperation with regional organisations (RCC, RACVIAC, PCC, and other), and with the Member States of the European Union (in particular within the framework of the Brdo Process initiative and in bilateral contacts with other partner countries in combating terrorism).

## 9. **Guidelines for preparation of a single action plan, action plans of entities and Brcko District of BIH**

The Action Plan is developed at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to implement strategic measures focusing on prevention and combating terrorism and hate crimes falling within the jurisdiction of state institutions, as well as to harmonize the implementation of measures laid

down by this Strategy, which are under the competence of governments of Republika Srpska, the Federation of BiH including cantonal governments, and the government of Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Action Plan is adopted by the Council of Ministers of BiH, on the proposal of the Ministry of Security of BiH.

Entity governments including the governments of cantons, and the Government of Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopt their own action plans for implementation of the Strategy,

which are consistent with objectives and measures referred to in this document, with legally defined jurisdiction of entities, cantons and institutions of Brcko District of BiH. Respective ministries of interior and the Brcko District Police will be in charge of preparing these action plans. The deadline for preparation is 60 days since the adoption of the Strategy.

In preparation of all action plans, it is necessary to identify measures arising from the Strategy and guidelines for the implementation of priority objectives. The guidelines are intended to clarify the manner of possible implementation of the listed key priorities defined under the four pillars of the strategy. Implementing bodies and the proposed timetable are set roughly by members of the Working Group and other bodies consulted, relative to key priorities, in order to facilitate the preparation of the action plans envisaged under the Strategy and achieve a certain level of time-wise alignment in implementing priority objectives of combating hate speech, violent radicalism, and extremism that leads to terrorism.

## List of Abbreviations

<b>CERT</b>	Computer Emergency Response Team
<b>DKP</b>	Diplomatic and Consular Offices
<b>CBRN</b>	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
<b>EU CBRN CoE</b>	European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Migration Centres of Excellence Initiative
<b>ISM</b>	Information System for Immigration
<b>INTERPOL</b>	International Criminal Police
<b>EUROPOL</b>	European Union's Law Enforcement Agency <b>EUROJUST</b> – European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit <b>FATF</b> – The Financial Action Task Force
<b>MONEYVAL</b>	Committee on the Expert on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
<b>RAK/CRA</b>	Communications Regulatory Agency
<b>MPPIS</b>	International Legal Assistance
<b>IBM</b>	Integrated Border Management
<b>ISM</b>	Information System Immigration
<b>SPS</b>	Service for Foreigners' Affairs
<b>OSA</b>	Intelligence and Security Agency
<b>ROS</b>	Register of Certain Foreigners

---

## ANNEX 3. CROATIA: NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING TERRORISM <sup>142</sup>

---

### I. RESPONSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

1. The purpose of the National Strategy for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (hereinafter the “Strategy”) is to establish the strategic framework of the Republic of Croatia to combat terrorism and, at the national level, to provide guidelines for upgrading the existing and building new mechanisms and measures for the prevention and combating of terrorism.
2. The Strategy is based on the provisions, principles, and the values of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, the United Nations Charter, membership of the EU and NATO, and other international law obligations, in particular in the field of the protection of human rights and freedoms, the rights of refugees, and humanitarian law. The Strategy provides a theme-centered follow-up to the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia and other national strategic documents connected to the prevention and combating of terrorism. Further, the Strategy supports the goals and values enshrined in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (EU), and other fundamental counter-terrorism documents from within the scope of work of the UN, the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe (COE).
3. The Republic of Croatia firmly condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and advocates the principle of zero tolerance towards this phenomenon. Terrorism is one of the most serious criminal offences that aims to provoke fear by planned and deliberate use of violence and/or threat of violence in order to achieve certain political, religious, ideological or other goals. At the same time, terrorism is a complete negation of the essence of democracy and of the recognized civilisation, religious, and cultural values of the modern world, including human rights and fundamental freedoms and, as such, does not have and may not have any justification and cannot and may not be associated with any national, religious, racial, ethnic or any other affiliation.

---

142 This is an unofficial translation of the document. The original document is available from [http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2015\\_10\\_108\\_2105.html](http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2015_10_108_2105.html).

4. The Republic of Croatia seeks to prevent any and all activities by terrorists, terrorist groups, and persons connected with them in its territory, and the use of its territory for any activities related to terrorism.
5. The Republic of Croatia advocates that political, economic, social, religious, cultural and other issues should be resolved through generally accepted democratic means in conformity with the legislation in force and with general international law, in full recognition of all human rights. Strengthening the culture of peace and knowledge, tolerance and dialogue, and of international understanding and respect eliminates some major conditions for the radicalisation of positions that might lead to the spread and strengthening of terrorism.
6. The Republic of Croatia holds that peace and security, development and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. The combating of terrorism also involves the resolution of other global problems: regional and world crises, conflicts and occupations, instability provoked by weak and failed states, wide-ranging disrespect of the principle of the rule of law and of the standards of effective protection of human rights, and other important issues, such as poverty, infectious diseases, climate change, poor economic development, the lack of sustainable development, undeveloped education, etc.
7. Terrorism is further linked with asymmetrical threats, such as transnational organised crime, the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and substances, the smuggling of weapons, narcotic substances, dual-purpose items and other products, counterfeiting and forging of documents, illegal migration, and human trafficking. Terrorism has evolved substantially by taking advantage of the growth and development of new technologies and of the intensive process of globalisation, thus strengthening its destructiveness and considerably expanding its area of activity. In this regard, terrorism is no longer only a direct threat but also a serious indirect threat to peace and security.
8. The aim of this Strategy is to provide the basis — through the engagement and development of all national resources necessary — for the highest possible level of protection of the Republic of Croatia against terrorism and, at the same time, to ensure the most effective contribution to international counter-terrorism efforts, which are also key to the national response to terrorism. In this regard, the Republic of Croatia supports the central coordinating role of the United Nations in its global effort to prevent and combat terrorism.



9. The Republic of Croatia recognizes the need to ensure the effective combating of this complex phenomenon through a comprehensive, coordinated and consistent approach. In this regard, the academic community, non-governmental organisations, religious communities, the private sector, and the media have great potential for the prevention and combating of terrorism, and it is necessary to continue to develop and advance public-private and social partnership.

## **II THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

10. In its response to the global threat of modern terrorism, the Republic of Croatia begins with the basic characteristics and determinants of terrorism:
  - a. terrorism is one of the main security threats of the 21st century, characterised by exceptional adaptability to new circumstances;
  - b. today and in the near future, the main threat is the operation of global fundamentalist terrorist networks, and of their branches and extremist followers as well as of groups with similar orientations;
  - c. new forms of terrorism that appear through the activities of foreign terrorist fighters and radical individuals, that is, terrorists acting independently and on their own, represent new challenges for the counter-terrorism systems of developed states;
  - d. in terrorism, there is a trend of inflicting the greatest number of victims possible, augmenting fear in the public from the consequences of terrorism, and organising the greatest possible destruction of material goods;
  - e. terrorism seeks the procurement and use of weapons and means of mass destruction, and of the goods of military and dual use which may be used for terrorist ends;
  - f. terrorists are highly organised in terms of logistics, especially in the procurement of weapons, equipment and other means;

- g. terrorists are developing new ways of financing their activities, including by kidnapping for ransom and the use of various covers and intermediaries;
- h. the growing abuse of communication and information technologies, especially the internet, is worrisome. Social networks/the media are used to communicate and disseminate terrorist ideologies, to ensure radicalisation, to attract extremists, and to relay knowledge and information about terrorist methods and techniques, as well as for other criminal and logistic activities that support terrorism;
- i. the "professionalization of terrorism" has been observed: it manifests itself in the use of specially trained persons who are not ideologically connected with terrorism but who perform tasks placed before them for a fee. Thus, access to specific social groups is ensured to secure the survival and development of the terrorist organisation through further radicalisation and dissemination of its ideology;
- j. it endeavours to attract individuals and/or groups who feel that they are neglected or even rejected in society and use them for its goals, that is, those who do not find socially and democratically acceptable forms for resolving their dissatisfaction (and problems), with the aim of making the implementation of counter-terrorism measures and mechanisms more difficult both in terms of preventing and combating terrorism;
- k. by deliberate and contorted interpretations of specific social, economic, religious, and political issues, it attempts to provoke international, inter-religious, intercultural, and other forms of divisions and conflicts and, by disseminating terrorist propaganda, it seeks to gain support for its radical positions and to recruit new members;
- l. its decentralised organisational structure and the creation of new and to a great extent autonomous terrorist cells give security and resilience to the terrorist organisation, and in particular to the leaders and ideologists of terrorism;
- m. terrorist activity can also be tied to other asymmetrical threats, such as transnational organized crime, the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and items, the smuggling of small arms and light weapons, explosive substances, man-portable rocket systems, narcotic substances, military and dual-use items, the counterfeiting and forging of documents and money, illegal migration, human trafficking, and kidnapping for ransom.

11. In principle, terrorist threats may vary from individual attacks against highly symbolic values, attacks aimed to inflict the greatest possible number of victims, attacks aimed to spread fear and cause as much destruction as possible, and attacks against critical national infrastructure, that is, systems, networks, and buildings of national importance which, if their operation is interrupted or if the delivery of products or services is cut, may result in serious consequences in terms of national security, health, and the lives of people, property and the environment, security and economic stability, and of the unimpeded functioning of the authorities.
12. In the context of national security of the Republic of Croatia, instabilities arising from problems present in the process of political, social and economic transition in the area of South East Europe result in undesirable processes of radicalisation and extremism that might grow into terrorism. Developments in a number of crisis trigger points in the world from which terrorist activities might cross over to the territory of the Republic of Croatia, thus directly or indirectly jeopardising national security, also pose a security threat. Therefore, it is particularly important to prevent attempted travel to and from crisis areas with the intention of taking part in terrorist activities.

### III CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS

13. The way in which the Republic of Croatia addresses the fight against terrorism is a reflection of its understanding that modern terrorism knows no state boundaries and, thus, should be regarded as international in its goals and methods, so that any response to it — its causes, manifestations, and consequences — should to a great extent be international and multi-lateral, and a concerted expression of shared intentions, fundamental values, and interests of the international community. Through its international activities, the Republic of Croatia wishes to strengthen its own national security by providing a more effective contribution to the security of its partners and allies, and the international community as a whole, which it also recognises as its responsibility and obligation.
14. The Republic of Croatia recognises the need to provide for the more effective combating of terrorism through a comprehensive, coordinated and consistent approach and, therefore, supports the central coordinating role of the United Nations in international counter-terrorism efforts.

15. The Republic of Croatia will continue to take an active part in the prevention and combating of terrorism at the global, regional and bilateral levels and, in particular, within the system of the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, and other relevant organisations and initiatives; it will also continue to contribute to the strengthening and development of counterterrorism cooperation at all levels.
16. In this regard, the Republic of Croatia will continue to make its contribution to the resolution of world problems recognised to be conducive to the development and survival of terrorism through its political and diplomatic engagement and to the strengthening of international peace and security by promoting the principles and values of international law, justice and equality, respect and tolerance, through its development assistance and participation in international peace operations, which it sees as a particularly important instrument for eliminating the causes of terrorism, extinguishing crisis points in the world that generate extremism and violence.
17. In the prevention of terrorism, the Republic of Croatia places special emphasis on activities in the area of South East Europe in cooperation with other countries. The activities include two components. The first involves the cooperation of the security sectors of the countries in the region in the prevention of terrorism that proceeds through police, intelligence, and cooperation in border control. The second component entails the overall foreign policy activity of the Republic of Croatia towards the countries in the region aimed at the development of political, economic, social and cultural relations as a way to achieve the long-term stabilisation of the entire region, which is the best way to prevent terrorism. It is also necessary to single out the possibility of providing assistance in the development of the counter-terrorism capacities of the states of South East Europe through the relaying of experiences and best practices of the European Union to the states of South East Europe. Thus, the Republic of Croatia directly influences the creation of a favourable and safe environment that should have a positive impact on the future development of the security situation in South East Europe and in the European Union.
18. Further, the Republic of Croatia will devote special attention to international cooperation by strengthening the international legal framework by means of drawing up possibly new or supplementing existing counter-terrorism conventions and protocols, exchanging important counterterrorism information and experiences and good practice in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures, strengthening cooperation in international legal assistance and issues of extradition, researching potential new terrorist threats and developing ade-

quate counter-measures and mechanisms, and strengthening professional, technical and scientific and educational dimensions.

## IV MEASURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM

19. Goals in the fight against terrorism should be achieved by implementing measures to prevent and combat terrorism, measures of protection and measures to restore damage resulting from terrorist attacks, measures of criminal prosecution and the processing of persons and subjects connected with terrorism, and the strengthening of inter-institutional coordination and international cooperation.
20. The Republic of Croatia holds that the wider social community and the private sector also play a role in the prevention and combating of terrorism, where there is enough room for the development and improvement of democratic values and procedures, tolerance and dialogue at the political, religious and other levels, the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism, the protection of high standards of human rights and freedoms, communication with the public, scientific-research work and practical solutions and tools in cooperation with the private sector.

### *Prevention of terrorism*

21. Prevention is the creation of political, social, and economic circumstances that strengthen the internal cohesion of a society and build its resilience to the impact of extreme ideologies and that eliminate conditions for the appearance and spread of terrorism in all its manifestations. The Republic of Croatia views the prevention of terrorism as an effort aimed at thwarting the proliferation of ideologies that are or could be the basis for terrorist activity, the resolve of individuals to perform terrorist actions, and the recruitment of new sympathisers and followers who might become perpetrators of terrorist offences. Prevention measures include:
  - a. the prevention of propaganda and calls to terrorism and of incitement of terrorism in any way;
  - b. the identification and prevention of radicalisation and extremism that can potentially grow into terrorism;

- c. the prevention of any abuse of civil society institutions and the non-profit sector for terrorist purposes;
- d. the encouragement of research, analysis, and the exchange of experiences and best practices in the field of prevention of the proliferation of extremist ideologies and the growth of understanding and tolerance in society;
- e. the development of human resources for the fight against terrorism through the envisioning of new education and training programmes, where it is necessary to create organisational and functional conditions for the development of scientific and professional work in this field;
- f. the strengthening and development of all national capacities for the prevention of terrorism;
- g. the establishment of a national mechanism with key participants from the state, private and public sectors with the goal of identifying and decreasing the availability and the effects of content on the internet that promotes terrorist radicalisation, recruitment, and training.

### **Combating terrorism**

22. Combating terrorism includes the taking of measures and procedures against the creation, dissemination, and the activity of terrorist networks and organisations that include timely identification of planning, preparation, organisation and/or implementation of activities with the characteristics of terrorism. Combating measures include:
- a. all measures aimed at preventing the organisation and logistics activity for terrorist ends that includes, for example, training and public incitement to commit acts of terrorism;
  - b. the prevention of the use of the territory of the Republic of Croatia for the deployment and activity of terrorist groups and their training, and of all persons and subjects thought to be in connection with terrorism, the activity of which is aimed against the Republic of Croatia, other states and/or international organisations;

- c. the prevention of the transit of all persons connected with terrorism through the territory of the Republic of Croatia;
- d. the prevention of the transport and procurement of weapons, explosives and other means intended for potentially terrorist activities;
- e. the prevention of the use of the means of mass destruction and military and dual-use items for terrorist purposes;
- f. the prevention of financing, the collection of the means or any kind of assistance to terrorist organisations or persons thought to be connected with terrorism;
- g. the prevention of all forms of recruitment for terrorist groups, the activity of which is aimed against any state;
- h. the prevention of criminal activities that can be directly and indirectly connected with terrorism (transnational organised crime, the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and items, the smuggling of weapons and explosives, military and dual-use items, narcotic substances and other products, the counterfeiting and forging of documents and money, illegal migration, and human trafficking).

## Protection against terrorism

23. The Republic of Croatia will build the required national capacity to protect its critical national infrastructure. Such protection measures shall include:
- a. the development and strengthening of national capacity to protect people and property;
  - b. the setting-up and timely activation of a special regime for the protection of locations and buildings particularly important for defence;
  - c. the protection of diplomatic, consular, and other posts of the Republic of Croatia abroad;
  - d. the informing of Croatian citizens and legal persons about the level of terrorist threats in countries to which they travel or in which they do business;

- e. the protection of foreign diplomatic, consular, and other posts in the territory of the Republic of Croatia;
  - f. the adjustment of the existing national security concepts and of the legal framework for the establishment of a system of management in extraordinary and crises situations, including in the event of terrorist activities;
  - g. the strengthening of the system of protection and surveillance of the state border;
  - h. the strengthening of the supervision of armament and disarmament, and of the system for the safe-keeping of weapons, explosives, and other items that could be used to commit terrorist attacks;
  - i. the strengthening of the supervision of transport and use of dual-use items;
  - j. the establishment of a system of protecting critical infrastructure, while at the same time acknowledging and applying the existing sector-specific measures of protection, plans and competences;
  - k. the establishment of a system for ensuring the continued operation of critical infrastructure;
  - l. the strengthening of the system of civil protection;
  - m. the strengthening of supervision of possible cyber-attacks.
  - n. Restoration of damage and recovery from terrorist attacks
24. The Republic of Croatia will develop a whole series of organisational and other procedures aimed at reducing the potential consequences of terrorist threats, the fastest possible restoration of damage, and the management of situations that can be provoked by terrorist activities, thus minimising the consequences of terrorist intentions and activities. The measures of restoration and recovery will include:
- a. the use of the relevant national capacity, depending on the consequences of the terrorist activity, with the aim of taking measures of civil protection and restoration of damage;



- b. the strengthening and development of all national capacities essential for the remedying of the consequences of attacks and the revival of any systems damaged;
- c. the strengthening and development of the mechanisms of civil protection and the restoration of damage provoked by the terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological and/or nuclear weapons and materials;
- d. the strengthening of bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation in the area of prevention of terrorism, and in reaction and assistance after a terrorist attack;
- e. the strengthening and development of procedures and ways of ensuring quality and timely communication and informing of the media and the public;
- f. the use of management systems in extraordinary and crisis situations to eliminate consequences;
- g. the development of mechanisms and measures to provide assistance to victims of terrorist attacks.

### ***Criminal prosecution and sanctions***

25. The measures of the criminal prosecution of natural and legal persons connected with terrorism relate to the following:
  - a. harmonisation of national criminal law with international convention law and the *acquis communautaire* with a view to ensuring effective criminal processing and sanctioning of all forms of planning, preparation, organisation and perpetration of all criminal offences connected with terrorism, either directly or indirectly, including the criminal offences of cybercrime connected with terrorism and international restriction measures connected with terrorism;
  - b. the improvement of cooperation and coordination with the aim of exchanging relevant information and intelligence data by and among investigation and criminal prosecution bodies at national and international levels to ensure more efficient investigations and the implementation of criminal procedures and the sanctioning of natural and legal persons involved in and connected with terrorist activities in a number of ways;

- c. the strengthening of international police cooperation and international criminal law assistance to third countries and judicial cooperation with EU Member States;
- d. the strengthening of the implementation of financial investigations through the swift exchange of relevant data at national and international levels aimed at the use of security measures to seize proceeds of crime (freezing) and to seize any form of proceeds of crime from natural and legal persons connected with terrorist activities;
- e. the prescribing of adequate criminal law sanctions with the possibility of using suitable security measures, special obligations and other alternative measures to prevent radicalisation and to prevent the existence and activity of legal persons connected with terrorism.

## V HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, AND INFORMING THE PUBLIC

- 26. In the Republic of Croatia, the highest standards of human rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution and other laws, and all relevant international conventions and protocols. The Republic of Croatia supports the continued improvement of the standards of respect of human rights and freedoms, especially within the EU, UN, OSCE, and the Council of Europe. Terrorism is a particularly grave violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms and, in that respect, it is the obligation and duty of the Republic of Croatia to take all measures necessary to prevent and combat terrorism.
- 27. Fully committed to the protection, promotion, and the improvement of human rights and freedoms that do not jeopardise the rights and freedoms of others and the community as a whole, the Republic of Croatia holds that all measures to prevent and combat terrorism should be in conformity with the accepted standards of human rights and freedoms. Since one of the intended aims of terrorism can actually be to provoke excessive, non-selective repression by the authorities, thus wanting to compromise authority in the eyes of the public and to justify its ends and means, counter-terrorism measures should be properly balanced, proportionate to the threat, and in conformity with the law. Such measures should not result in the inequality of persons on grounds of their race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, social origin or legitimate political affiliation.

28. The Republic of Croatia guarantees freedom of expression, in particular the freedom of the press and other means of the public media and freedom of speech and public appearances, in its Constitution, laws, and relevant international treaties. The principles of the freedoms concerned, and the freedom of legitimate civil and political association and activity are the bases of democratic and pluralistic societies and a condition for the progress of the society and further development of human rights.
29. Free and unimpeded dissemination of information and ideas is one of the most effective means for promoting understanding and tolerance, which should help to prevent and combat terrorism. The public should be duly informed about all forms of terrorism, its criminal nature, the threats that it represents, and the responsibilities that everyone has to prevent and deter terrorism.
30. However, at the same time, modern terrorism abuses the very same openness of our societies, the speed, complexity, and the freedom of communication and information technologies, especially the internet, and the free flow of people and products in the world, to spread its ideas, to attract extremists, and to perform operations.
31. Dissemination of any ideology of terrorism, any association to commit crimes, and conspiracies to perform acts of terrorism, its aggrandisement and incitement and, finally, the very acts of terrorism themselves, do not fall within the category of permissible human rights and freedoms, such as the freedom of expression and association, in any way, but in the category of prohibited, legally punishable acts, the negation of fundamental human rights and freedoms of individuals and of the community as a whole. Therefore, it is necessary to take all measures to prevent the dissemination of terrorist ideas by any means of transmission, and also measures to supervise and prevent communication connected with the organisation of acts of terrorism.

## **VI IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY AND COORDINATION**

32. All competent state bodies of the Republic of Croatia regularly take measures to prevent and combat terrorism from within their scope of work. The complexity of the phenomenon of terrorism requires the inclusion of a large number of state institutions, and thus an effective mechanism for their coordination.

33. In this sense, the Government of the Republic of Croatia has set up the National Commission for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (hereinafter the "National Commission"); some of its duties include the coordination and monitoring of the activities of implementation of the Strategy and its implementing Action Plan, and of the guidelines of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (EU), and the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and other international counter-terrorism documents for the purposes of taking part in the activities of the UN, EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Council of Europe (COE), and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as other international counter-terrorism initiatives. The National Commission proposes to the Government at a strategic level suitable measures and procedures, including for the needs of international counter-terrorism cooperation of the Republic of Croatia.
34. The National Commission, whenever necessary, proposes amendments to the Strategy and its implementing Action Plan. To more clearly define the roles and measures of state bodies in the prevention and combating of terrorism, the National Commission shall develop proposals of specific operating protocols and procedures.
35. In order to ensure effective implementation of the Strategy and its Action Plan, the National Commission shall also, through the state institutions involved:
  - a. a. develop cooperation with civil society to create a social climate that is not conducive to the dissemination and strengthening of terrorism, especially cooperation in the promotion of tolerance, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, good management, and inter-religious dialogue;
  - b. b. develop cooperation with the scientific and educational community to improve the existing measures of protection and mechanisms for the prevention and combating of terrorism. Cooperation by and between academic experts, experts working in the field and policy-makers will be particularly encouraged, with the aim of identifying investigative needs and guiding investigative activities in the field of counter-terrorism, extremism, the media, propaganda, social networks, and all other disciplines and areas that can help determine and eliminate the causes of terrorism;
  - c. c. develop public-private partnerships in the field of identification, prevention, and combating of terrorist activities, and the training of the business sector in response to ter-

rorist acts, that is, the elimination of the consequences of terrorist attacks. Development of public-private partnerships will be encouraged particularly with respect to the suppression of the financing of terrorism, the improvement of informing and educating the public concerning topics connected with terrorism, and with a view to protecting the key infrastructure identified, such as the energy sector, information and communication technology, transport, health protection, water management, food, finances and production, storage and the transport of dangerous substances.

36. For the purposes of implementing the measures to prevent and combat terrorism, the competent state administration bodies shall provide funds in their budgets and shall analyse the organizational and staff-related possibilities concerning the implementation of the Strategy and, if necessary, propose adjustments.

## ANNEX 4. KOSOVO: NATIONAL STRATEGY AGAINST TERRORISM

### ACRONYMS

<b>OPM</b>	Office of Prime Minister
<b>MoIA</b>	Ministry of Internal Affairs
<b>KP</b>	Kosovo Police
<b>KIA</b>	Kosovo Intelligence Agency
<b>KC</b>	Kosovo Customs
<b>MoJ</b>	Ministry of Justice
<b>MKSF</b>	Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces
<b>EMA</b>	Emergency Management Agency
<b>FIU</b>	Financial Intelligence Unit
<b>KARPNS</b>	Kosovo Agency for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety
<b>MF</b>	Ministry of Finance
<b>KJC</b>	Kosovo Judicial Council
<b>KPC</b>	Kosovo Prosecutorial Council
<b>ICITAP</b>	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
<b>OSCE</b>	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>EULEX</b>	European Union Rule of Law Mission
<b>MCYS</b>	Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports
<b>MLSW</b>	Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>TRA</b>	Telecommunications Regulatory Authority
<b>MTI</b>	Ministry of Trade and Industry
<b>MLGA</b>	Ministry of Local Government Administration
<b>MCR</b>	Ministry for Community and Return
<b>KAS</b>	Kosovo Agency of Statistics

## SUMMARY

Based on the importance the living has in a peaceful and multiethnic country to the citizens of Kosovo, that ensures their welfare and guarantees the freedoms foreseen in the constitution, it is crucial that the state and the society establish institutional mechanisms and coordinate activities to cope with the security challenges in general as well as for undertaking measures to prevent and counter terrorism in particular, a phenomenon which nowadays is regarded as one of the major threats against the national and international peace.

Coping successfully with terrorism, as one of the most serious threats in the contemporary world, is possible only with a systematic, planned and coordinated engagement at the national level and in the international aspect.

The global terrorism can strike any country while there is an international consensus that the terrorism is unacceptable. The vast majority of states do not support the terrorism. Kosovo will work with Governments and other international institutions to address the common concerns about the threats, even with countries that have not recognised Kosovo. International cooperation is essential to defeat the terrorism.

The state of Kosovo vows to maximally be committed in preventing and combating this phenomenon in our country, but aims as well to be an important partner and an integral part of the international efforts against terrorism.

With the purpose to more successfully address this phenomenon, the Government has set as a objective to draft this strategy. This strategic document contains the strategic objectives, the specific objectives, determines the mechanisms, methods and the manner through the action plan with the view to enforce an effective policy against terrorism at the national and international level.

The National Strategy against Terrorism complements and primarily is coordinated with the Republic of Kosovo Security Strategy and as well with other strategies as follows:

1. Republic of Kosovo National Strategy against Organised Crime;
2. Republic of Kosovo National Strategy on Crime Prevention;
3. National Strategy on Integrated Border Management;
4. Republic of Kosovo National Strategy against Drugs;
5. National Strategy against Trafficking in Human Beings;
6. National Strategy on Community Safety etc.

The constitution of the Republic of Kosovo guarantees that “no one can be discriminated on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political thought or others national or social origin, association with any community, property, economic and social status, sexual orientation, birth, disability or another personal status”.

Also, the Security Strategy of the Republic of Kosovo determines the willingness of the Republic of Kosovo institutions for good Governance, and for cooperation and a unified approach of the institutions to cope with the security challenges in the Republic of Kosovo.

The coordination of the National Strategy against Terrorism with other national strategies, in particular with the ones against organised crime, against drugs, against trafficking in human beings etc, is of an particular importance since in many countries is noted a trend of approximation of terrorist organisations with the criminal ones. Through organised crime, particularly the money laundering, to terrorists are enabled to conceal and legitimize crime products. Trafficking with drugs and drugs cultivation provides the terrorists with valuable sources of revenues which they convert into funds for terrorist training purposes, for the provision of logistic equipments and technology and the provision of the necessary infrastructure.

The threat from terrorism in Kosovo is local and global as well. It is necessary a more transnational approach in order to cope and diminish the threat.

Terrorism of any kind does not enjoy the support of the majority of Kosovo citizens. These citizens expect that the Government of Kosovo and the law enforcement agencies do everything possible to provide to them security and at the same time to respect the civil freedoms and human rights.

## INTRODUCTION

Terrorism nowadays is considered as one of the most serious threats against the national security of each country, but is also one of the most serious threats against the international security especially taking into account the global trends of the violent extremism and terrorism.

In this context, even Kosovo is not immune against this threat or phenomenon. The Government of the Republic of Kosovo is aware of the seriousness of this threat and has set clear policies for preventing and combating this phenomenon. To address more successfully this phenomenon, the Government has decided to develop this strategic document with the purpose to enable a



more efficient use of the material, financial and human resources in preventing and combating the terrorism.

This strategy aims at strengthening the institutional mechanisms dedicated to prevent and counter the terrorism, increasing the institutional cooperation and coordination at the national level and establishing the international cooperation.

This strategy is a document which defines the strategic objectives, the specific objectives, the basic principles, the responsible institutions and the methods for attaining the success in preventing and combating terrorism.

The National Strategy against Terrorism 2009-2011 of the Republic of Kosovo, has contributed in establishing the necessary institutional capacities for preventing and combating terrorism, by establishing the adequate mechanisms, necessary human resources, and the physical, technical and technological infrastructure.

These established mechanisms are operational already, however there is a need to further strengthen them.

Although this strategic document is designed for a period of five years, the strategic document shall be revised and reassessed in annual basis.

## **SITUATION ANALYSIS:**

The political, economical and social context in the Republic of Kosovo remains without significant changes since 2009, therefore further situation analysis in terms of terrorism, which is presented when drafting the National Strategy against Terrorism 2009-2012, remains without major changes.

Interethnic relations between the two largest communities continue to remain tense especially at the northern part of the country, where the extremist groups are still present and active, which are disposed to use the violence for achieving their political goals. So far, there have been registered several cases of the violence against citizens, against institutions of the Republic of Kosovo and against the international presence in the Republic of Kosovo. These acts of violence may boost violent reactions.

Challenge still remains the protection of the citizens of the Republic of Kosovo from the influence of extremist ideologies based on intolerance, hatred, and violence to achieve political and ideological goals by misusing the religion.

The Republic of Kosovo may be threatened also by various groups or international terrorist organisations, which may target the large international presence in Kosovo because of their commitment in the global fight against terrorism.

The geostrategic position of Kosovo except that creates the possibility to make our country as a target transit country for illegal activities and various traffics, this position also poses a risk for spreading the terrorist syndrome particularly the one based on the religious fundamentalism. In this light, the religious composition of our population with Muslim majority can be used as an alibi to change the focus from other elements that are present in Kosovo and in region for various political purposes.

Based on the current assessments, the Republic of Kosovo is better positioned in comparison to other countries but however is considered to not be immune against terrorism, therefore the national institutions in cooperation with international institutions must be careful and must track the activities of the organisations and groups that can help in recruiting and financing individuals for various terrorist activities.

## Fundamental Principles

The National Strategy against Terrorism and the Action Plan are led by the following principles:

**The principle of constitutionality and legality** - Actions undertaken to counter the terrorism must be based on the provisions provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, the applicable legislation and the international agreements.

**The principle of human rights and freedoms** - Meaning guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of all individuals during all phases of the institutional involvement in preventing and combating the terrorism.

**The principle of cooperation** - The Government of the Republic of Kosovo is committed in respecting the cooperation and coordination of activities between national institutions and the international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

**Participation** – Meaning the inclusion of all institutions, other mechanisms as well as the society in general, in preventing and combating terrorism at the national and international level.

**The principle of continuity** - Meaning the ongoing commitment of all institutions and of various stakeholders.

**The principle of reliability** – The responsible institutions for the prevention and fighting of terrorism should have caution in building the confidence when preserving the integrity of investigations, the integrity of data and of information from the misuse by those who have access to them.

**The principle of proportionality** - Meaning exercising the authority of institutions dealing with prevention and fighting terrorism, only then when is necessary and only up to the necessary extent in order to achieve the legitimate objectives, by appropriate tools and methods, in the shortest time possible.

## THE METHODOLOGY:

### *Institutional Mechanisms*

The institutional mechanism shall imply all mechanisms which have roles and are important in the coordination of activities in the fight against terrorism.

The institutional stakeholders involved in drafting and enforcing state policies in the prevention and fight against terrorism, are, but not limited only to:

**Ministry of Internal Affairs** - through its mechanisms assists in providing information and undertakes activities for preventing, protecting, tracking and responding to all terrorist activities.

**Kosovo Intelligence Agency** – is a body which gathers, analyzes and delivers information with the view to prevent the terrorist activities taking place at the expense of security of the Republic of Kosovo and the global security.

**Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces** - through its mechanisms assists the national institutions in preventing terrorisms, while with its units takes actively part in the protection and response against potential terrorist attacks.

**Ministry of Finances** - through its mechanisms, the Kosovo Customs, the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Tax Administration, which by exercising their function of controlling the goods and persons at the border crossing points and within the territory of Kosovo, contribute in the prevention, identification, investigation and blocking of financial sources of terrorist activities.

**The National Coordinator against Terrorism** – The National Coordinator is an individual body responsible for the coordination, cooperation, monitoring and reporting on the implementation of policies, activities and actions related to the fight against terrorism.

**The Secretariat of the National Coordinator against Terrorism** – The principal duty and responsibility of the secretariat is to collect information and data from other institutions in order to analyse and evaluate such information, and prepare analytical reports for the National Coordinator.

**Ministry of Justice** - Develops policies, enables the preparation and implementation of the legislation in the field of Justice.

**Police** - Is an institutional mechanism within the framework of Ministry of Internal Affairs which deals with prevention, tracking and combating of terrorism.

**Prosecutions and Courts** - Are the responsible institutions for the investigation, prosecution of terrorists, their adequate punishment, and confiscation of properties and assets acquired by the means of terrorist activities.

**Ministry of Education, Science and Technology** - Has an important role in the prevention of terrorism through education, through curriculums, through inter-curricular approach and other various extracurricular activities.

**Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports** - Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports in the fight terrorism, has the role in organising awareness (campaigns) activities with the youth and informal groups, with the view to raise the awareness on the risk of terrorism and its prevention.

**Ministry of Local Government Administration** - through mechanisms of local authorities will assist in identifying the elements which may lead to terrorist activities, and to actively participate in preventing, preparing or responding against terrorist activities.

**Kosovo Agency for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (KARPNS)** - Permanent implementation and advancement of measures through which the nuclear and radioactive security is guaranteed, including radiation protection and nuclear safety, for effective prevention or elimination of misusing the radioactive and nuclear material.

**ICITAP** Assists in the professional and transparent development of law enforcement institutions in order to protect the human rights, to counter corruption and to diminish the threat of terrorism.

**EULEX**- Is the European Mission for Rule of Law. Its main aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the field of rule of law, especially in the field of police, judiciary and customs.

**OSCE** - Monitoring the rule of law and establishing independent law enforcement institutions, further development of the public security sector, including police, customs and correctional services.

In addition to the aforementioned institutions, an important role in the prevention and fight against terrorism, have other national and international institutions present in Kosovo and abroad.

## **Legal Framework**

The National Strategy against Terrorism is based on the applicable legislation where included but not limited only to:

- ▶ The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, The Criminal Code of Kosovo,
- ▶ The Code of Criminal Procedure of Kosovo,
- ▶ Law on 03/L-063 on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, Law on Courts,
- ▶ Law no 03/L-225 on State Prosecutor, Law on the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council,
- ▶ Law no 03/L-223 on the Kosovo Judicial Council,
- ▶ Law no 03/L-224 on the Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo,
- ▶ Law no 03/L-053 on the Jurisdiction, Case Selection and Case Allocation of EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo,
- ▶ Law no 04/L-076 on Police,

- ▶ Law no. 04/L-015 on Witness Protection,
- ▶ Law no 04/L-043 on Protection of Informants, The Code on Juvenile Justice,
- ▶ The Customs and Excise Code,
- ▶ Law no 03/L-191 on Execution of Penal Sanctions,
- ▶ Law no 03/ L-183 on Implementation of International Sanctions, Law no 03/L-137 on the Department of Forensic Medicine,
- ▶ Law no 03/L-142 on Public Peace and Order,
- ▶ Law no 03/L-196 on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Law no 03/L-231 on Police Inspectorate of Kosovo,
- ▶ Law no 04/L-030 on Liability of Legal Persons for Criminal Offences, Law no 04/L-031 on International Legal Cooperation in Criminal Matters, Law no 04/L-052 on International Agreements,
- ▶ Law no 04/L-072 on State Border Control and Surveillance, Law no. 04/L-017 on Free Legal Aid,
- ▶ Law no 04/L-093 on Banks, Microfinance Institutions and Non Bank Financial Institutions, Law no 02/L-57 on Institutions of Culture,
- ▶ Law no 04/L-57 on Freedom of Association in Non-Governmental Organizations, Law no 04/L-064 on Kosovo Forensic Agency,
- ▶ Law no 04/L-053 on Kosovo Public Safety Agency, Law no 04/L-094 on the Information Society Services,
- ▶ Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances, Law on Security Force Service.

## VISION AND MISSION

### *Vision*

The vision of this strategy is to create a safe environment in which the citizens of the Republic of Kosovo will be protected from the threats of terrorism.

### *Mission*

The mission of this strategy is:

Setting the objectives and the strategic priorities for preventing and combating terrorism;

Establishing effective and efficient capacities to cope with terrorism;

Developing and strengthening the partnership at the national, regional and international level in the field of counter-terrorism;

## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

### 1. *Prevention*

Identification and minimization the factors and causes which may lead to the creation of a favourable environment for posing and spreading the ideas of violent extremism.

- ▶ Timely identification the factors and causes that may encourage citizens to violent extremism and radicalization.
- ▶ Promotion of democratic values, equality and ethnic and interreligious tolerance.
- ▶ Identification, monitoring and tracking of various forms of global influence that affect the radicalization of individuals or certain groups.
- ▶ Reaction and opposition to the ideology that propagates or supports the violence, hindering the exercise of impact and coping with the threat posed by those who promote it.
- ▶ Strengthening the institutional, regional, international cooperation and coordination, as well as of international organisations.
- ▶ Establishing and strengthening the capacities of the Republic of Kosovo in identification and prevention.

### 2. *Pursuit*

Pursuit, investigation and bringing to the justice individuals or groups who pose a terrorist threat or who commit terrorist acts.

- ▶ Preventing, hindering and investigating violent extremists or terrorists from influencing, recruiting, planning and building legitimacy within the territory of the Republic of Kosovo.
- ▶ Establishing partnership with the community, and inter-institutional, regional and international cooperation and coordination, and of international organisations.
- ▶ Establishing and strengthening the capacities of the Institutions of the Republic of Kosovo in identification, prevention, detection and pursuit.

### 3. **Protection**

Strengthening the protective measures against the potential terrorist attacks against the Republic of Kosovo and its interests within and abroad.

- ▶ Protection of the citizens of the Republic of Kosovo, their property as well as the protection of the critical infrastructure from all the terrorist acts.
- ▶ Prevention of acquisition and using the strategic goods, dual use goods, and weapons of mass destruction.
- ▶ Establishment of security measures along the borders of the Republic of Kosovo, control and supervision of the movement of citizens and goods across the border.
- ▶ Undertaking measures for protection against cyber interventions and attacks.

### 4. **Preparation and reaction**

The readiness for reaction and management of situations in order to minimise the consequences in the event of any potential terrorist attack.

- ▶ Developing protection plans and of scenarios for reaction of the critical infrastructure and facilities of a particular importance.
- ▶ Establishing the readiness for risks with higher striking effect in the National Risk Assessment.
- ▶ Continuing to build generous capacities to respond and recover from the wide range of terrorist emergencies and other civil emergencies.
- ▶ Management and elimination of the consequences caused by the potential terrorist attacks.
- ▶ Establishing partnership with the community, and the inter-institutional, regional, and international cooperation and coordination and of the international organisations.
- ▶ Establishing and strengthening the capacities of the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo for management and response.

## **ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED**

When drafting this strategy a considerable research and analytical work has been carried out in order to formulate the strategic, specific objectives and the necessary activities for preventing and combating the terrorism. As a result of the work and commitment of all institutions of the Republic of Kosovo, are identified the best alternatives respectively the most appropriate objectives which will assist the Republic of Kosovo in preventing and combating the terrorism.



Those who support terrorism or who commit terrorist attacks can be motivated and encouraged by numerous factors including the religion, the nationalism and the political and right wing extremism. It is an acknowledged fact that currently the threat at international level derives from groups who abuse with the Islamic religion.

Kosovo continues to be a potential target of domestic terrorism. Kosovo is a country with a military presence from many western countries, together with a large number of institutions and international governmental organisations. All those are potential targets of terrorist organisations of the global scale.

Law enforcement and intelligence mechanisms may be effective in addressing the terrorist threats.

Kosovo has internal capacities and resources though not sufficient to counter the terrorist attacks of large size, and other international subjects will support, and will cooperate with the Republic of Kosovo in the event of such an attack.

Kosovo has the resources and capacities to cope and to address the domestic terrorist threats.

<b>Organizativna Struktura Mehanizma Koordiniranja, Monitorisanja I Implementiranja</b>				
<b>Strategic level</b>	<b>Secretariat</b>	<b>The National Coordinator anti Terrorism</b>		<b>Kosovo Security Council</b>
	The National Coordinator anti Terrorism Kosovo Intelligence Agency Ministry of Internal Affairs Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces Ministry of Finances Ministry of Local Government Administration Ministry of Education, Science and Technology Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport Ministry of Infrastructure Ministry of Justice Prosecution and Court Prosecutions and Courts Kosovo Judicial Council Kosovo Prosecutorial Council			
<b>Operational level</b>	<b>Prevention</b> KIA MIA MEST MCYS MF	<b>Protection</b> MIA MKSF MF	<b>Pursuit</b> MIA Prosecution and Court MF	<b>Reaction</b> MIA MKSF MLGA

## MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT, EVALUATION

The design and enforcement of the state strategy against terrorism includes all the governmental structures and other mechanisms, acting together to cope with the threat against terrorism.

Enforcement also depends on the partnership between the law enforcement agencies, institutions and other mechanisms, public administration, local authorities as well as the private and charitable sectors.

The monitoring process enables the rapid identification and resolution of the problems with the coordinated and concerted inter-institutional efforts and of the civil society, in order to prevent the recurrence of these problems.

Through the continuous monitoring process of data collection, are provided information about the progress of the impact of measures taken during the implementation of the strategy and then are evaluated and shown the results attained. This process will take place in period of three (3) months.

The evaluation is the process of reviewing the effectiveness and the efficiency of the impact of measures provided in the strategy. A workshop will be organised each year for the purpose of assessment, evolution and reviewing the strategy and the action plan.

At the end of the time limit prescribed for the implementation of this strategy will be organised a workshop for its final assessment.

The structure of the implementing, monitoring and evaluation mechanism foreseen in this strategy means the structure of the current mechanism under the supervision and coordination of National Coordinator against Terrorism.

## ANNEX 5. MONTENEGRO: STRATEGY FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND TERRORIST FINANCING

### ABBREVIATIONS

<b>CTC</b>	Counter-Terrorism Committee
<b>EGMONT GROUP</b>	The international gathering of financial intelligence units
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUROPOL</b>	European Police Office
<b>FATF</b>	Working group for financial measures against money laundering – Organization for Control and Prevention of Money Laundering
<b>INTERPOL</b>	International Criminal Police Organization
<b>MONEYVAL</b>	The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures of the Council of Europe
<b>NATO</b>	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>OUN</b>	Organization of the United Nations
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe <b>OECD</b> – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development <b>SC</b> – Security Council
<b>CoE</b>	Council of Europe
<b>SEPCA</b>	Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association
<b>SELEC</b>	Southeast European Law Enforcement Center
<b>SALW</b>	Strategy for Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>IBASE</b>	An analytical tool that allows quality national and international cooperation in exchanging information with other bodies responsible for law enforcement
<b>NSA</b>	The body responsible for the protection of classified information

## SUMMARY

In line with its basic goal, the Strategy defines the framework of action of Montenegro in the fight against terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing, which is aimed at improving the existing and developing new measures, mechanisms and instruments, the purpose of which is to ensure stability and security of Montenegro, the region and beyond.

The Strategy is based on the analysis of the situation and recommendations of relevant international institutions, on the basis of which strategic goals have been defined and further activities required to achieve the vision that describes a future situation in the field of preventing terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing in Montenegro have been planned.

The analysis of the current situation shows that Montenegro was not confronted with the criminal act of terrorism in the previous period. However, the approach of Montenegro to the fight against terrorism takes into account that modern terrorism knows no national borders and that it is therefore considered international in terms of its goals and modalities of action. Therefore, the responds to the causes, occurrences and consequences should be an expression of joint action with the international community.

Establishing a modern and comprehensive legislative framework in accordance with relevant international standards presents one of the key conditions for efficient prevention and suppression of terrorism, as well as the promotion of legal measures for suppression of the criminal acts of money laundering and terrorist financing.

The number of state authorities and institutions involved in counter-terrorist actions and suppression of money laundering and terrorist financing requires the establishment of an effective mechanism of coordination in the formulation and implementation of comprehensive policy in these fields.

Pursuant to Article 12 paragraph 3 of the Decree on the Government of Montenegro (Official Gazette of Montenegro 80/08), the Government of Montenegro, at its session held on 30 September 2010, adopted the following

## 2010-2014 STRATEGY FOR PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM, MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The Strategy for Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, Money Laundering and Terrorist financing (hereinafter: the Strategy) is the first strategic document, which in a unique and comprehensive manner provides the answer in the field of fight against terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing in Montenegro.

Terrorism, money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities may jeopardize national, security and economic interests which, among other things, require a stable constitutional order, rule of law, development of democracy, strengthening peace and stability as prerequisites for the development of society, financially strong business sector, a stable financial system, fair and free labor market and a functioning market economy. These phenomena can also jeopardize all social structures.

The main goal of the Strategy is to establish priorities based on the need to develop effective and functional mechanisms of the relevant institutions and the need to improve procedures to prevent and suppress terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing. The Strategy shows the commitment of Montenegro to work jointly, through the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, with other countries and international organizations, with a view to strengthening national, regional and global security.

In line with its basic goal, the Strategy defines the general framework of action and response of Montenegro to current and future challenges and threats, through the promotion of existing and development of new measures, mechanisms and instruments, the purpose of which is to ensure stability and security, implying the realization of the following vision:

*"Montenegro has a coordinated and efficient system for the prevention of terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing based on international standards and cooperation between the competent institutions."*

In this sense, the strategic directions of actions of Montenegro are:

- ▶ Adoption and implementation of the Strategy;
- ▶ Promotion of cooperation and exchange of information with regional and international partners in the fight against terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing;

- ▶ The adoption and application of international standards;
- ▶ Defining the principles and methods of improving cooperation between the competent institutions.

## 2. **METHODOLOGY**

The Strategy is based on the analysis of the situation and the projection of developments in the field of international security integrations, the characteristics of modern challenges and threats in the fields of terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing, which is a prerequisite for the determination of strategic goals, as well as for planning future activities necessary to achieve the vision. The analysis of the situation was carried out through: reports and recommendations of relevant institutions; analysis of statistical data from reports, on: suspicious cash transactions, criminal acts, the crime situation and its manifestations, the predicate criminal acts, etc.

The Strategy is harmonized with other strategic documents of Montenegro, primarily with the National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy and the 2010-2014 Strategy for the Fight against Corruption and Organized Crime. In addition, the Strategy follows those goals and values that are defined in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of the United Nations and the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, as well as in other basic counter-terrorism documents of the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe (CoE).

## 3. **TERRORISM**

### 3.1. **The basic characteristics of terrorism**

Terrorism presents one of the major global security threats in the 21st century and shows an upward trend in all of its forms, which is manifested through an increased number of terrorist acts, endangering human lives, causing increased public fear of the consequences of terrorist acts, larger destructions of material goods, etc.

In preparing the terrorist acts, terrorist organizations and individuals use wide availability, complexity and openness of communication and information technologies, especially Internet, to attract extremists, as well as for communication and dissemination of terrorist ideology. In this sense, knowledge of terrorist methods and techniques is of utmost importance for the prevention of all forms of terrorist acts.

Activities of terrorist organizations and terrorists are aimed at:

attracting, to their cause, those individuals and/or groups who feel ignored or rejected in their society, or those individuals who do not manage to find socially and democratically acceptable forms of resolving their discontent and problems;

deliberate and distorted interpretation of specific social, economic, religious and political issues, in order to cause inter-national, inter-religious, inter-cultural and other forms of intolerance and conflict, spreading, in this manner, terrorist propaganda and trying to gain support for their radical views, activities and goals, and recruiting new members;

establishing a decentralized organizational structure, through creation of new and largely autonomous terrorist cells, protecting, in this manner, the security and the resilience of the terrorist organization itself, particularly the leaders and ideologists of terrorism.

Terrorist activities are conducted in an organized manner and are associated with other threats and risks, such as: trans-national organized crime, the spread of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and materials, smuggling: small arms and light weapons, explosive devices, man-portable missile systems, narcotic drugs, supplies of military and dual use, counterfeiting documents and money, illegal migration and human trafficking.

Terrorist groups and organizations are developing alternative ways of organizing and financing and they use elaborate logistical organization, especially in the acquisition of weapons and weapons of mass destruction, supplies of military and dual use, equipment and other assets that can be used for terrorist purposes.

It is the obligation of all state authorities and public administration bodies to, in accordance with their responsibilities, continually analyze and monitor all aspects of potential terrorist threats with which Montenegro could face, and to act, in an appropriate manner, to prevent them.

### **3.2. Legal and institutional framework for prevention and suppression of terrorism**

#### **3.2.1. National legal framework**

Establishing a modern and comprehensive legislative framework, in accordance with relevant international standards, is one of the key prerequisites for efficient prevention and suppression of



terrorism. Authorities responsible for prevention and suppression of terrorism are carrying out a permanent evaluation of the efficiency of the legal framework and take care of its promotion as needed.

Jurisdiction, competences and actions of state authorities participating in the fight against terrorism are regulated by several laws which are related to this criminal-law field or refer to it:

- ▶ Criminal Code (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 70/03 and 47/06 and Official Gazette of Montenegro 40/08 and 25/10); Criminal Procedure Code (Official Gazette of Montenegro 57/09 and 49/10); Law on Public Prosecution Office (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 69/03 and 40/08); Law on Courts (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 5/02, 49/04 and Official Gazette of Montenegro 22/08); Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Official Gazette of Montenegro 14/07 and 4/08); Law on Police (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 28/05 and 88/09); Law on the Agency for National Security (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 28/05); Law on Asylum (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 45/06); Law on Border Control (Official Gazette of Montenegro 72/09); Law on Foreigners (Official Gazette of Montenegro 82/08 and 72/09); Law on Travel Documents (Official Gazette of Montenegro 21/08 and 25/08); Law on the Protection of Personal Data (Official Gazette of Montenegro 79/08 and 70/09); Law on Data Confidentiality (Official Gazette of Montenegro 14/08 and 76/09).

According to the **Criminal Code of Montenegro**, the criminal act of terrorism is made by any person who, with the intent to seriously intimidate citizens or to coerce Montenegro, a foreign country or an international organization, performs one of the following acts:

1. Attack against the life, body or freedom of others,
2. Kidnapping or hostage taking,
3. The destruction of state or public buildings, transportation systems, infrastructure including information systems, fixed platforms in the epicontinental shelf, a public good or private property that may endanger human lives or cause significant damage to the economy,
4. Hijacking an airplane, ship, other means of public transport or transport of goods that may endanger human lives,
5. Manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives, nuclear or radioactive materials or devices, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons,
6. Research and development of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons,
7. The discharge of dangerous substances, or causing fires, explosions or floods, or taking other generally dangerous action that may endanger human lives,

8. Disruption or suspension of water, electricity or other energy source supply that may endanger human lives.

With regard to the latest amendments to the Criminal Code from 2010, a special emphasis was placed on the harmonization with the standards in the field of fight against organized crime, corruption and terrorism. The above-mentioned amendments to the Criminal Code provide for an entirely new conception of criminal acts of terrorism, which are, in the corpus of criminal acts against humanity and other goods protected by international law, in accordance with the tendency of full compliance with international standards. The basic criminal act of terrorism (regardless of whether the act is directed against Montenegro, a foreign state or international organization) is prescribed by Article 447 with numerous forms of the act of commission. This criminal act, as well as the new criminal acts of terrorism such as the public calls to commit acts of terrorism (Article 447a of the Criminal Code), recruitment and training for terrorist acts (Article 447b of the Criminal Code), use of a lethal device (Article 447c of the Criminal Code), destroying and damaging a nuclear facility (Article 447d of the Criminal Code), threatening an internationally protected person (Article 448), as well as the financing of terrorism (Article 449) were provided for and harmonized with a number of conventions aimed at preventing acts of terrorism, especially the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism from 2005, which Montenegro has ratified in 2008.

With regard to the **Criminal Procedure Code** (Official Gazette of Montenegro 57/09 and 49/10), a special emphasis was placed on confiscation of property and material benefits acquired through a criminal act. The Code provides for a procedure of seizure of property and a financial investigation for the purpose of extended seizure of property. Through enactment of this Code, a confiscation procedure is introduced for property whose legal origin has not been proved. Through adoption of the institute of extended seizure of material benefits and the reverse burden of proof, efficient suppression of terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing has been enabled. The procedure for confiscation of property whose legal origin has not been proved and the financial investigation for the purpose of extended seizure of property are significant changes in comparison to the previous legal text, which can be of great influence on the court practice. The measures of secret surveillance (special investigative means) may be applied to a larger number of criminal acts than before, and among these acts, the following are specified: criminal acts with elements of corruption (money laundering, causing false bankruptcy, abuse of evaluation of assets, passive bribery, active bribery, disclosure of an official secret, trading in influence, abuse of authority in economy, abuse of an official position and fraud in the conduct of an official duty). The measures of secret surveillance may also be applied for criminal acts against the security of computer data that are difficult to prove and complicated to detect due to the use of sophisticated computer

technology, which will further contribute to the efficient fight against organized crime, terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing.

### 3.2.2. **International legal framework**

Montenegro is a signatory to a large number of conventions regulating the area of fight against terrorism, which were adopted by the Organization of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. With a view to joining the European Union, Montenegro is implementing Common Position 2001/931/CFSP

relating to the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. In this field, Montenegro is also promoting the cooperation in accordance with Resolution 1373 (2001), Resolution 1535 (2004), Resolution 1624 (2005) and other relevant UN resolutions, international conventions and other instruments. Montenegro is, through its Permanent Representative, actively cooperating with the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council, set up by the Resolution 1373 (2001). Acting within different international organizations, especially the United Nations and the Council of Europe, Montenegro has become a signatory to a series of international - legal instruments, as presented in Annex I.

### 3.2.3. **Institutional framework**

**The Ministry of Interior and Public Administration** supervises and controls the work of the Police Directorate and performs tasks related to the preparation of strategies, laws, secondary legislation, projects and programs in the field of fight against terrorism. Within the Ministry of Interior and Public Administration, the Department for Emergency Management plays a significant role in the remediation of consequences of possible terrorist attacks.

**The Ministry of Justice** is carrying out tasks of the state administration relating to: criminal legislation, international legal assistance; the preparation of strategies, projects and programs and monitoring their implementation; preparation of necessary reports and measures for the implementation of ratified conventions in the field of judiciary; preparation and implementation of international agreements in the field of international assistance; preparation of laws and secondary legislation and their implementation, which are related to the organization, jurisdiction and work of courts, public prosecutor and misdemeanor authority, attorneys and legal assistance.

**The Ministry of Defense** proposes and implements the established defense policy; prepares the Plan of Defense of Montenegro and harmonizes Plans of Defense of other proponents of defense preparations; assesses war and other dangers; realizes multilateral and bilateral cooperation in the field of defense; conducts affairs of organization, equipping, arming, development and use of the Armed Forces and other activities in accordance with the Constitution.

**The Agency for National Security** collects data and information, through the use of special methods and means determined by law, on potential threats, plans or intentions of organizations, groups and individuals that are directed against the territorial integrity, security and the national legal order determined by the Constitution, and draws attention to the potential challenges, risks and threats to security.

**The Armed Forces of Montenegro**, in accordance with the Defense Strategy of Montenegro and the Law on Defense, among other things, are responsible for tasks relating to: assisting the Police Directorate in the fight against terrorism and supporting civil authorities during natural or man-made disasters and other emergencies.

**The Police Directorate** provides for general, personal and property safety and protection of citizens. The Police Directorate is responsible for internal security, preventing and suppressing all forms of crime, especially organized crime and corruption, protection of human rights, monitoring and control of the state border, ensuring public peace and order, the safety of citizens and traffic safety, and assisting the civil authorities during natural or man-made disasters. The Police Directorate is one of the most important bodies in the fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, corruption and drugs.

**The Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism**, in accordance with the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, performs tasks of the Administration related to detecting and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing determined by this Law and other regulations. The Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism is organized as a financial intelligence service of an administrative type. The Administration is responsible for tasks related to detecting and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing related to gathering, analyzing and submitting to the competent bodies of data, information and documentation necessary for the detection of money laundering and terrorist financing.

**The Directorate for Protection of Classified Data** in accordance with the Law on Data Confidentiality, organizes performance of tasks related to sharing classified information with foreign countries and international organizations, through the Central Registry, performs the tasks of issuing permits for access to classified data of natural (Personal Security Clearance) and legal persons (Facility Security Clearance), as well as inspection control of the implementation of the Law and the application of international agreements. In accordance with the Agreement on Security of information, in its part related to the exchange and protection of NATO classified information, the Directorate has been marked as NSA (National Security Authority).

**The Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office** established, for the tasks of suppressing corruption, the **Division for Suppressing Organized Crime, Corruption, Terrorism and War Crimes**, headed by the Special Prosecutor, which acts before the High Courts. The Division manages the pre-trial proceedings, directs the work of the Police Directorate and takes the necessary measures for the purpose of detection of criminal acts within its jurisdiction; requires an investigation, brings and represents indictments, and takes other actions stipulated by law, with a view to seizure and confiscation of assets and material benefits acquired through criminal acts.

**The Specialized Division of the High Court in Podgorica and Bijelo Polje** is responsible for trials in criminal cases of organized crime, corruption, terrorism and war crimes.

Other government authorities participate, within the scope of their jurisdiction and if necessary, in prevention and suppression of terrorism.

### 3.3. Strategic response of Montenegro to the threat of terrorism

So far, Montenegro has not been confronted with the criminal act of terrorism. However, given that global terrorism and organized crime pose a serious threat to international peace and security, these phenomena, regardless of their real source, are considered serious security risks and threats to Montenegro.

Therefore, Montenegro is trying to contribute, to the greatest extent possible, to general security at the regional and global level. In this context, the greatest attention is being paid to preventive mechanisms in the fight against terrorism: the strengthening of international cooperation, prevention of radicalization, monitoring movement of people and goods across land and sea borders, and exchange of information through information and intelligence connections.

With a view to coordinated and efficient implementation of strategic measures for the fight against organized crime and terrorism, the Government of Montenegro has adopted, in the previous period, a significant number of strategic documents and laws in the field of illegal migration, human trafficking, drugs and arms trafficking and other forms of cross-border crime. These are primarily the Criminal Procedure Code, Criminal Code, Strategy for the Reform of Judiciary, Strategy for the Fight against Human Trafficking, Strategy for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Strategy for Integrated Border Management, Strategy for Integrated Migration Management, National Strategic Response to Drugs, Strategy for the Fight against Corruption and Organized Crime, etc.

#### **3.4. Contribution to international counter-terrorism efforts**

Montenegro will continue to actively participate in the prevention and suppression of terrorism at global and regional level, particularly within the system of UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe, Interpol, Europol, and other relevant organizations and initiatives, as well as to contribute to strengthening and developing the counter-terrorism cooperation on the inter-regional level.

In the prevention of terrorism, Montenegro places special emphasis on cooperation with other countries, particularly in the area of South-Eastern Europe. This action consists of two components. The first one encompasses cooperation of security sectors of countries in the region in the prevention of terrorism, which takes place through the police, intelligence and border control cooperation. In this regard, it is important to emphasize successful cooperation of Montenegrin institutions with SEPCA and SELEC. The second component is the cooperation among the countries of the region, aimed at developing political, economic, social and cultural relations, as a means of achieving long-term stabilization of the whole region. Montenegro will continue to pay particular attention to international cooperation in the field of adopting international-legal instruments, through the implementation of conventions and protocols, exchange of information, experiences and good practices in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures, strengthening cooperation in terms of international-legal assistance and extradition matters, researching into possible new terrorist threats and developing appropriate counter-measures and mechanisms and strengthening professional-technical and scientific-educational dimensions.

### 3.5. Informing the public

Modern terrorism misuses, for its own purposes, free and unhindered dissemination of information to spread its ideas, attract militants, and carry out operations. It is therefore necessary to take all measures to prevent the spread of terrorist ideas through any media of transmission.

Free and unhindered dissemination of information and ideas is one of the most effective means of promoting understanding and tolerance, which should be effective in preventing and suppressing terrorism as well. The public should be competently informed about all forms of terrorism, its criminal nature, the threats it presents and the responsibility that everyone has in its prevention and deterrence.

### 3.6. The goals of fight against terrorism

In the fight against terrorism the goals are achieved through implementation of the measures of prevention, suppression, protection and remediation of damage from terrorist attacks, the measures of criminal prosecution of individuals and entities linked to terrorism, strengthening inter-agency coordination and international cooperation.

The main goal of the prevention and suppression of terrorism is to achieve the highest possible level of protection of Montenegro, its citizens and all the people residing in it, its values, interests and resources from the threat and consequences of terrorism, while simultaneously providing the most effective possible contribution to international efforts in the fight against terrorism.

#### 3.6.1. Prevention of terrorism

Goals in the field of prevention include:

- ▶ improved normative-legal framework;
- ▶ developed personnel, administrative and material-technical capacities;
- ▶ implemented new programs of training and vocational training;
- ▶ improved cooperation among all relevant institutions in the country, region and at international level;
- ▶ improved mechanisms for prevention of propaganda, calling for terrorism, and inciting terrorism in any way.

### 3.6.2. **Suppression of terrorism**

Goals in the field of suppression of terrorism include:

- ▶ improved mechanisms for prevention of organizational and logistics activities with terrorist intentions;
- ▶ improved mechanisms for the detection and prosecution of all persons who are associated with terrorism or the disclosure of all activities directed against Montenegro, other countries and/or international organizations;
- ▶ improved mechanisms for prevention of the movement and residence of all persons associated with terrorism in the territory of Montenegro;
- ▶ improved mechanisms for prevention of criminal activities that may be directly or indirectly related to terrorism (transnational organized crime, the spread of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons and items, smuggling weapons and explosives, goods of military and dual use, narcotic drugs and other goods, counterfeiting documents and money, illegal migration and human trafficking).

### 3.6.3. **Protection against terrorism**

Goals in the field of protection against terrorism include:

- ▶ improved mechanisms for developing and strengthening the protection of infrastructure facilities of special importance on the territory of Montenegro;
- ▶ improved mechanisms for strengthening the system of protection and surveillance of the state border;
- ▶ improved system of control of traffic, warehousing and storage of weapons, explosives and other assets that can be used for terrorist attacks;
- ▶ improved mechanisms for strengthening surveillance of traffic and the use of dual-use goods;
- ▶ improved mechanisms for informing citizens and legal entities on the level of terrorist threats.

### 3.6.4. **Remediation of damage from terrorist attacks**

Goals in the field of remediation of damage from terrorist attacks include:

- ▶ improved and developed national capacities necessary for remediation of consequences of attacks and rehabilitation of damaged systems;



- ▶ developed mechanisms for rescuing people, material and cultural resources and the environment.

### 3.6.5. **The criminal prosecution**

Goals in the field of criminal prosecution of persons and entities associated with terrorism include:

- ▶ efficient criminal prosecution of the perpetrators, accomplices and other persons who are in any way associated with terrorist activities.

## 4. **MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING**

One of the key requirements for the preparation of terrorist activities and their implementation is the provision of financial resources, acquired in an illegal manner. Money laundering and terrorist financing are global problems, which have negative effects on economic, political, security and social structure of each country. The consequences of money laundering and terrorist financing are: undermining the stability and efficiency of the financial system of the country, economic disruptions and instability, jeopardizing the planned reforms, a decrease of investment security and investment and jeopardizing both, national and international security.

### 4.6.1. **Money laundering**

According to the Criminal Code of Montenegro, the criminal act of money laundering is committed by any person who performs the conversion or transfer of money or other property with the knowledge that they were acquired through criminal activity, with the intent to conceal or misrepresent the origin of money or other property, or who acquires, holds or uses money or other property with knowledge, at the time of their admission, that they were acquired through criminal activity, or who conceals or misrepresents the facts about the nature, origin, place of deposit, movement, disposition or ownership of money or other property, knowing that they were acquired through criminal activity.

Money laundering, according to the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, includes:

1. Conversion or other transfer of money or other property acquired through criminal activity;
2. Acquisition, possession or use of money or other property acquired through criminal activity;

3. Concealing the nature, origin, place of deposit, movement, disposition, ownership or rights over money or other property acquired through criminal activity.

Money laundering can be divided into three basic stages: investment, stratification and integration, while it is important to note that in practice these stages are very difficult to observe and differentiate. During the first stage, the money, which is acquired through criminal activity, is introduced in the financial system. Afterwards, after the investment of cash, the stage of concealment is underway, when, by transferring to different accounts, an attempt is made to conceal the source of funds and their owner. At the same time, an attempt is made to conceal the link between the money and criminal activity from which the money originated. In the third stage, or the integration stage, the money is invested in legitimate businesses, or investments are made, so that it is considered to be acquired in a lawful manner.

Looking at these stages, in the fight against money laundering, the most can be done at the stage of investment, in which the institutions that take deposits are especially jeopardized. The European Community adopted regulations requiring the identification of the party that opens the account and makes payments, the obligatory keeping of appropriate records of deposits, and the notification of the competent authorities of suspicious financial transactions.

#### 4.1. **Terrorist financing**

Terrorist financing, according to the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist financing, refers to providing or collecting, or an attempt of providing or collecting money or other property, directly or indirectly, with the goal or the knowledge that they will be used, as a whole or partially, for carrying out a terrorist act or used by terrorists or terrorist organizations, as well as inciting or assisting in providing or collecting funds or property.

Terrorist financing has several stages, namely: raising funds from legitimate businesses, storage and transfer of funds. In the first stage, funds are gathered from legitimate business companies, which are linked to terrorist organizations or individuals. In the next stages, the funds gathered are stored in different ways and transferred to terrorist organizations or individuals, for the purpose of implementing terrorist activities.

#### 4.2. Analysis of the situation

On its way towards improving the legislative framework and accepting international standards in the fields of prevention and suppression of money laundering and terrorist financing, the starting point for Montenegro will be the exchange of existing experiences and information on the types and ways of sharing intelligence information of relevant institutions of the countries of the region. Bearing in mind that these phenomena exceed national borders, the countries of the region took a unique position that financial intelligence services shall be the proponents of the development of systems for the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. In this regard, the financial intelligence services will, among other things, constantly work, through the media, on raising awareness of the professional and general public on the establishment of an effective system for the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

The Ministry of Finance issued the Rulebook on the guidelines for risk analysis in order to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, on the basis of which the authorities who supervise the implementation of the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist financing establish guidelines for risk analysis. In accordance with established guidelines, the obligated parties prepare the internal regulation on risk analysis.

The Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist FINANCING from 2007 was brought in line with relevant international standards. The Law provides for a list of obligated parties who are required to submit, to the Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism, reports on any cash transaction in the amount of EUR 15.000 or more, at the latest within three days from the date of the transaction, as well as on any transaction (regardless of the amount and type) for which there is suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, before the transaction itself is processed. The largest number of reports on suspicious transactions is submitted to the Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism by banks. The Customs Administration also submits information on any cross-border transfer of cash, checks, bearer securities, precious metals and stones, the value of which is EUR 10.000 or more, as well as information on the transfer or attempted transfer of money, checks, etc., with a value or an amount less than EUR 10.000, if in relation to the specific person, there are reasons to suspect money laundering or terrorist financing. The Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism can order a temporary (up to 72 hours) suspension of a transaction, if it assesses that there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, notifying the competent authorities to take measures within their competence. The law defines the authorities who supervise the implementation of this Law in relation to different categories of obligated parties.

In practice, cases of money laundering are mainly based on: drugs and arms trafficking, corruption, abuse of an official position and abuse of authorizations in economy, fraud, counterfeiting documents, tax fraud, etc., as well as predicate criminal acts.

Potential threats in the field of money laundering can be: the creation of fictitious companies; investments in the construction industry; investments in real estate; investments in the privatization process.

In the MONEYVAL report on the third round of a detailed assessment of Montenegro in the field of money laundering and terrorist financing, the compliance with international standards was evaluated and out of 49 FATF recommendations, Montenegro has brought in line its system of prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing with 41 recommendations or - 83.67% (some 12% or 6 recommendations were not harmonized and 2 recommendations, or about 4% are not applicable). In March 2010, in the Council of Europe, a Progress Report for Montenegro in the field of money laundering and terrorist financing for last year was adopted.

#### 4.2.1. **National legal framework**

Given that money laundering is a criminal activity with a high degree of social danger, and that this criminal act is very difficult to detect and prove, the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing also includes strengthening administrative, technical, personnel and material conditions for work of the institutions for fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Montenegro is making great efforts to create appropriate legal requirements and to strengthen the institutions involved in the system for prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. These institutions are: the judiciary and prosecutor's office, Police Directorate, Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism, Agency for National Security, Customs Administration, Tax Administration.

Jurisdiction, competences and actions of the above-mentioned state authorities participating in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing are regulated by several laws related to this criminal- law field:

Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Official Gazette of Montenegro 14/07 and 4/08); Criminal Code (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 70/03, 47/06 and Official Gazette of Montenegro 40/08, 25/10); Criminal Procedure Code (Official Gazette of Montenegro 57/09 and 49/10); Law on Banks (Official Gazette of Montenegro 17/08, 44/10); Customs

Law (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 7/2002, 38/2002, 72/2002, 21/2003, 29/2005, 66/2006 and Official Gazette of Montenegro 21/2008); Law on Insurance (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 78/06 and Official Gazette of Montenegro 19/07, 53/09); Law on Voluntary Pension Funds (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 78/06 and 14/07); Law on Financial Leasing (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 81/05); Law on Games of Chance (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 52/04 and Official Gazette of Montenegro 13/07); Law on Securities (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 59/00, 10/01, 43/10, 28/06 and 53/09); Law on Investment Funds (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 49/04); Law on Education in Judicial Bodies (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 27/06); Law on Accounting and Auditing (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 69/05 and Official Gazette of Montenegro 80/08); Law on Payment System (Official Gazette of Montenegro 61/08); Law on State Audit Institution (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 28/04, 27/06, 78/06 and Official Gazette of Montenegro 17/07); Law on the Central Bank of Montenegro (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 52/00, 53/00, 47/01 and Official Gazette of Montenegro 40/10 and 46/10); Law on International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Official Gazette of Montenegro 4/08); Law on Managing Seized and Confiscated Assets (Official Gazette of Montenegro 49/08); Law on Criminal Liability of Legal Persons (Official Gazette of Montenegro 2/07); Law on the State Property (Official Gazette of Montenegro 21/09).

A series of by-laws were adopted which were passed under the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Law on Banks and the Law on International Current and Capital Transactions: Rulebook on the indicators for identifying suspicious customers and transactions (Official Gazette of Montenegro 69/09); Rulebook on drafting guidelines for risk analysis in order to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing (Official Gazette of Montenegro 20/09); Rulebook on the manner of submission of data on cash transactions valued at 15.000 euro or more and suspicious transactions to the Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism (Official Gazette of Montenegro 79/08); Rulebook on the manner of work of authorized persons, manner of implementation of internal control, data storage and protection, manner of keeping records and training of employees (Official Gazette of Montenegro 80/08); Decision on the banking ombudsman (Official Gazette of Montenegro 15/09); Decision on the amount of cash that can be brought in and out of the Republic of Montenegro without reporting (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 58/05); Decision on records of accounts for performing international payment transactions (Official Gazette of Montenegro 09/24); Decision on internal audit in banks (Official Gazette of Montenegro 60/2008); Decision on minimum standards for managing interest rate risk, which does not derive from commercial activities of the bank (Official Gazette of Montenegro 60/2008); Decision on minimum standards for managing liquidity risk in banks (Official Ga-

zette of Montenegro 60/2008); Decision on the basis of the internal control system in banks (Official Gazette of Montenegro 60/2008); Decision on minimum standards for market risks management in banks (Official Gazette of Montenegro 60/2008); Decision on minimum standards of bank operations with entities related to the bank (Official Gazette of Montenegro 60/2008); Decision on records of accounts for performing international payment transactions (Official Gazette of Montenegro 24/2009); Decision on the minimum elements of credit and debit orders (Official Gazette of Montenegro 24/2009 and 41/2009); Decision on conditions and manner of performing certain tasks in carrying out transfers of funds by an agent (Official Gazette of Montenegro 24/2009); Decision on the manner of exercising payment systems control (Official Gazette of Montenegro (24/2009); Decision on minimum standards for risk management in micro-lending financial institutions (Official Gazette of Montenegro 24/2009 and 41/2009); Decision on methods for making consolidated financial statements of banking groups (Official Gazette of Montenegro 24/2009); Decision on minimum standards for operational risk management in banks (Official Gazette of Montenegro 24/2009).

New regulations in the Criminal Code, in accordance with MONEYVAL recommendations and regulations laid down, inter alia, in the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with Protocols thereto (Palermo Convention) and the United Nations Convention on the Unlawful Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention) amended the definition of the crime of money laundering referred to in Article 268. The new definition in the Criminal Code abolished earlier restriction of the crime of money laundering as operations which covered "banking, financial and other business operations". The definition includes every aspect of exchange (conversion) and transmission, as well as acquisition, possession and use of money or other assets acquired through crime. Concealment and misrepresentation of facts concerning the nature, origin, place of deposit, movement, ownership or disposition of money or other property obtained by crime were also criminalized.

Amendments to the Criminal Code in Article 449 revised the definition of act of terrorist financing, which includes activities that contribute to the financing of terrorism and which are not strictly raising money and securities. The definition includes provision of funds or property for the purposes of terrorist financing. The terms "funds" and "property" are interpreted broadly in line with ratified international conventions.

The new definition of terrorism financing lays down imprisonment sentences ranging from one to ten years for anyone who in any way provides or collects money, securities, other assets or property which is intended to be wholly or partly used for financing criminal acts referred to in Art. 447 (terrorism), 447a (public calls to commit acts terrorism), 447b (recruitment and training

for terrorist acts), 447c (use of a lethal device), 447d (destroying and damaging a nuclear facility) and 448 (threatening an internationally protected person) of the Criminal Code or for financing either organizations that aim to carry out such crimes, or members of such organizations.

Montenegro has ratified the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Official Gazette of the FRY – International Treaties 7/02), as well as the Palermo Convention and the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (Warsaw Convention). Bearing in mind the hierarchy of normative acts stipulated by the Constitution, the terms “funds”, “property”, “confiscation”, “seizure”, “predicate offense” and other defined in that Convention are an integral part of our law and order and are applicable in case law.

Measures to detect and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing are undertaken by obligated parties before and during all activities of receiving, investing, exchanging, storing or other disposition of money or other property, other transactions in accordance with this Law and regulations adopted pursuant to this Law, and during all transactions for which there are grounds to suspect that they are of money laundering and terrorist financing nature.

Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing has been harmonized with the requirements of international organizations and institutions and relevant regulations on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, as follows:

1. Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering;
2. Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council;
3. Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing;
4. FATF (40 +8 +1) Recommendations;
5. UN Convention against Corruption.

#### 4.2.2. **International legal framework**

Montenegro contributes to suppressing money laundering and terrorist financing at the regional and global levels by fulfilling the obligations arising from membership in international organizations, as well as via intensive cooperation with the competent authorities of other countries

through exchange of information. As a member of the United Nations, Montenegro implements measures pursuant to UNSC Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004) and 1373 (2001).

Montenegro is a member of the Egmont Group (world association of financial intelligence units), a full member of MONEVAL, and in June 2010 Montenegro was admitted as a member of the Eurasian Group (EAG), with the status of observer.

The list of international legal instruments ratified by Montenegro and the list of bilateral treaties on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing are given in Annexes I and II.

#### 4.2.3. Institutional framework

The competent national authorities, parties subject to the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and other natural and legal persons are engaged in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

The Division for suppressing organized crime, corruption, terrorism and war crimes was established within the **Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office**. The Special Prosecutor is a coordinator in resolving issues related to money laundering and setting up cooperation with relevant national and international institutions.

Specialized divisions for trials in cases of organised crime, corruption, terrorism and war crimes were established in **High Court in Podgorica and High Court in Bijelo Polje**. Trials for money laundering and terrorist financing are under the jurisdiction of these specialized divisions. Specialized divisions, which administer justice in cases related to crimes of money laundering and terrorist financing, have trained personnel and they are equipped to work effectively.

From an organizational point of view, the **Police Directorate** is divided into several departments. As regards fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, the most important is the Criminal Police Department, parts of which are the Division for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption and the Division for Combating Economic Crimes.

According to the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, **Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism** performs administrative functions related to detecting and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, as



laid down in law and other regulations. Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism was organized as a financial and intelligence administrative type unit, whose work is supervised by the Ministry of Finance. The Administration is responsible for tasks related to detecting and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, related to collecting, analyzing and disseminating to the competent bodies data, information and documentation necessary for the detection of money laundering and terrorist financing.

**Tax Administration** performs tasks related to: initiating and conducting first instance misdemeanor proceedings and imposing penalties and protective measures for tax violations and preventing and detecting crimes and corporate offences in misdemeanor procedure.

**Customs Administration** carries out: customs supervision; clearance of goods; control of goods whose import or export are specially regulated; foreign exchange control in international travel and cross-border traffic with foreign countries; prevention and detection of customs violations and conducting administrative and first instance misdemeanor procedures; prevention and detection of crimes and corporate offences in customs procedures; preventing and detecting foreign exchange related violations in international travel and cross-border traffic; processing and monitoring statistical data on imports and exports, as well as other duties placed under its competence.

#### **Supervision over the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing is carried out by:**

**Ministry of Finance**, which monitors the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in cases of audit companies, independent regime and legal relations of natural persons engaged in accounting and tax consulting services.

Through an authorised official and in accordance with the law governing inspection control, **Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism** carries out inspection control over the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in: humanitarian, nongovernmental and other nonprofit organizations and business associations, legal persons, entrepreneurs and natural persons engaged in the activity or activities of: buying and selling receivables; factoring; asset management for third parties; issuing payment and credit cards and carrying out transactions with those cards; financial leasing; organizing travels; trade in real estate; trade in motor vehicles; trade in vessels and aircraft; storage in safes; issuing guarantees and other warranties; lending and loan brokering; lending and mediation in contracting lending; brokerage or representation in life insurance; insurance;

organizing and conducting auctions, trade in works of art, precious metals and precious stones and articles made from precious metals and stones, and other goods, if payment is in cash in the amount of 15,000 euro or more, in one or a number of related transactions.

In accordance with the Law on the Central Bank of Montenegro, among other things, **Central Bank of Montenegro** monitors the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in banks, branches of foreign banks, other financial organizations, organizations engaged in payment transactions, savings banks, saving-banks, exchange offices and companies for the issuance of electronic money.

**Securities Commission**, among others, performs supervision over the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, in: investment funds management companies and branch offices of foreign companies for managing investment funds, pension funds management companies and branch offices of foreign companies for managing pension funds, as well as stockbrokers and branch offices of foreign stockbrokers.

In accordance with the Law on Electronic Communications, among others, **Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services** performs supervision over the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing by the national postal service.

**Insurance Supervision Agency** monitors the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in insurance companies and branch offices of foreign insurance companies engaged in life insurance activities.

**Administration for Games of Chance** supervises the implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing on the part of organizers of classical and special games of chance.

In addition to these bodies and institutions, the Banking Association of Montenegro, Institute of Accountants and Auditors, etc. also deal with issues of money laundering.

### 4.3. **Strategic response of Montenegro to the threat of money laundering and terrorist financing**

Montenegro has made significant progress, especially in terms of creation of legal and institutional measures for suppressing the crimes of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Owing to the adoption of the Criminal Procedure Code (Official Gazette of Montenegro 57/09 and 49/10), secret surveillance measures can be applied in relation to a higher number of crimes compared to the past, and such offences are enumerated so as to include, inter alia, corruption crimes (money laundering, causing false bankruptcy, abuse of evaluation of assets, passive bribery, active bribery, disclosure of an official secret, trading in influence, abuse of authority in economy, abuse of an official position and fraud in the conduct of an official duty). In fact, under the previous Code, it was not possible to apply secret surveillance measures for certain criminal offenses, which would be more difficult to prove without the application of these measures. The application of measures of secret surveillance is provided for criminal acts against the security of computer data that are difficult to prove and complicated to detect precisely due to the use of sophisticated computer technology, which will further contribute to a more efficient fight against organized crime, terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing.

By-laws necessary to implement the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing were adopted. Rules and procedures were established for reporting transactions executed in cash amounting to 15.000 euro and above, as well as for reporting suspicious transactions to the Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism, which also relates to rules for organizing records and manner of keeping them, professional development of staff and performance of internal control within entities obliged to report to the Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism. Rulebook on the development of risk analysis in order to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing was drawn up in March 2009, as well as Rulebook revising the list of indicators for identifying suspicious customers and transactions. Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism has databases of suspicious transactions and cash transactions higher than the statutory limit. Management has made the purchase of an important analytical tool (IBASE), which will allow for better national and international cooperation and data exchange with other law enforcement authorities.

It is necessary to further improve the legal, institutional, personnel, administrative, material and technical capacities of the competent authorities in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, in accordance with new threats and challenges.

#### **4.4. The goals of fight against money laundering and terrorist financing**

are implemented via:

- ▶ improvement of normative and legal framework;
- ▶ developed human resources, administrative, material and technical capacities;
- ▶ improved institutional cooperation aimed at effective exchange of information;
- ▶ improved international cooperation;
- ▶ established centralized information system between the competent authorities;
- ▶ conducted new programs, trainings and specializations;
- ▶ applied MONEYVAL recommendations;
- ▶ prepared and adopted risk analysis.

#### **5. Conclusion**

Adoption of the Strategy is one of the key conditions for more effective prevention and suppression of socially dangerous phenomena of terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing and represents a response to new challenges and threats to stability and peace in the country.

Implementation of the Strategy involves coordinated action by all actors involved in combating terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing. National Commission for the implementation of the Strategy for the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing will carry out control of the implementation of this Strategy in the period 2010-2012, during which the Action Plan will be implemented.

Objectives, specific activities of all the authorities competent for implementation of the Strategy and time- frame for implementation of objectives and measures envisaged in the Strategy will be laid down in the 2010-2012 Action Plan.

## Annex I

### United Nations conventions:

- ▶ United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with Protocols thereto (Official Gazette of FRY 6/2001) assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention), (Official Gazette of SFRY - International Treaties 14/90), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Official Gazette of SFRY - International Treaties 47/70), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Official Gazette of SFRY - International Treaties 09/84), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Official Gazette of FRY - International Treaties 02/02 and Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro 18/05), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Official Gazette of FRY 07/02), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Official Gazette of FRY 12/02), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ UN Convention against Corruption (Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro - International Treaties 11/05), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ International Convention for the Prevention of Acts of International Terrorism (Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro - International Treaties 06/02), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro - International Treaties 2/2006), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Official Gazette of SFRY - International Treaties 14/89); assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro - International Treaties 11/05), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ *Montenegro ratified*

- ▶ *Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Official Gazette of Montenegro 11/07)*
- ▶ *Convention on Cluster Munitions (Official Gazette of Montenegro, International Treaties 4/09)*

### **Council of Europe conventions:**

- ▶ Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Official Gazette of FRY 01/92), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ European Convention on Extradition, with Additional Protocols thereto (Official Gazette of FRY 10/01), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons with Additional Protocol thereto (Official Gazette of FRY 01/04), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Official Gazette of FRY 10/01), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (Official Gazette of FRY 10/01), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters with Additional Protocol thereto (Official Gazette of FRY 10/01 and Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro - International Treaties 2/06), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments with Annexes thereto (Official Gazette of SFRY - International Treaties 13/02 and 02/06), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006
- ▶ Agreement on Cooperation to Prevent and Combat Trans-border Crime (Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro - International Treaties 05/03), assumed by succession, entered into force on 03/06/2006

### **Montenegro has ratified the following Council of Europe conventions and protocols:**

- ▶ Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Official Gazette of Montenegro - International Treaties 1/08)
- ▶ Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (Official Gazette of Montenegro, International Treaties 4/08)
- ▶ Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (Official Gazette of Montenegro, International Treaties 5/08)

- ▶ Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (Official Gazette of Montenegro, International Treaties 5/08)
- ▶ Convention on Cybercrime (Official Gazette of Montenegro, International Treaties 4/09)
- ▶ Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems (Official Gazette of Montenegro, International Treaties 4/09)
- ▶ Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Official Gazette of Montenegro, International Treaties 5/08)
- ▶ Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe (Official Gazette of Montenegro 1/08)
- ▶ Agreement on Strategic Cooperation between Montenegro and the European Police Office (Official Gazette of Montenegro, International Treaties 2/09).

## Annex II

### List of bilateral treaties on cooperation in the fight against organized crime Treaties signed by the Government of Montenegro

- ▶ Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the Republic of Montenegro on Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illicit Traffic in Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors, Illegal Migration and Other Criminal Offences (2005);
- ▶ Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Government of Montenegro on Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism, Organized Crime, Trafficking and Other Illegal Activities (2003);
- ▶ Agreement between the Government of Montenegro and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on Police Cooperation (2007);
- ▶ Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of Montenegro on Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime, People Trafficking and Illegal Migration, Trafficking in Illegal Drugs and Precursors, Terrorism and Other Forms of Crime (2006);
- ▶ Agreement between the Government of Montenegro and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism, Organized Crime, Trafficking in Drugs, Psychosomatic Substances and Precursors, Illegal Migration and Other Criminal Acts (2007);
- ▶ Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Montenegro and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illegal Trafficking in Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors, Illegal Migration, and Other Crimes (2003);

- ▶ Memorandum of Understanding on Police Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Montenegro and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (2003).

### **Agreements signed by Mol&PA / Police Directorate**

- ▶ Agreement between the Mol of Montenegro and the Mol of the Republic of Croatia on Police Cooperation (2005);
- ▶ Agreement between the Mol of Montenegro and Federal Mol of the Republic of Austria on Police Cooperation (2004);
- ▶ Protocol on Police Cooperation between the Ministry of Interior of Montenegro and the Ministry of Interior of Romania (2006);
- ▶ Protocol between the Mol of Montenegro and the Mol of the Republic of Serbia on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illegal Trafficking in Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors, Trafficking in Human Beings, Illegal Migration and Other Criminal Acts, as Well as on Cooperation in Other Areas under Their Competences (2003);
- ▶ Agreement on Cooperation between the Ministry of Interior of Montenegro and the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation from 2008.

## **THE FIELD OF PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING**

### **Agreements signed by the AfPMLaFT**

- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU Serbia, 16/04/2004,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU Albania, 16/04/2004,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU B&H, 19/04/2005,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU Macedonia, 29/10/2004,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIC - Financial Information Centre UNMIK – Kosovo, 07/12/2004,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU Slovenia, 28/12/2004,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU Croatia, 24/03/2005,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU Bulgaria, 11/04/2006,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU Portugal, 11/06/2007,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU Russia, 07/09/2007,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU Poland, 15/11/2007,



- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with FIU Romania, 10/10/2008,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network - FinCEN, 22/10/2008,
- ▶ Agreement on Cooperation with the FIC of EULEX Mission in Kosovo, 20/02/2009,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with the State Committee for Financial Supervision of Ukraine, 27/05/2009,
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Cooperation with the Unit for Preventing Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases - FIU of the United Arab Emirates, 06/07/2009,
- ▶ Regional Protocol on Combating Money Laundering in Order to Promote Regional Cooperation, was signed by representatives of FIUs of Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Slovenia, Croatia, B&H at the II Regional Conference of Financial Intelligence Units, in April 2008.

## CUSTOMS COOPERATION

- ▶ Agreement between the Government of the SFRY and the Government of the Polish People's Republic on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters (signed on 9 May 1967 in Warsaw),
- ▶ Agreement on Administrative Assistance in Preventing, Detecting and Combating Customs Offenses between the Government of the SFRY and the Government of the Republic of France (signed on 28 April 1971 in Belgrade),
- ▶ Treaty between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Federal Government of the Republic of Germany on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Prevention, Investigation and Suppressing Violations of Customs Regulations (signed on 2 April 1974, in Bonn),
- ▶ Agreement between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Austria on Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters in Suppressing Violations of Customs Regulations (signed on 15 March 1978, in Belgrade),
- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Parliament and the Government of the Republic of Greece on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters (signed on 4 October 1983, in Athens),
- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Executive Council of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Parliament and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Customs Matters (signed on 23 January 1989, in Belgrade),
- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the USA Government on Mutual Assistance between their Customs Administrations (signed on 11 April 1990, in Belgrade),

- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of Customs Services (signed on 6 November 1996, in Moscow),
- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (signed on 4 September 1996, in Skopje),
- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (signed on 4 June 1997, in Belgrade),
- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Czech Republic on Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters (signed on 9 September 1998 in Belgrade),
- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of Romania on Customs Cooperation and Administrative Assistance in Preventing, Investigations and Suppression of Customs Offences (signed on 14 January 1998, in Belgrade),
- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of Republic of Hungary on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters (signed on 24 September 1998, in Belgrade),
- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Slovakia on Customs Cooperation (signed on 28 March 2001, in Belgrade),
- ▶ Agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (signed on 18 December 2001 in Sarajevo),
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Italy in Prevention, Investigating and Suppression of Customs Offences (signed on 10 November 1965, in Belgrade),
- ▶ Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance between the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Turkey in Prevention, Investigating and Suppression of Customs Offences (signed on 6 February 2002, in Istanbul),
- ▶ Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Montenegro and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters (signed on 9 December 2005, in Podgorica),
- ▶ Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Montenegro and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters (signed on 26 December 2005, in Tirana),

- ▶ Agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the Republic of Montenegro on Mutual Assistance and Cooperation in Customs Matters (signed on 1 June 2005, in Teheran),
- ▶ Memorandum of Understanding between the Customs Administration of Montenegro and the Customs Service of United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters (signed on 19 November 2004 in Podgorica),
- ▶ Customs Administration exercises cooperation pursuant Annex 5 on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters of the Agreement to Amend and Enlarge the Central European Free Trade Agreement –
- ▶ CEFTA 2006. CEFTA signatories which exercise cooperation pursuant to the afore-mentioned Annex are: Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Republic of Serbia and UNMIK /Kosovo. This Agreement represents amendment to the agreements on mutual assistance in customs matters, which may be or have already been concluded between the CEFTA signatories.

#### **Agreements signed by the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office**

- ▶ Cooperation Agreement between the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office of Montenegro and the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Croatia on the Fight against Organized Crime
- ▶ Cooperation Agreement between the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office of Montenegro and the Public Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- ▶ Cooperation Agreement between the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office of Montenegro and the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Serbia,
- ▶ Cooperation Agreement between the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office of Montenegro and the Public Prosecutor's Office for War Crimes of the Republic of Serbia,
- ▶ Cooperation Agreement between the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office of Montenegro and EULEX Office - Special Public Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Kosovo,
- ▶ Cooperation Agreement between the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office of Montenegro and the General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Albania,
- ▶ Cooperation Agreement between the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office of Montenegro and the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine.

---

## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

### Official Documents and Reports

"IC's Worldwide Threat Assessment Opening Statement," remarks as delivered by The Honorable James R. Clapper Director of National Intelligence Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, February 9, 2016.

Archick, Kristin, et al., *European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessments, Responses, and Issues for the United States*, No. 7-5700. Washington, DC: US Congressional Research Service, 2015.

Europol Public Information, *Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State terrorist attacks*, The Hague, January 18, 2016.

National Security Division, "Assistant Attorney General John P. Carlin Delivers Remarks at the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law's Event on More Effective Responses to the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Threat," Department of Justice, September 28, 2015.

United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 15 December 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council," No. S/2015/975, December 29, 2015.

United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat*, January 29, 2016.

United Nations Security Council, *Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) by States Affected by Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Second Report*, No. S/2015/683, September 2, 2015.

United Nations, *Analysis and Recommendations with Regard to the Global Threat from Foreign Terrorist Fighters (Report prepared by the 1267 Committee)*, No. S/2015/358, May 19, 2015.

Weenink, A. W., "Behavioral Problems and Disorders among Radicals in Police Files," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 2 (2015).

### Research Studies and Academic Papers

Ahmed R. and Daniela Pisoiu, *Foreign fighters: An overview of existing research and a comparative study of British and German foreign fighters*, The Centre for European Peace and Security Studies (ZEUS), Working Paper, no. 8, December 2014.

Arasli, J. A., *Archipelago SYRAQ – Jihadist Foreign Fighters from A to Z: 200 Essential Facts You Need to Know about Jihadist Expeditionary Warfare in the Middle East*. Baku: Teknur, 2015.

Atwan, A.B., *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*. University of California Press, 2015.

Azinovic, V., *Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Nexus with Islamist Extremism*, AI-DPC BiH Security Risk Analysis, Policy Note, no. 5, Sarajevo, November 2015.

*Balkan Jihadists: The Radicalisation and Recruitment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq*. Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, March 2016.

Bergen, P., C. Schuster, and D. Sterman, "ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism," *New America*, November 2015.

Berger, J. M., *Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption*, ICCT Research Paper, May 2016.

Bloom, M., John Horgan and Charlie Winter, "Depictions of Children And Youth In The Islamic State's Martyrdom Propaganda, 2015-2016," CTC Sentinel, 18 February 2016.

Coolsaet, R., *What Drives Europeans to Syria, And to IS? Insights from The Belgian Case*, Egmont Paper, no. 75, Royal Institute for International Affairs, March 2015.

"Exporting Jihad: Foreign Fighters from the North Caucasus and Central Asia and the Syrian Civil War," Chatham House, Russia and Eurasia Programme, September 23, 2015.

The Soufan Group, "Foreign Fighters: An Update," *TSG IntelBrief*, December 7, 2015.

Francis, M. and E. Barrett, *Terrorists' Use Of Messaging Applications*, Center for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, March 3, 2016.

Gates S. and S. Podder, "Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 4, 2015.

Hafez, M. M., "The Ties That Bind: How Terrorists Exploit Family Bonds," CTC Sentinel, February 19, 2016.

Hegghammer, T. and P. Nesser, "Assessing the Islamic State's Commitment to Attacking the West," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 4, 2015.

Haslam, S. and Stephen D. Reicher, "Fueling Terror: How Extremists Are Made," *Scientific American*, March 25, 2015.

Holman, T., "The French Jihadists 'Foreign Fighters' Legion in Syria and Iraq," Jamestown Foundation, *Terrorism Monitor* 13, no. 15, 2015.

Horgan, J., "A call to arms: The need for more psychological research on terrorism," *Social Psychological Review* 18, no. 1, Spring 2016.

Jung, D., *The Search for Meaning in War: Foreign Fighters in a Comparative Perspective*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers, February 2016.

Lister, C., "Evolution of an Insurgency: How Syria Was Radicalized," *Foreign Affairs*, March 14, 2016.

Neumann, P. R., "Foreign Fight Total in Syria Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s," ICSR, January 26, 2015.

Neumann, P. R., *Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors*, ICSR, 2015.

- Olidort, J., "The Game Theory of Terrorism: How ISIS Radicalizes Others," *Foreign Affairs*, December 10, 2015.
- Pecastaing, C., "The Absurdity of ISIS," *Foreign Affairs*, March 26, 2016.
- Roy, O. *What Is the Driving Force Behind Jihadist Terrorism? A Scientific Perspective on the Causes/Circumstances of Joining the Scene*, BKA Autumn Conference, November 18-19, 2015.
- Saltman E. M. and Melanie Smith, *'Till Martyrdom Do Us Part' Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon*, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015.
- Schmid, A. P. and J. Tinnes, "Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspective," *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague* 6, no. 8, 2015.
- Simcox, R., "ISIS' Next Target," *Foreign Affairs*, March 23, 2016.
- Spahiu, E., "Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters and the Islamic State," *Terrorism Monitor* 13, no. 10, May 15, 2015.
- Speckhard, A., *Bride of ISIS: One Young Woman's Path into Homegrown Terrorism*. McLean, VA: Advances Press, 2015
- Speckhard A. and Ahmet S. Yayla, "Eyewitness Accounts from Recent Defectors from Islamic State: Why They Joined, What They Saw, Why They Quit," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 6, 2015.
- Shtuni, A., "Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters In Iraq And Syria," CTC Sentinel, April 30 2015.
- Van Ginkel, B. and E. Entenmann, eds., *The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles, Threats & Policies*, International Center for Counter-Terrorism Research Paper, April 2016.
- Winter, C., *The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy*, Quilliam, 2015.
- The Soufan Group, "The Islamic State's Foreign Fighters Exposed," *TSG IntelBrief*, March 11, 2016.
- Vidino, L and S. Hughes., *ISIL in America: From Retweets to Raqqa*, Program on Extremism, George Washington University, December 2015.
- Zelin, A.Y., *The Islamic State's Territorial Methodology*, Research Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, No. 29 January 2016.

## Media Reports and Blogs

- "13-jarige Duitser Wilde naar IS," *Telegraaf*, July 29, 2015.
- "A disarming approach," *The Economist*, April 2, 2016.
- "Leaked ISIS documents reveal recruits' blood types, obedience levels," *CNN*, March 10, 2016.
- "The Number of Children Dying for ISIS is Rising," *PBS Frontline*, March 1, 2016.
- "Who are Germany's Islamists?" *Deutsche Welle*, September 24, 2015.
- "Hundreds of Tunisian women join jihadists in Syria: Minister," *Agence France-Presse*, December 5, 2015.

Adam, K., "Report: Western Women Are Attracted to Islamic State for Complex Reasons," *Washington Post*, May 28, 2015.

Apuzzo, M., "Who Will Become a Terrorist? Research Yields Few Clues," *New York Times*, March 27, 2016.

Berger, J. M., "ISIS and the Big Three," *Hate Speech International blog*, April 2, 2016.

Burke, J., "How the changing media is changing terrorism," *The Guardian*, February 25, 2016.

Burnham, M., "The Arbitrary Distinction Between Terrorism And Mass Shootings," *Ramen IR blog*, December 24, 2015.

Cuthbertson, A., "Isis Telegram channel doubles followers to 9,000 in less than 1 week," *Yahoo News*, October 12, 2015.

De Freytas-Tamura, K., "ISIS Defectors Reveal Disillusionment," *New York Times*, September 20, 2015.

Dodd, V., "Police study links radicalisation to mental health problems," *The Guardian*, May 20, 2016.

Gall, C., "How Kosovo Was Turned Into Fertile Ground for ISIS," *New York Times*, May 21, 2016.

Giambone, A., "How to Spot a Jihadist," *The Atlantic*, January 20, 2015.

Gude H. and W. Wiedmann-Schmidt, "Back from the 'Caliphate': Returnee Says IS Recruiting for Terror Attacks in Germany," *Der Spiegel*, December 16, 2015

Harras, A., "Ko su Kosovari koji se bore u Siriji?" *Al Jazeera Balkans*, February 13, 2016.

Kan, P., "This Is Your Jihad On Drugs," *War on the Rocks blog*, March 7, 2016.

Muir, J., "Islamic State group: The full story," *BBC News*, March 11, 2016.

Nemr, C., "Strategies to Counter Terrorist Narratives Are More Confused Than Ever," *War on the Rocks blog*, March 15, 2016.

Paul, A., "Foreign Fighters from the Caucasus," *NRT News*, July 21, 2015.

Ragan, S., "After Paris, ISIS moves propaganda machine to Darknet," *CSO Online*, November 15, 2015.

Stern, J., "What Does ISIS Really Want Now?" *Lawfare blog*, November 28, 2015.

Winter, C., "Totalitarianism 101: The Islamic State's Offline Propaganda Strategy," *Lawfare blog*, March 27, 2016.

Wolf, C., "How terrorists exploit family ties to recruit and retain members," *SDPB Radio*, March 23, 2016.

Zelin, A. Y., "The Clear Banner: The Forgotten Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq," *Jihadology blog*, February 2, 2015.

Xharra, A., "Few but Fanatical – the Kosovo Women Who Go Over to ISIS," *Balkan Insight*, January 26, 2016.

## **The New Lure of the Syrian War - The Foreign Fighters' Bosnian Contingent**

<b>Authors</b>	Vlado Azinović and Muhamed Jusić
<b>Editor</b>	Dr Edina Bećirević
<b>Copy Editor</b>	Kimberly Storr
<b>Reviewers</b>	Dr Sead Turčalo Dr Mirza Smajić
<b>Translators</b>	Dijana Jovičić Hadžiahmetović Leila Dizdarević Željka Vojinović Armina Mujanović
<b>DTP</b>	Enes Husejinčehajić
<b>Publisher</b>	Atlantic Initiative, Sarajevo 2016
<b>Print</b>	Amosgraf, Sarajevo
<b>Copies</b>	300



---

CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji  
Nacionalna i univerzitetska biblioteka  
Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo

355.216(497.6):341.317(567+569.1)(047.1)

AZINOVIĆ, Vlado

The new lure of the Syrian war - the  
foreign fighters' Bosnian contingent :  
research project / by Vlado Azinović,  
Muhamed Jusić ; [translators Dijana Jovičić  
Hadžiahmetović ... [et al.]. - Sarajevo :  
Atlantska inicijativa, 2016. - 195 str. : graf.  
prikazi ; 30 cm

Prijevod djela: Novi zov rata u Siriji i  
bosanskohercegovački kontingent stranih  
boraca. - Bibliografija: str. 190-193 ;  
bibliografske druge bilješke uz tekst.

ISBN 978-9958-0320-5-9

1. Jusić, Muhamed

COBISS.BH-ID 23060998

---

